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ABSTRACT 
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are two 
events that scarred America and its people. In the aftermath of the assassination and the terrorist 
attacks, the American public was forced to sift through competing messages existing in the 
public sphere in order to make meaning out of the events. Although the American government, 
within a few days of both events, released who was ultimately responsible (Lee Harvey Oswald 
assassinated President Kennedy and Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were responsible for 9/11), 
the people were still left with coming to terms for why such violence occurred. 
In order to provide a frame from which the American people could view and understand 
the assassination and the terrorist attacks, two blue ribbon commissions were formed: the Warren 
Commission, which investigated the assassination of President Kennedy, and the 9/11 
Commission, which investigated the terrorist attacks. Despite the reports‘ purposes, significant 
segments of the population questioned both Commissions‘ conclusions. In both instances, 
conspiratorial understandings of the events grew after the publication of the reports so that, in the 
case of the Warren Commission, most of the American public believe Oswald did not act alone 
and, in the case of the 9/11 Commission, there is growing belief that the government‘s failure to 
predict and prevent the terrorist attacks was the result of a governmental conspiracy. This 
dissertation seeks to understand why, in our current times, official discourses are unable to 
prevail over conspiracy theories. 
This study proposes to illustrate the power of conspiracy discourse by examining it 
through the lens of official discourses that were designed, in part, to head-off conspiracy beliefs 
before they gained momentum within the American public. Such an inquiry will provide three 
main benefits: it will contribute to a more exacting understanding of the rhetorical power of 
conspiracy arguments in our times; it will provide insight into the relationship between official 
and conspiracy discourses (especially as they now exist); and, such a study has implications for 
determining the current direction of political life. 
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
FRACTIOUS FICTIONS: CONSPIRACY THEORY AND ITS 
EVOLUTIONARY EFFECT ON OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
"It is, I think, an indisputable fact that Americans are, as Americans, the most  
self-conscious people in the world, and the most addicted to the belief that the 
other nations of the earth are in a conspiracy to under value them.” 
—Henry James  
 
Worldwide and Historical Appeal of Conspiracy Thinking 
Conspiracies, or ―the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act, or to do a lawful act 
by unlawful means,‖ have recurred throughout world history and have shaped and influenced 
political thought and action.
1
 Catiline‘s attempt to overthrow the Roman government in 63 BCE 
was chronicled by Cicero and served to influence Roman politics and historical thought. The 
Roman Catholic Church, during the Middle Ages, was involved in the Crusades and the Spanish 
Inquisition, which, as some scholars posit, marked the beginning of a millennium-long 
conspiracy to root out Jews and Muslims in the name of Christianity.
2
 In addition to the 
bloodshed inspired by Christianity, the selling of indulgences and corrupt policies—which were, 
to some degree, designed to expand the power and influence of the Roman Catholic Church 
throughout Europe—were a driving force behind the Protestant Reformation. During the early 
years of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I of England (1570-1586), agents of the Church were 
implicated in at least four assassination attempts against the queen.
3
 There are even those who 
argue that the advent of Christianity was itself a conspiracy.
4
 With several significant historical 
2 
events being the result of conspiracies, it should come as no surprise that theories about 
conspiracies have also informed worldwide political thought and action.  
 Conspiracy theories, or ―the theor[ies] that an event or phenomenon occurs as a result of 
a conspiracy between interested parties,‖ specifically as it pertains to ―belief[s] that some covert 
but influential agency (typically political in motivation and oppressive in intent) is responsible 
for an unexplained event,‖ have similarly influenced political thought and action.5 Fears about a 
secretive group, the Bavarian Illuminati, surfaced in Europe during the late eighteenth century 
and posited that the group was out to control the world.
6
 Similarly, in the late nineteenth century, 
a pamphlet titled the Protocols of the Elders of Zion circulated throughout Europe and detailed a 
secret plot being enacted by Jews to take over the world.
7
 More modern conspiracy theories are 
as varied as Adolph Hitler‘s belief that Jews were the cause of Germany‘s moral decay and the 
widely held belief, rebutted most recently in an official inquest nearly eleven years after her 
tragic accident, that the death of Princess Diana was the result of a secret and concerted plot. 
Though not a peculiarly American phenomenon, the United States has proved a 
hospitable climate for a wide array of conspiracy theories. American historian Bernard Bailyn 
argues that conspiracy beliefs inspired the events leading up to the American Revolution.
8
 
Following the Revolution, the American people engaged in a series of movements denouncing 
certain groups because of beliefs that these groups were attempting to take control of the new 
country. Jedidiah Morse sounded the alarm that the Bavarian Illuminati were attempting to 
infiltrate and control the new nation. Following closely on this fear was the kidnapping and 
murder of a Freemason who was set to expose the secret inner workings of the Masonic Order.
9
 
Religious movements with secretive underpinnings were particularly susceptible to alarmist 
claims. Anti-Mormon and anti-Catholic sentiments were especially virulent during the first half 
3 
of the nineteenth century, and a profound suspicion of secret religious sects continues to exist in 
the American populace.
10
 The slave power conspiracy expressed beliefs that powerful 
slaveholders were trying to subvert and gain control over the North and emerging states.
11
 By the 
twentieth century, suspicions with deep nineteenth-century roots about the Federal Reserve 
System were forwarded by such groups as the Grangers, and the fear of communist infiltration 
prompted the first Red Scare at the close of World War I. The 1940s featured fears that an alien 
other was invading the country in the form of an alleged UFO crash in Roswell, New Mexico.
12
 
The 1950s saw the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy and claims, made by him and by others, that 
communists were again among us.
13
 Other conspiracy theories include beliefs that the 
fluoridation of water is a mind-control plot implemented by the government and that the United 
Nations is attempting to implement a New World Order.
14
 Although hardly an exhaustive list, 
these examples reveal conspiracy thinking to be a perennial feature of American history, 
occasionally significant enough to spur political reaction. 
Cultural conditions in the time since World War II have proved to be a particularly ripe 
breeding ground for the propagation and dissemination of conspiracy theories. In the time since 
World War II, conspiracy theories have changed from pervasive fears that a cabal of alien others 
were attempting to infiltrate and subvert American culture and ideals to, as Peter Knight states, 
―a not entirely unfounded suspicion that the normal order of things itself amounts to a 
conspiracy.‖15 The mutation of conspiracy fears from a single identifiable enemy to a more 
amorphous and harder to define enemy now has conspiracy theories cast as ―a reasonable 
assumption‖ on the part of a large segment of the American population instead of a ―fringe 
belief‖ that is sometimes able to garner popular support and action.16 Technological advances in 
communication, in particular, are credited with turning the conspiracy theory tide. The almost 
4 
unfettered access the American people have to fanzines such as ―Paranoia,‖ which actively 
promote a conspiratorial understanding of current cultural, social, economic, and political 
conditions; media that capitalize on and popularize conspiracy beliefs with television shows and 
films such as the X-Files and Oliver Stone‘s JFK; and the millions of Web pages devoted to 
forwarding beliefs, either in support or denial, of conspiracy claims build off one another, 
reinforcing a conspiratorial interpretation of events in the world.
17
  
This ―culture of conspiracy‖ casts a default suspicion toward institutions of power so that 
when these institutions ―authorize‖ discourses to explain a situation or event, they are lodged, 
sometimes in direct opposition, against the information and various interpretations of the event, 
whether factual or not, existing within the public sphere.
18
 Auditors are faced with an 
overwhelming amount of information from which to choose in order to form their beliefs, and 
this choice frequently rests on the question of whom to believe, the conspiratorial or the official; 
this is a peculiarly contemporary phenomenon. 
Despite their current widespread popularity and belief, conspiracy theories and the 
rhetoric that accompanies them have received only modest attention from historians and even 
less from rhetoricians. What we do understand about conspiracy theories has been deeply 
influenced by psychological perspectives, which identify a political maladjustment in peoples—
usually located on the political, social, and economic fringes—who use conspiracy claims as a 
means to gain notoriety or to force some sort of political action.
19
 For instance, filmmaker Oliver 
Stone‘s release of JFK, and the hype that surrounded it, spurred the National Archives to release 
hundreds of thousands of pages of previously sealed assassination records, and the work of 
Stanton Friedman, and others like him, has prompted the U.S. Air Force to reinvestigate the 
alleged UFO crash in Roswell at least twice.
20
 Rhetoricians confronting conspiracy theories have 
5 
generally engaged in criticism designed to evaluate the theories by mapping the generic, 
argumentative, and narrative dimensions of such arguments.
21
 What is common to both historical 
and rhetorical scholarship is the tendency to examine conspiracy theories as aberrant, 
misinformed, and overly simplistic, although there is a more recent recognition that belief in 
conspiracy is neither as marginal as once imagined, nor as misguided and paranoid as once 
presumed.
22
 
Currently, conspiracy beliefs are a pervasive and powerful mode of thinking and many, 
from the most marginal to the most powerful, people in the country fall victim, at times, to 
conspiracy theory‘s seductive nature. Generally, identifying an argument as a conspiracy theory 
serves as a means of dismissal, setting the ―theory‖ apart from the more reasoned, more 
believable explanations offered by social, economic, and political leaders. There is now 
recognition that a closer affinity than we have previously acknowledged exists between official 
and/or political discourses and their conspiratorial counterparts; in fact, the current relationship 
that exists is more dialogic than once believed.  
Politicians have always had to respond to conspiracy claims when conspiracists were able 
to forward a prima facie case. When such a case is presented it creates a rhetorical exigence
23
 
that forces officials to address the claims, sometimes by passing legislation such as the Alien and 
Sedition Acts and, in other times, by focusing political campaigns on conspiracy fears. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was created specifically to combat the fear of a communist 
invasion following World War I.
24
 In instances where politicians forwarded their own claims of 
conspiracy, as evidenced in discourses such as the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, politicians framed 
fears of conspiracy in ways that dismissed the more ―irrational‖ beliefs as faulty while 
simultaneously forwarding an argument that laid out a more ―reasonable‖ take on the issue at 
6 
hand.
25
 Prior to World War II, once politicians took hold of the issue, or some sort of official 
action was taken to address conspiracy fears, generally the fears faded back to the periphery until 
a different alarm featuring a different enemy was sounded.
26
 Now, however, conspiracy theories 
exist in a persistent battle between their version of reality and ―official‖ or ―authorized‖ 
discourses. 
In our time, the ability of politicians and/or official discourses to maintain argumentative 
presumption when challenged by conspiracy narratives is severely diminished. The general 
skepticism leveled against economic, social, and political institutions and their discourses is, 
according to Knight, ―inseparable from the culture of postmodernism … [and] is very much in 
tune with a postmodern distrust of final narrative solutions.‖27 After all, Americans in large 
numbers ―know,‖ contrary to claims set forth by the Warren Commission Report, that Lee 
Harvey Oswald did not act alone in the assassination of President Kennedy, and although we 
―know‖ Osama bin Laden was the master plotter behind the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a growing 
portion of the population believes that there are significant questions about the attacks that 
remain unanswered, despite the explanations propounded by the 9/11 Commission Report. The 
uncertainty cast upon these two documents—the former embroiled in controversy for over forty 
years, and the latter the subject of increasingly more widespread doubt—indicates that regardless 
of the more ―reasonable‖ explanations for occurrences offered by officials, those officials have 
been unable to forward arguments that quell conspiratorial beliefs about these events despite the 
―definitive‖ and ―final‖ nature of the texts and despite being given almost limitless resources. 
Certainly the sheer force of the authority of the government is insufficient to carry the burden of 
proof. 
7 
What this suggests is that conspiracy theories have enormous power in our contemporary 
world. Conspiracy theories about significant historical, social, and cultural events often enter the 
public sphere prior to the release of an ―official‖ response or interpretation. Official discourses, 
at least in recent years, have been unable to diminish beliefs that conspiracies were behind the 
events; indeed, in cases such as President Kennedy‘s assassination and the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, conspiratorial interpretations of events, although present before publication, continued to 
grow after the publication of the discourses. Central to this dissertation is understanding how 
conspiracy theories manifest their power by shaping official discourses in the conspiracy image, 
an image that allows conspiracy theories to grow after the release of official discourses. 
Official discourse, like all discourse, is called forth by rhetorical exigencies.
28
 Based on 
the situation, those who fashion official discourses are faced with the unenviable task of 
compiling and sifting through overwhelming amounts of evidence, including the depositions and 
testimony of witnesses from the most pedestrian of citizens to the most powerful leaders in the 
country. This is no easy task; not only must the official discourse provide a complete account of 
the events, it is also expected to ease the public‘s fears and to provide a list of suggested 
comprehensive policy changes to keep such a tragic event from happening again. Moreover, the 
discourse must provide a story that competes with counter claims and charges surrounding the 
event, all of which are in circulation in the public sphere before the official discourse is formed. 
If, as I argue, official discourse is designed, in part, to dismiss, contradict, and head off 
conspiracy theories, then the inability for official discourse to prevail over conspiracy theories is 
hampered by the enormous agenda-setting capabilities exhibited by conspiracy theories. 
In essence, conspiracy theories force official discourse into a dialogue wherein official 
discourse not only is incapable of prevailing over conspiracy beliefs, but in countering 
8 
conspiracy claims takes on some of the generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. If 
conspiracy beliefs are powerful enough to force official discourse into a dialogue and are then 
capable of calling into question the veracity and believability of official discourse, then there are 
broad political implications that may be better understood by examining the nexus between 
official and conspiratorial discourses under our contemporary cultural, social, and economic 
conditions. 
 
Categorizing Conspiracy, Conspiracy Theory, and Conspiracists 
Different valences of conspiracy research have emerged within the last few years, providing the 
public with a cornucopia of different synonyms for conspiracies, conspiracy theories, and 
conspiracists. None of these studies share a definition of conspiracy. Conspiracy comes from the 
Latin conspire, meaning to breathe together.
29
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(OED), the word ―conspiracy‖ found its way into the English language in 1386 when Chaucer 
wrote of the conspiracy between Brutus and Cassius against Julius Caesar.
30
 Conspiracy theory, 
however, did not find expression as a term until 1909 in The American History Review.
31
  
The popular use of ―conspiracy theory‖ as a term, however, would not be realized until 
1952 when it was used by Karl Popper to designate ―an explanation of a social phenomenon 
[that] consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of‖ 
conspiracies.
32
 More interesting, however, is the fact that the term ―conspiracy theory‖ was not 
added to the OED until July 1997 when a supplemental issue of the dictionary was released.
33
 As 
Alasdair Spark writes, recognition by the OED is a signal of the growing importance of 
conspiracy theories in the popular imagination, especially as they exist in the United States.
34
 
Even though the history of the term chronicles a growing recognition of the importance 
9 
conspiracy theories play in contemporary society, for the sake of clarity and expediency, it is 
necessary to define other key terms that relate to conspiracies and conspiracy theories. 
 Following the definitions of Jack Bratich and Michael Pfau, ―conspiracism,‖ ―conspiracy 
beliefs,‖ and ―conspiracy fears‖ are the beliefs that conspiracies are ―a driving force in history.‖35 
―Conspiracists‖ and ―conspiracy theorists‖ are those who believe in and conjure conspiracy 
theories.
36
 ―Conspirators‖ are those who are implicated in the conspiracy plot. ―Conspiracy 
discourse‖ is an umbrella term that encapsulates the sum of persuasive texts and the 
―intertextual, ideological, political, and social context[s] within which these texts are produced 
and consumed.‖37 ―Conspiracy narratives‖ and ―conspiracy rhetoric‖ are the narrative/rhetorical 
accounts that posit that two or more people, for their own nefarious benefit, seek to control the 
way an event occurs to the detriment of others.
38
 ―Conspiracy arguments‖ are narrower in focus 
and pertain ―to the logical or rational operations and techniques‖ used to forward conspiracists‘ 
arguments.  
In understanding the effects conspiracy theories have on official discourse, it is necessary 
that all of these terms be employed and interrogated. Official discourse is a part and product of 
the larger discursive arena into which it is born. This arena involves conspirators, conspiracists, 
conspiracy theories, conspiracy discourse, and conspiracy arguments, all of which play a part in 
shaping official discourse. In order to arrive at a thoughtful conclusion about the role conspiracy 
theories play in the shaping of official discourse, it is necessary to be aware of, and sensitive to, 
the above terms and their interrelationship.  
 
 
 
10 
Historical Treatment of Conspiracy Arguments 
Although conspiracy thinking and beliefs permeate world and American history, not much 
scholarly ink was spilled in pursuit of its study until the height of the Cold War, followed by an 
explosion of interest in the 1990s and into the new millennium. For instance, a basic search on 
―conspiracy theory‖ in the ProQuest database lists only eleven theses or dissertations written 
prior to 1990. Since 1990, however, over fifty theses and dissertations have directly dealt with 
the topic of conspiracy theory.
39
 In their studies, historical and cultural scholars have typically 
used a psychological approach to analyze conspiracy beliefs, characterizing conspiratorial belief, 
itself, as a political disease. Virtually all of the existing scholarship aims at discrediting 
conspiracy theories, either by pointing out the inherent problems associated with a conspiracy 
culture, or by debunking the individual theories conspiracists introduce into the public sphere.
40
 
Even those scholars who take a more sympathetic approach, sometimes recognizing that there 
are very good reasons to believe in conspiracies, largely view conspiracy theories as 
problematic.
41
 
No work has been more influential in discrediting conspiracy beliefs than Richard 
Hofstadter‘s ―The Paranoid Style in American Politics.‖42 Hofstadter wrote his invective against 
conspiracy theories in the aftermath of World War II when existentialist and psychological 
approaches to making meaning were not only en vogue in the scholarly community, but also in 
more popular venues such as newspapers and magazines.
43
 The discovery of the horrors 
uncovered after the war that were promoted by extremist ideologies prompted a general hostility 
in the intellectual community directed against any form of extremist thought. The extremist 
views widely followed by significant segments of the population, forwarded by Joseph 
McCarthy in the 1950s and Barry Goldwater, Robert Welch and the John Birch Society in the 
11 
1960s, signaled alarms for the susceptibility of even a more pragmatic culture in the United 
States to fall victim to increasingly extremist and emotional views.
44
 With a general hostility 
directed against extremist views of politics, Hofstadter identified what he termed as ―an old and 
recurrent mode of expression in our public life which has frequently been linked with 
movements of suspicious discontent and whose content remains much the same even when it is 
adopted by men [sic] of distinctly different purposes.‖45 Hofstadter labeled the totalizing and 
apocalyptic expressions to which he was referring as ―the paranoid style,‖ being careful to note 
that, although it was not a clinical pathology, such utterances were indicative of a political 
malaise existing in a minority of political movements. 
The belief that the paranoid style was a political fringe phenomenon was expanded to 
encompass more than the radical right, which was Hofstadter‘s primary concern. Scholars such 
as David Brion Davis, writing within a few years of Hofstadter, noted that virtually all counter-
subversive movements, whether from the political right or left, contained elements of 
Hofstadter‘s paranoid style.46 Today, over forty years later, Hofstadter‘s delineation of a 
―paranoid style‖ continues to be influential in scholarly and popular media. As Bratich observed, 
―Most serious contemporary analysts of conspiracy theories (on various points on the political 
spectrum) cite Hofstadter. In so doing, they use conspiracy theories as paradigmatic of the 
‗paranoid style.‘‖47 Current conceptions of those suffering from the delusions of conspiracy now 
range from the politically disaffected (e.g., African Americans) to the most powerful leaders in 
the country.
48
 There continues to be a default assumption cast against conspiracy theories that 
automatically presumes them to be a type of ―paranoid‖ pathology, sometimes blurring the line 
between the political and clinical pathologies.
49
 
12 
Those who view belief in conspiracy theories as a clinical delusion call to mind crackpots 
who cling to conspiratorial beliefs because of their mental incapacity for determining real from 
fictive causal events. Daniel Pipes compares belief in conspiracy to a ―titillation,‖ or a ―modish 
… taste for puzzles and puzzlement.‖50 Regardless of a ―modish‖ taste for conspiracy, Pipes 
emphasizes that belief in conspiracy is dangerous because it has the capability of becoming the 
way one ―views life itself,‖ where one no longer can distinguish between fact and fiction. Robert 
Robins and Jerrold Post posit that when political leaders suffer from the paranoid style it can lead 
to hatred and result in a remarkable amount of bloodshed.
51
 Conspiracy beliefs, for these 
scholars, are misguided, seductive, and dangerous and operate from a premise that there is a 
―proper‖ or ―rational‖ way to view history and current situations, as opposed to an ―improper‖ or 
―irrational‖ view. 
Hofstadter, in particular, employed a ―consensus‖ approach to historiographic study. 
Consensus historiography stemmed from the belief that the United States exhibited a rich and 
unique history marked by an ideological consensus among its people. It was generally believed 
that the American people were, on the whole, aspiring to middle-class values and beliefs. Those 
who argued against or challenged consensus beliefs were attempting to disrupt the remarkable 
continuity of the American experience.
52
 Thus, those who forwarded discourse that reflected the 
paranoid style were malcontents, disenfranchised by the consensus view. As the study of history 
changed to reflect a growing recognition that the telling of history is ideological, marginalizing, 
and silencing of disparate voices in the polity, the metanarratives of history became problematic. 
Far too frequently those voices that were not part of the prevailing view of history and politics 
were left unexplored and unrecorded. Murray Edelman has pointed out that psychological frames 
have the effect of turning social problems into individual problems, and explanations based on 
13 
psychological pathology have the capacity to turn social problems into issues of individual 
maladjustment.
53
 Historians began to posit that belief in conspiracy cannot solely be explained 
by a paranoid premise. 
With the increasing recognition that a multiplicity of disparate voices has either been 
ignored or marginalized within the public sphere, that social problems are sometimes systemic 
and structural and cannot always be dismissed as individual psychopathology, scholars have 
recognized that conspiracy theories are not limited to the totalizing and apocalyptic frame set out 
by Hofstadter. There is a general recognition in the historical and cultural communities that the 
status of conspiracy theory in contemporary American society has fundamentally changed since 
Hofstadter first published his ―paranoid‖ essay. Robert Goldberg states, ―This period departs 
from the past in the regularity of the drumbeat, the multiplicity of messages and carriers, the 
number of believers, and the depth of immersion of popular culture in conspiracy thinking.‖54 
Conspiracy theories, rather than being marginal beliefs held by a minority of people, are now a 
fundamental way a significant number of Americans view ―how the world works.‖55 The prima 
facie belief in conspiracy gives rise to a whole host of types of conspiracy arguments. Various 
types of conspiracy theories exist within the public sphere, some simply attributing causal 
reasons to significant events, while others direct attention to a cabal of ne‘er-do-wells who are 
attempting to destroy a way of life.
56
 While those who followed Hofstadter focused on the latter 
type of conspiracy, most now focus on the former, recognizing that these types of conspiracy 
theories serve different purposes within the polis. 
Historians and cultural scholars have approached this new take on conspiracy theories by 
using various interpretive frames by which to analyze conspiracy beliefs. Largely, scholars still 
rely on psychological explanations arguing that different peoples use conspiracy theories for 
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different functions. For example, marginal populations use conspiracy theories as a binding force 
with which to battle racism, sexism, and oppression.
57
 Others are likely to use conspiracy 
theories as a means to gain autonomy and power as intermediaries between the people (e.g., 
labor unions) and large institutions of power.
58
 Conspiracy theories represent a battle between 
competing ideological factions and give people a means by which to infuse their lives with 
meaning and significance.
59
 Instead of automatically seeing pathology when looking on 
embittered people fighting against large systems of control, scholars are now inclined to 
recognize what George Marcus terms ―paranoia within reason.‖60  
Popular belief in conspiracy no longer requires an alien ―other‖ attempting to infiltrate 
and subvert the masses; the enemy to be combated is our own system of power.
61
 While belief 
that an alien ―other‖ is attempting to infiltrate and overtake the American government still exists 
and has been most recently exploited by fringe members of the Tea Party, a belief that the 
establishment itself is conspiring against the American people comes at the hands of uncovered 
instances of corporate and governmental malfeasance (e.g., Watergate, COINTELPRO, Iran-
Contra, and Enron). Significant portions of the public now cast a cynical eye toward officials and 
their ―authorized‖ versions of events. Knight explains, ―In the eyes of many Americans, the only 
safe bet is that there might well be a conspiracy, for all the public at large know or are likely to 
ever know. The burden of proof is now reversed, such that the authorities must strenuously 
provide conclusive evidence that there has been no initial conspiracy or subsequent cover-up.‖62 
Officials and their discourses must now not only ―prove‖ what happened in significant events, 
but also must prove that the resulting event was not part of a larger conspiracy.  
The questioning of official accounts of events through the medium of conspiracy theory 
signifies that conspiracy and official discourse exist within a dialogic relationship. Of particular 
15 
importance to this study is Bratich‘s observation that conspiracy theories are ―a zone where 
politics and reason meet.‖63 Not only do conspiracy theories cast suspicion and doubt onto 
institutions of power and the discourses they provide, but these same institutions view conspiracy 
theories as dangerous. Bratich argues that current political rationality views conspiracy theories 
as the enemies, the threats against democracy that need to be battled.
64
 Conspiracy theories exist 
in a battle of one-upmanship with official discourse, and, as it currently stands, are threatening to 
become the way most of the population thinks about historical events.
65
 
Although the historical and cultural studies of conspiracy theories still largely operate 
from a psychological standpoint, there is a growing recognition that conspiracy theories stand in 
direct opposition to their official counterparts. Conspiracies, rather than occasionally infecting 
political thought and action, are now more about a growing suspicion directed at institutions of 
power and are seen, by these same institutions, as an enemy that needs to be combated. If 
conspiracy theories are an enemy, then it stands to reason that official discourses that are 
designed to quell conspiracy beliefs should attempt to attack and root them out within the corpus 
of their texts. Rhetorical scholars, in particular, are concerned with, and uniquely situated to 
uncovering the suasory strength of conspiracy rhetoric and its interaction with official discourse.  
 
Complicating the Context and Genesis of Conspiracy Argument 
Rhetorical examinations of conspiracies have largely reflected the trajectory set out by 
historians. The study of conspiracy within the rhetorical community has taken two primary paths: 
determining the rhetorical characteristics that make conspiracy theories particularly persuasive 
and evaluating individual conspiracy theories in an effort to expose their inherent argumentative 
problems. Although the rhetorical community has largely used its skills to delegitimize 
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conspiracy theories and beliefs, there is, as in the historical community, recognition that 
conspiracy theories cannot be solely identified as pathological. Conspiracy theories are now a 
staple of American politics and are forwarded by marginal and mainstream political actors 
alike.
66
 
Initial forays by rhetoricians into the dark world of conspiracy built upon Hofstadter‘s 
characterization of paranoid discourse. Hofstadter argued that conspiracy discourse was marked 
by a ―distorted style‖ contained within an ―apocalyptic and absolutist framework.‖67 The 
narrative of the conspiracy theory, according to Hofstadter, contained: 1) ―a vast and sinister 
conspiracy, a gigantic and yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and 
destroy a way of life‖; 2) ―the special significance that attaches to the figure of the renegade 
from the enemy cause‖; and 3) ―that quality of pedantry‖ in which conspiracists imitate the form, 
substance, and style of scholarly and legal arguments.
68
 Through this emulation, conspiracists 
attempt to create ethos. Conspiracy theories, according to Hofstadter, begin with ―certain moral 
commitments‖ and ―judgments‖ that can be defended.69 Conspiracists, when marshalling their 
evidence to make their cases for conspiracy, are subject to ―leaps in logic‖ when tying together 
seemingly unrelated events, people, and practices into these theories.
70
 Following Hofstadter‘s 
lead, Earl Creps determined that conspiracy theories comprised a unique rhetorical genre 
―composed of a deductive/causal substantive form, a massively documented/dramatic style, and 
a ‗stressful‘ situation‖ that are bound together through the location of an evil force trying to 
subvert American ideals.
71
 The location of evil allowed for a single, identifiable enemy to be 
combated, resulting in polarizing the audience between ―Us,‖ upholders of traditional American 
values and beliefs, and ―Them,‖ those who would destroy America and its way of life.72 In 
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essence, Creps was articulating the signature elements of the narratives conspiracists weave in 
telling their tales of deceit and corruption. 
Conspiracy theories begin with the anomalies of an event or events: the unanswered 
questions, the peculiarities of agents, the conflicting accounts among authorities. Conspiracists 
point to the anomalous information and argue that such anomalies are a ―sign‖ that ―something‖ 
corrupt is occurring.
73
 These ―signs‖ then get woven into a dramatic and polarizing narrative 
form. Narrative is, as Fran Mason asserts, ―the main form of legitimating knowledge in 
conspiracy theory.‖74 The basic plot of the conspiracy narrative posits that someone or something 
is threatening to destroy a community or way of life. The audience is warned of this impending 
doom by a farsighted leader who amasses colossal amounts of evidence into a ―singular plot‖ 
that draws from ―the traditional logic of conventional popular narratives‖ (most notably the 
mystery), and ascribes causality and agency of the potential destruction to some malignant 
outside agent.
75
 Indeed, ―the primary burden of the conspiracy theorist,‖ according to James 
Darsey, ―is to provide credible purpose as the preeminent element of motive‖ to the agent‘s 
perceived desires.
76
 Conspiracy narratives gain their persuasive appeal by melding the purpose 
guiding the agent (evil) with a dramatic form, what Burke calls a syllogistic progression. Burke 
states, ―We call it syllogistic because, given certain things, certain things must follow.‖77 When 
the audience reaches the inevitable conclusion of the conspiracy, it faces the recognition that the 
only way the community can be saved is by purging itself of either the agent or the agency.  
Conspiracy theories are plausible because of their ability to tap into the traditional values 
and beliefs of their audiences, and they are able to stay popular within the public sphere over 
long periods of time because of their ability to adapt to, and reflect, temporal and cultural 
conditions.
78
 Conspiracy narratives allow for no ambiguities, no discrepancies, no coincidences; 
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everything within the conspiracy narrative has a purpose.
79
 Indeed, the stories woven by 
conspiracists maintain an internal coherence so masterful, that, according to Darsey, traditional 
modes of evaluation, although helpful, are not accessible enough for the lay person to use to 
evaluate conspiracy claims. Rather, a more helpful and public way to evaluate conspiracy 
theories rests on a question of motive because, as Walter Fisher argued, even a lay public has the 
access and acuity to determine if the motives of the villain make sense.
80
 While narrative may be 
the vessel through which conspiracy theories gain their legitimization, equally important are the 
argumentative techniques used within conspiracy narratives. 
Perhaps the single most seductive element of the conspiracy argument is what David 
Zarefsky terms as its self-sealing nature.
81
 Successful conspiracy arguments, according to 
Zarefsky, ―shift the burden of proof onto opponents while minimizing its own burdens.‖82 
Frequently, shifting the burden of proof onto those countering conspiracy claims includes using 
argument from absence. When a conspiracy charge is made, and a respondent counters by 
asserting that there is no conspiracy, then the response actually becomes proof that there is a 
conspiracy. Even if there is no response, the absence of a response becomes evidence that a vast 
and sinister conspiracy is brewing. As Brian Keeley notes, ―conspiracy arguments are the only 
theories for which evidence against them is actually constructed as evidence in favor of them.‖83 
Darsey affirms:  
Under normal circumstances, appearance demands presumption. One who claims that  
things are not as they appear to be assumes the burden of proof; a strong prima facie case  
is required before appearances need be seriously interrogated. Conspiracy argument  
exploits and reverses this normative presumption, making the lack of evidence into  
evidence transmogrifying surfaces from their pedestrian status as the most visible  
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outward manifestation of reality into veils and masks.
84
 
Thus, the ability of conspiracy theories to use the absence of evidence as evidence allows for 
virtually anything to be subsumed into the conspiracy narrative.  
The rhetorical hallmarks of conspiracy theories provide insight into the power such 
theories wield. However, rhetorical scholars have generally focused on, and analyzed, a singular 
conspiracy theory located within the public sphere in order to uncover the argumentative and 
narrative strategies conspiracists use in persuading their audiences. Such studies have tended to 
uncover the situational and contextual elements that make conspiracy theories more believable 
and then map out their inherent logical and narrative problems. I am more interested in the 
intersection that exists between conspiracy arguments and official discourse and what this 
intersection has to offer to our insight. Darsey alludes to an examination of this nexus when he 
calls for a restoration of public science.
85
 The secrecy under which institutional agencies operate 
is often ascribed to a malign purpose. Sissela Bok argues secrecy, by its very nature, breeds 
distrust: it is an intentional concealment that ―sets apart the secret from the non-secret, and of 
keepers of a secret from those excluded.‖86 In our increasingly secret world (be it related to 
political, scientific, or trade realms), there is a tendency to believe the worst rather than the best 
about what these ―secretive‖ agencies are doing. 
When a significant event happens, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and a claim that is 
not immediately discreditable or compelling is made about the causes and culprits behind the 
event, there is a moment of suspension where auditors fall in between comprehension and 
incomprehension, the awful and the awe-full, what Darsey, borrowing from Tzvetan Todorov, 
describes as the fantastic. It is this space between meaning and meaninglessness that conspiracy 
theories fill, ascribing agency, purpose, and direction to otherwise senseless acts and effects.
87
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When an ―official‖ explanation is forthcoming, it is already entering into a sphere of competition 
with conspiracy theories. When counter-narratives fill the voids left by an absence of official 
discourse, a kind of rhetorical back-peddling occurs on the part of officials. In other words, 
officials have to prove within the corpus of their discourse that there is no conspiracy rather than 
simply proving what happened, and the standards for proof are altered by the presence of 
conspiracy narratives. The legitimacy of conspiracy theories is expanded when the discourse 
offered fails to tell a story that ―fits‖ the facts and is exacerbated when credible witnesses offer 
conflicting evidence and substantiate causal agency. In the absence of a compelling case on the 
part of officials, people find themselves choosing between stories that provide purpose and 
motive and other accounts that leave them open to interpretation and that seemingly defy 
belief.
88
  
Why are conspiracy theories so able to force the hand of officials? Part of the answer lies 
with the loss of central authority and the indeterminacy of information that are, at least in part, a 
result of the conditions of postmodernity. 
 
Loss of Authority, Indeterminacy, and the Conditions of Conspiracy 
Scholars overwhelmingly posit that the proliferation of conspiracy theories in our time is a result 
of the loss of central authority and the rise of indeterminacy, both of which are a part of the 
postmodern condition. Postmodernity is a highly contested term, entailing a host of theoretical 
positions and criticisms. Generally, the term has been used to signal a period of time, although 
Barry Smart offers that it is more useful to think of it as a recognition that the promises of 
modernity—certainty, stability, security—―will remain unfulfilled.‖89 If the term is contested, so, 
too, is the issue of its precise genesis. There is a general consensus that postmodernity emerged 
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in the post-World War II world, and reached maturity, including finding its name, in the 1970s.
90
 
Regardless of the exact time of its emergence, the nascent characteristics of postmodernity were 
noticeable in the general turbulence that marked the 1950s and even more so the 1960s. 
If postmodernity is a recognition of historical time, then postmodernism is the vehicle 
through which this recognition is made manifest. ―Postmodernism‖ has been employed to signify 
a ―style or genre‖ representing notions of fracture, ―fragmentation, indeterminacy, and plurality‖ 
that combated the narrow, restrictive views of modernity.
91
 Modernity, characterized as 
―positivistic, technocentric, and rationalistic,‖ according to David Harvey, ―has been identified 
with the belief in linear progress, absolute truths, the rational planning of ideal social orders, and 
the standardization of knowledge and production.‖92 Political, social, and economic norms were 
based on universal and totalizing ideals that set the standard to which people were to aspire.
93
 
Those disenfranchised from the norms of political, social, and economic orders joined in a 
mutual struggle to attain access to the universal ideals in the public sphere. In contradistinction, 
postmodernity, is prefaced on the search for more individual meaning. Smart wrote, ―The 
questioning of universals, of grounds, of foundations, and values, and the corollary, a recognition 
of cultural pluralism and fragmentation, of diversity and difference are widely acknowledged to 
be prominent features of the complex contemporary conditions we encounter.‖94 What has 
changed from modernity to postmodernity are not the ideas of universal concepts, such as 
equality, justice, and freedom, but, according to Simon Malpas, ―their ‗ontological status‘: their 
certainty, the means by which they are defined, justified, and defended.‖95 Universal standards 
take on new and disparate meanings among disparate peoples. A cacophony of voices enters into 
an endless struggle to determine their own ideals rather than having meanings defined for them 
by authorities. 
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The universalizing and totalizing metanarratives of history and politics are now 
recognized for their silencing and oppressive natures; the response is a proliferation of voices 
and methodological positions essentially decimating a unified frame from which to interpret 
meaning.
96
 Meaning is now constructed based on the intertextual nature of information and 
communication; beginning from what we already know (or think we know) and the constant 
addition of information from ever more texts to meaning, diminishing the authority of singular 
texts in favor of the continual construction of meanings by individuals.
97
 This multiplicity of 
voices blurs the line between truthful and factual information, and questions whom to trust and 
believe. There is no longer one fixed narrative that serves as a binding force for the people but 
multiple frames of reference, a condition that breeds uncertainty and anxiety, and also leads to a 
loss of authority and the indeterminacy of information. 
Discursive authority lies with its effects, or what Bruce Lincoln has argued, ―the 
conjuncture of the right speaker, the right speech and delivery, the right staging and props, the 
right time and place, and an audience whose historically and culturally conditioned expectations 
establish the parameters of what is judged ‗right‘ in all these instances, in such a way as to 
produce attitudes of trust, respect, docility, acceptance, even reverence, in the audience.‖98 If 
discursive authority rests with the ability to render an audience silent on an issue, then in 
postmodernity generally, and with the state of conspiracy theories more specifically, authority is 
in serious trouble. No longer are authorities (whether executive or epistemic) able to offer their 
version of a story and have an audience docilely accept their interpretation.
99
 Authorities no 
longer enjoy the presumption they were afforded in the past; official narratives are now just one 
among a cacophony and have the same burden as any narrative to persuade their audiences that 
they are offering the most complete, compelling, and consistent telling of events. If anything, this 
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burden is increased for official narratives in light of revelations of official scandals and abuses of 
power.  
 The loss of central authority, the loss of a fixed meaning ascribed to information has 
given rise to a multiplicity of interpretations within the public sphere. As Smart notes, ―Central 
to the postmodern condition is the notion that the legitimation procedures of knowledge have 
been eroded, and that the assumption at the heart of legislative reason of the possibility and/or 
acceptability of deriving prescriptions from denotative statements is no longer sustainable.‖100 
Most telling of Smart‘s passage is the erosion of the belief in science. Intelligent design now 
challenges the more scientific position of evolution; the etiology of HIV/AIDS is hotly disputed; 
global warming deniers argue against scientific evidence of climate change; even whether there 
was a moon landing is subject to speculation from various segments of the public. In Jean-
François Lyotard‘s words, ―the grand narrative‖ of science ―has lost its credibility‖; everything is 
now subject to competing interpretations.
101
 New forms of media technology, especially the 
Internet, have diminished the ability to determine what is credible and what is incredible. The 
line between legitimate and illegitimate information has become increasingly blurred. Such an 
indeterminate climate has led to an enlargement of the public sphere which, Frederic Jameson 
asserts, ―also results in an enormous enlargement of the idea of rationality itself, in what we are 
willing to ‗understand‘ (but not endorse), as what we can no longer have removed from the 
visual record as ‗irrational‘ or incomprehensible, unmotivated, insane or sick.‖102 Instead, more 
―legitimate‖ forms of knowledge are in direct competition with various interpretations afloat 
within the public sphere. The pother of information offered by competing voices within the 
public sphere is a breeding ground for conspiracy thinking. 
24 
The polyphony of competing voices, bolstered by the ease of posting and ―researching‖ 
information on the Internet, makes it increasingly difficult for the public to make informed 
decisions. Each post has its own theory, its own interpretation as to what happened and why. 
Exacerbating the competition among multitudinous voices is the cynical and suspicious attitude 
directed toward the government by large segments of the public, brought about by the 
clandestine and secret nature of some of its agencies as well as the uncovering of actual 
governmental conspiracies.
103
 Amplified media coverage in the face of significant tragedies finds 
conspiracists capitalizing on the misstatements, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies of 
governmental officials in their statements to the press and in the testimony they provide in 
investigations, and then weaving those problems into their narratives as proof that not all is as it 
seems. 
Conspiracy theories, which claim to know the ―truth,‖ are not so different from official 
discourse. Indeed, like official discourse, conspiracy theories pose their adherence to ―facticity, 
causality, coherence, and rationality.‖ What sets contemporary conspiracy theories apart from 
official discourse, according to Jodi Dean, is ―suspicion.‖ Conspiracy narratives emphasize ―that 
something has been withheld, that all the facts aren‘t known, that what we see isn‘t all there is. 
Conspiracy theory demands more information. Too humble to offer a totalizing account, [the] 
accumulated assertions [of conspiracy narratives] remind us that we don’t know.‖104 The 
multiplicity of competing information casts suspicion onto more ―legitimate‖ forms of 
knowledge. Knight explains, ―Conspiracy theories are a form of pop sociology cobbled together 
on the fly as people try to gain a handle on the complexities of social and economic causation in 
an era of rapid globalization. With the increasing overload of information from mutually 
competing sources, none of which seem entirely trustworthy, a hermeneutic of suspicion has 
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become a routine operating procedure.‖105 Belief in conspiracy becomes an almost necessary 
response to the multiplicity of information, especially with the lack of a suitable explanation. 
Even when an explanation is provided, enough questions are asked, enough ―evidence‖ is 
brought to light, so as to cast doubt and suspicion onto the explanation. Any official discourse 
that comes into being after doubt and suspicion have been leveled against ―legitimate‖ 
explanations has to at least attempt to assuage any existing doubts, which inherently alters the 
substance and form of official discourse.
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 The leveling of the discursive playing field precipitated by the loss of central authority 
and the indeterminacy of information provides an opening for conspiracy theories to find 
increasing prominence and belief. Conspiracy theories challenge and question authority and 
capitalize on the strength of their own narratives, the inconsistencies of official accounts, and the 
proliferation of conflicting information. Conspiracy theories are a mode of constructing meaning 
in a rapidly changing and complex world. It is no longer automatically discrediting to label 
something a conspiracy theory; authorities must prove their positions, write compelling and 
believable accounts of events, and, ultimately, must get back in touch with their audiences if they 
want the support of the people. Yet the ability for officials to connect with the people is 
problematic because officials are no longer able to forward an affirmative argument simply 
providing the causes or reasons behind an event. Officials are forced into a defensive position 
brought on by claims of conspiracy existing prior to the crafting of an official response. For this 
reason it is necessary to examine the power of conspiracy beliefs through the lens of official 
discourse. If recent ―authoritative‖ texts are any indication, then there is a real danger that 
conspiracy beliefs will usurp official explanations and become the preferred way of thinking. 
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Uncertainty, Doubt, and Skepticism in the United States, post-WWII 
Prior to the publication of the Warren Commission Report, the American people placed a great 
deal of faith in the American government. According to the Pew Research Center, in 1958, the 
first year a poll testing public trust in government was conducted, nearly 73 percent of the 
American people trusted the federal government. That number increased to nearly 78 percent by 
1963. By 1964, however, Americans‘ faith in their government was on a precipitous decline, 
dropping to 65 percent in 1966, down to 36 percent in 1974, and bottoming at a dismal 25 
percent by 1979. In the last thirty years, there have been spikes and dips in the poll numbers, 
frequently corresponding with times of crises where faith in the government increased, and drops 
during economic times of crisis. Even so, Americans‘ faith in their government has not reached 
over 60 percent since 1969.
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 At least part of the reason for the decline of the American people‘s 
faith in government can be attributed to the eruption of revealed official scandals and abuses 
enacted by the federal government and its agents that date back to the 1940s.      
The late 1940s and early 1950s saw a litany of Americans accused, and in some cases 
convicted, of espionage. The ―Pumpkin Papers‖ seemingly confirmed accusations that Alger 
Hiss, a lawyer who worked for the New Deal policies of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and was involved in coordinating the creation of the United Nations, was a Soviet spy in 1948.
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The Hiss case, and Hiss‘s subsequent defense by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, prompted 
Congressman Richard Nixon and other Republicans to forward claims of subversion within the 
White House.
109
 The Eisenhower administration‘s cover-up of a top-secret American U2 spy 
plane, shot down over Soviet air space on May 1, 1960, was one of the first instances where the 
secret machinations of the president were publicly revealed.
110
 The election of President 
Kennedy in 1960 had its own allegations of conspiracy and cover-up. David Steigerwald admits 
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that Republican allegations that President Kennedy won the 1960 election through fraudulent 
votes facilitated by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley were not without merit.
111
 Government 
involvement in scandals and conspiracies after World War II and up to the election of President 
Kennedy are at least nascent indicators of the loss of central authority, although the continued 
scandals and conspiracies would exacerbate the erosion of faith the American people had in their 
system of governance.   
The assassinations of President Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy; 
the escalation of the war in Vietnam; and the increasing violence associated with the Civil Rights 
Movement and the student protests, all gave rise to a further cultural anxiety existing within the 
public sphere. In the early 1970s, the fears that the federal government was engaging in 
conspiracies against its own people were realized. The revelation of the secret domestic 
intelligence program of the FBI known as COINTELPRO provided the American public with 
proof that the FBI had engaged in illegal activities against the American people, including 
Martin Luther King, Jr.
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 ―The Pentagon Papers,‖ stolen by State Department employee Daniel 
Ellsberg, provided evidence that the federal government had lied about U.S. involvement in 
Vietnam.
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 The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments revealed that the United States government had 
intentionally withheld treatment from African American men infected with the disease to study 
its effects, even after penicillin was found to cure the disease.
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 The coup de grace to faith in 
American governance came with the uncovering of the Watergate scandal. President Nixon 
resigned in disgrace after it was revealed that he was intimately involved with illegal campaign 
activities in 1974.
115
 The decline of the American people‘s faith in their government, while not 
recognized prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, steadily declined until the Watergate 
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scandal erupted. The continued revelations of scandals and conspiracies enacted by the 
government furthered spurred the loss of central authority.  
The 1980s and 1990s revealed another spate of governmental scandals. The Savings and 
Loan scandal saw American taxpayers shell out over $150 billion to rescue over 700 failed 
institutions. Five U.S. senators were accused of corruption for illegally intervening in a 
regulatory investigation into the Lincoln Savings and Loan Association on behalf of Charles 
Keating, Jr.
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 The Iran-Contra Affair uncovered that the U.S. had illegally sold weapons to Iran, 
via Nicaragua, in exchange for American hostages held in Iran.
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 The 1990s saw President 
Clinton being investigated for alleged illegal activities involving a real estate company called the 
Whitewater Development Company. Out of the Whitewater investigation came allegations that 
President Clinton had had an affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, which the 
president denied. President Clinton was later impeached by the U.S. House of Representatives 
for perjury for lying about the affair under oath in 1998.
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 Finally, the presidency of George W. 
Bush was besieged by controversy. The collapse of Enron, warrantless wiretappings of American 
citizens‘ domestic telephone calls, the outing of CIA operative Valerie Plame, allegations that 
the U.S. was using torture as a means to interrogate terrorist suspects, the manufactured 
yellowcake uranium evidence prompting the War in Iraq, the loss or destruction of millions of 
emails from the White House, and claims that the dismissal of eleven federal prosecutors 
occurred because they prosecuted Republicans and not Democrats, all helped to engender 
uncertainty, even fear, within the public sphere.
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The American people, cognizant that they had been repeatedly lied to, even conspired 
against, by their government, lost faith in central authority. The inability to determine what is 
true and what is (conspiracy) theory becomes a question of interpretation because there is no one 
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authority the people can turn to for the truth. The loss of a fixed meaning, the loss of one 
authoritative way to view events, leads to the indeterminacy of information that further erodes 
authority and provides an ample breeding ground in which conspiracy theories become 
particularly salient in our contemporary society. 
 
Complicating Conceptions of Conspiracy 
Two documents, in particular, are important for understanding the power of conspiracy beliefs in 
our time: The Warren Commission Report and The 9/11 Commission Report.
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 The most 
obvious significance of these two documents is that they represent discourses that were called 
into being as the official accounts of two tragic events in American history: the assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Blue ribbon 
commissions created to investigate national tragedies are hardly new. Indeed, almost every 
national tragedy in our history has resulted in the formulation of a commission designed to 
investigate the causes of the event and possible courses of action the administration in power 
may take in order to assuage the public‘s concerns and fears.121 What makes these two 
Commissions unique is the degree to which they were designed to limit belief in conspiracy 
theories forwarded as explanations for the two events. 
To some degree, the members of both commissions were aware of the conspiracy beliefs 
permeating the public sphere prior to the completion of their reports. The Warren Commission 
Report, in its preface, notes that the ―rumors and speculations‖ surrounding the death of 
President Kennedy dictated that they not only investigate the alleged conspiracies, but also dispel 
false rumors that had reached the public.
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 Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the Chair and Vice 
Chair of the 9/11 Commission, were also acutely aware of the claims of conspiracy existing in 
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the public prior to the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report. Kean and Hamilton, in their 
memoir about the Commission stated ―September 11 has generated its own share of conspiracy 
theories … These questions ranged from small to large, rational to irrational … Some questions 
[the more irrational] we dealt with indirectly …. Other, more reasonable questions we dealt with 
directly.‖123 Significant in this passage is Kean‘s and Hamilton‘s acknowledgement that not only 
were they aware of conspiracy theories, but they directly confronted only those they deemed 
rational and only indirectly confronted those they defined as irrational. In recognizing that 
conspiracy theories were already in circulation, both commissions inadvertently acknowledge 
areas of conflict—conflict between the discourse they constructed and the conspiracy arguments 
they were attempting to dispel—within their texts. How both the commissions handled beliefs in 
conspiracies in their discourses gives insight into the rhetorical choices that were made in the 
course of compiling the responses. 
In addition to being official discourse, the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports represent 
two of the most significant responses to conspiracy theories in our time; interestingly, the 
discourses that were shaped to combat these theories share some of the generic elements of 
conspiracy arguments. As the above statements from commissioners on both the Warren 
Commission and the 9/11 Commission indicate, these two reports were obligated to address 
certain issues because of public discourses already in circulation. Neither report had the luxury 
of simply setting out an affirmative case providing the official explanation of events. Both 
reports are defensive and refutative, the agenda being largely set by popular conspiracy 
discourse. Reconstructing the logic and reasoning in the reports is crucial in determining the 
interplay that exists between official discourse and conspiracy beliefs. The Warren and 9/11 
Commission reports are public documents, and, as such, official memos, minutes of meetings, 
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and all other evidence not deemed a matter of national security are available, largely online. 
Moreover, members of both Commissions have written memoirs about the proceedings and the 
roles they played within them. Examination of the commission reports, in particular, and the 
discourses surrounding them, provides a wealth of information that provides perspective about 
the ways in which commissioners attempted to craft texts that spoke to the rhetorical exigencies 
of the events themselves, but also what they did to attempt to quell the tide of conspiracy. 
The Warren and 9/11 Commission reports are significant for another reason—both are 
products of our contemporary era. These two reports represent two very different moments in our 
era: the Warren Commission Report was written while the loss of central authority was 
prepubescent, and the 9/11 Commission came into being after the loss of central authority was 
thoroughly entrenched. As Knight notes, President Kennedy‘s assassination has been determined 
by many postmodern scholars, including Frederic Jameson and Jean Baudrillard, as ―being on 
the cusp of a crisis of representation.‖124 However, Knight argues that the culture of conspiracy 
that has emerged, one that forwards a ―causally coherent narrative about growing skepticism 
towards the authority of experts and the government,‖ finds its roots in the creation of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947 and the burgeoning intelligence community of the 
security state.
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 The erosion of the American people‘s faith in their government, precipitated by 
the revelation of actual governmental conspiracies enacted by the government against the people, 
raises the awareness that ―there is no certain way of knowing … [what] is true … [A] lingering 
suspicion always remains; nothing is ever quite as it seems; no ‗final report‘ ever ensures that the 
case is truly closed.‖126 Examination of the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports, two texts 
existing at very different moments in our contemporary era, offers insight into the similarities 
and differences in the challenges the commissioners faced while composing their discourse. 
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Finally, the most significant attribute of both commissions‘ reports is the degree to which 
they have been unable to quell conspiracy beliefs. By many accounts, President Kennedy‘s 
assassination is the ―mother lode‖ of all conspiracy theories with roughly 75 percent of the 
American public believing that Lee Harvey Oswald did not act alone.
127
 However, the 9/11 
Commission Report itself is gaining ground as more people begin to question the report. A 2006 
Zogby poll indicated that 42 percent of the population believed that the 9/11 Commission and the 
federal government were covering up significant evidence that points to the causes and reasons 
behind the 9/11 terrorist attacks, while only 48 percent believed there was no cover-up. In the 
same poll, 45 percent of the population believed that 9/11 should be reinvestigated while 47 
percent believed it was a sound and thorough investigation.
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 In a Scripps Howard poll, over a 
third of the population believed that the United States government actually aided in the planning 
and implementation of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
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 Although the 9/11 Commission was not 
plagued with the same degree of disbelief that existed for the Warren Commission, the fact that 
nearly half of those who were polled expressed doubt indicates there is a large degree of 
skepticism existing within the public sphere. 
On the surface, it seems claims of conspiracy of both the murder of President Kennedy 
and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 follow current conceptions of conspiracy argument. A minority 
(although a significant minority) of the population during a time of social strain and anxiety were 
able to infect the larger public imagination with their suspicions. To some degree, both The 
Warren Commission Report and The 9/11 Commission Report had to anticipate some of the 
suspicions of conspiracists, and were thus drawn into a dialogue with conspiracy discourse. What 
is significant is that neither document has been able to significantly quell claims of conspiracy. 
In fact, over time, belief in conspiracy has grown rather than diminished. Why are conspiracy 
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theories able to force official discourse into a dialectical relationship? What does this dialectical 
relationship say about the conspiratorial contexts in which it was produced? What are the 
political implications that such relationships between conspiracy theories and official discourse 
have for the future? The answers lie within an examination of the power of conspiracy through 
the lens of official discourses. 
 
Uncovering the Genre and Crisis of Conspiracy  
In order to explore the rhetorical power of conspiracy theories through the lens of official 
discourse, I employ a multi-methodological approach to study my texts, which recognizes the 
utility of drawing from a number of theoretical models that allow for the building of an artistic 
and insightful theory while adhering to scholarly rigor. Although the Warren Commission Report 
and the 9/11 Commission Report are themselves worthy of study, a more compelling reason is 
understanding and exposing the intersection between these two texts and the conspiracy theories 
that informed them while recognizing that there are other forces at work in the make-up of the 
discourses. Notable scholars in the rhetorical community have used similar approaches in their 
works to build highly influential and provocative theories in rhetoric. Such scholars include 
James Darsey in The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America, Michael Pfau in The 
Political Style of Conspiracy: Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln, and Stephen O‘Leary in Arguing the 
Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric.
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Of particular import to this study is Lloyd Bitzer‘s discussion of the rhetorical situation. 
Bitzer argues that discourse comes into being because of its rhetorical situation, which is ―a 
natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites 
utterance.‖131 Bitzer explains that ―an exigence is an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a 
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defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing that is other than what it should be.‖132 
Put more simply, an exigence is something that demands explanation. Exigencies are explained 
by rhetorical audiences, which are those ―capable of being influenced by discourse and of being 
mediators of change.‖133 Yet, audiences face constraints when constructing their discourses. 
Constraints are elements that ―have the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify 
the exigence‖ and consist ―of persons, objects, events, and relations.‖134 The combination of 
exigence, audience, and constraints are constitutive of the rhetorical situation. 
The tragic death of a young president and the terrorist attacks were certainly remarkable 
enough to call forth the creation of discourse to modify the public‘s perceptions of the events. As 
a direct result, two independent bipartisan commissions were created to serve as the rhetorical 
audiences of the two tragedies. However, the exigencies of the assassination of President 
Kennedy and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 contained more than just the assassination and the 
attacks. The murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, President Kennedy‘s alleged assassin, while in 
police custody complicated the exigencies of the assassination. Similarly, the subsequent 
invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after the terrorist attacks added intricacy to the exigencies of 
the terrorist attacks. Uncovering the complexities of the rhetorical situations for both the Warren 
and 9/11 Commission reports required examining numerous texts including various media 
accounts, scholarly works, and the memoirs written by members of both Commissions. Within 
these texts I looked for clues that would lend insight into the rhetorical situation and how it 
influenced the shape of the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports. For instance, numerous 
scholars have posited that the Warren Commission was formed to specifically combat conspiracy 
beliefs that existed in the public sphere.
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 The formation of the 9/11 Commission was 
motivated, in part, by the very public lobbying of the 9/11 victims‘ families. The complicated 
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exigencies that led to the creation of the Warren and 9/11 commissions, and the subsequent 
discourses both commissions created in response, were subject to other forces that helped to 
shape their missives. 
In order to provide a ―fitting‖ response to the assassination of President Kennedy and the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Warren and 9/11 commissions had to address not only the rhetorical 
situations, but also the greater social and political contexts into which they entered. Determining 
the political, social, and historical contexts required examination of historical texts and media 
that recounted what was transpiring in the country before and during the investigations of both 
commissions. For instance, the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred just a year prior to the 
assassination of President Kennedy, and the Civil Rights Movement was in full swing at the time 
of the president‘s death. The highly contested presidential election of 2000 created a highly 
partisan atmosphere in the public, and the collapse of Enron, just a month after the terrorist 
attacks, further fueled the doubt and uncertainty in the public in the wake of the attacks. The 
contexts into which each commission entered were marked by a high degree of uncertainty in the 
public sphere.  
Conspiracy theories, as we have seen, are more likely to flourish during times of social 
strain. Conspiracy theories about the assassination and the terrorist attacks occurred almost 
immediately after the events. In the case of the Warren Commission, most of the public believed 
that President Kennedy‘s death occurred at the hands of a conspiracy. The terrorist attacks were a 
conspiracy. Even so, theories about who was behind the attacks circulated within days. As time 
passed beliefs in conspiracy theories grew as more information came out about the intelligence 
failures of the FBI. Beliefs in conspiracy, for both commissions, inherently influenced their 
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discourses. Of particular concern was uncovering the different conspiracy theories in circulation 
in the public before the release of both commissions‘ reports. 
A vast amount of literature exists on both the assassination of President Kennedy and the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. In order to determine which conspiracy theories were in circulation prior 
to the publication of the Warren Commission Report, I relied on reading articles on the 
―Academic JFK Assassination Website,‖ which provides an enormous amount of information on 
the assassination of President Kennedy and the controversy surrounding it. Significantly, the 
website provides pre-Warren Commission accounts of the assassination from the right, left, and 
center of the political spectrum.
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 On the website, Kenneth A. Rahn provides articles written in 
response to President Kennedy‘s death beginning on November 22, 1963, through September 27, 
1964. The articles that were the most informative about the conspiracy theories that existed prior 
to the publication of the Warren Commission‘s report were written by Revilo P. Oliver, Martin 
Dies, Bertrand Russell, M. S. Arnoni, Jack Minnis and Staughton Lynd, Harold Feldman, Eric 
Norden, Victor Perlo, Leo Sauvage, and Mark Lane.
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 From the articles, five central concerns 
were raised by conspiracists: where the shots came from; the magic bullet and the problems the 
autopsy evidence posed; the lack of a discernible motive on the part of Oswald and his actions 
before and after the assassination; the underworld ties of Jack Ruby; and the possibility that 
agents of the government were complicit in the assassination.
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Seemingly limitless sources detailing the conspiracy theories in the public sphere prior to 
the release of the 9/11 Commission Report similarly exist. For the sake of expediency, I limited 
my choice of texts. One of the most well-known and well-respected texts published before the 
9/11 Commission‘s report is The New Pearl Harbor by David Ray Griffin.139 Within, Griffin 
provides a compendium of some of the most popular conspiracy theories in circulation during the 
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aftermath of 9/11. While my analysis is largely dependent on Griffin, other sources were used to 
determine what conspiracy theories were circulating prior to the release of the Commission‘s 
report. Mathias Broeckers‘ Conspiracies, Conspiracy Theories, and the Secrets of 9/11, 
originally published in Germany in 2002, gave a more complete account of some of the 
conspiracy theories alluded to in Griffin‘s book.140 Senator Bob Graham‘s book, Intelligence 
Matters, was also instructive in illuminating some of the conspiracy theories that gained force 
after the publication of Griffin‘s and Broeckers‘ books.141 From the literature, there are four 
broad themes that they share and on which they base their theories of conspiracy: The reasons 
behind the decision of the U.S. to invade Iraq; the problems concerning the inability for the FAA 
and NORAD to effectively coordinate on 9/11; the mystery surrounding the flights of Saudi 
nationals who were allegedly allowed to leave the country before the airspace ban was lifted, the 
funding behind the terrorist attacks; and, the evidence that existed about Osama bin Laden‘s role 
in the terrorist attacks. 
Understanding the rhetorical situations that instructed both texts was only part of the 
analysis. Genre criticism is an essential methodological tool for uncovering the interplay 
between conspiracy arguments and the substance of the Warren and 9/11 Commission reports. 
While I am not arguing that these two reports are representative of a rhetorical genre, others have 
argued that conspiracy theories do represent a generic classification.
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 The Warren Commission 
Report and the 9/11 Commission Report, while being influenced by, and taking on significant 
substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics of, the conspiracy genre, lack the signature 
element of conspiracy theories; their hermetically sealed nature. Both commissions‘ reports 
inherently served as an intermediary step in the formation of the archetypal conspiracy argument. 
In order to understand the degree to which both discourses were influenced by conspiracy 
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arguments, and how they, in turn, influenced conspiracy theories, it is necessary to approach both 
texts with generic sensitivity. Genre criticism provides a method that uncovers the individual 
features of a discourse that, when combined, characterize a rhetorical form. In this way, genre 
criticism allows for determining the degree to which discourses engage in dialogues with one 
another, shape and influence each other‘s texts. 
Work in rhetorical criticism posits that genres are characterized by substantive, stylistic 
and situational constellations that make up these forms. ―A genre,‖ according to Karlyn Kohrs 
Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, ―is a group of acts unified by a constellation of forms that 
recurs in each of its members. These forms, in isolation, appear in other discourses. What is 
distinctive about the acts in a genre is the recurrence of the forms together in isolation.‖143 While 
individual forms attributed to conspiracy arguments may be found in other discourses, it is the 
pattern of the forms, taken together, that signify the conspiracy argument. Building on Campbell 
and Jamieson‘s classification of genre, Carolyn Miller argues that genres are dependent upon the 
situations from which they arise.
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 Miller asserts that genres are dependent on ―typified 
rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations.‖145 For Miller, genres should be classified based 
on ―the actions [they are] used to accomplish.‖146 Miller‘s conceptualization of genre is based on 
a hierarchy of meaning. Form and substance fuse to make up a genre, and then that genre serves 
as the substance of the next level of meaning. Context becomes an integral aspect of genre 
precisely because it influences the way acts are viewed and understood.
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 Both essays promote 
the idea that the recurrence of substance, form, and situation are necessary components in a 
given genre. Miller‘s work adds that the context must also be taken into consideration.   
Genre criticism required a close reading of my primary texts in order to isolate the 
substantive and stylistic characteristics that fused together to construct the form of the argument 
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each commission employed. Reading the reports of both commissions through the lens of 
conspiratorial discourse provides insight into how both texts were influenced by the conspiracy 
theories in circulation in the public. Significantly, in combating claims of conspiracy, both 
commissions‘ discourses took on some of the generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. 
Conspiracy theories about the assassination of President Kennedy were never marginal 
beliefs.
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 Unlike Hofstadter‘s assertion that once conspiracy theories are addressed by 
authorities, they fade back into the periphery of society, conspiracy theories about the 
assassination continued to grow after the release of the Warren Commission Report.
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 The 
inability of the Warren Commission to successfully contain conspiracy theories is indicative that 
it was not able to maintain its discursive authority over conspiracy theories. Understanding why 
the Commission was incapable of maintaining its authority required an examination of the nexus 
between conspiracy theories and the Commission‘s report.  
In my examination of the Warren Commission Report, I looked at rhetorical indications 
of authority, presumption and the burden of proof in concert with the argument from absence, the 
paradox of substance, the use of massive amounts of evidence, and internal consistency, which, 
as noted above, are generic elements of conspiracy arguments. Of central concern was examining 
how the Commission chose to handle claims that Oswald had a confederate in the assassination. 
In refuting claims that Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in a conspiracy plot, the Warren 
Commission directly confronted claims by attempting to negate them based on argument from 
absence. Argument from absence, according to Darsey, is constructed to imply that the absence 
of evidence is evidence for a proposition.
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 In negating claims that there was a conspiracy in 
place to assassinate the president, the absence of evidence of conspiracy becomes evidence that 
there was no conspiracy. It is a negative argument used in an attempt to shift the burden of proof 
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onto those who were making claims that there was a conspiracy. The Commission‘s decision to 
directly confront conspiracy claims, and its use of argument from absence to do so, is indicative 
that the Commission did not have argumentative presumption. If the Warren Commission had 
presumption, then, as Whately characterizes it, one need do nothing.
151
 However, because the 
Warren Commission felt compelled to attack conspiracy beliefs by asserting that the absence of 
evidence of a conspiracy was evidence that there was no conspiracy, the Commission was, 
rhetorically, indicating that it lacked presumption over conspiracy theories. 
In addition to uncovering how the Warren Commission handled claims that the 
assassination was the result of a conspiracy was determining how it managed claims that agents 
of the government, especially those employed by the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service, were 
involved in a conspiracy plot. The Warren Commission was put into a paradoxical position. On 
the one hand, the Commission was supposed to conduct an independent and thorough 
investigation. On the other hand, the Commission was dependent on the investigations of federal 
legal agencies implicated in conspiracy charges. Being forced into a paradox because of 
conspiracy claims is indicative that the Warren Commission, if it were to be believed, would 
have to make a case for its position. The Commission attempted to resolve its position through 
the use of the paradox of substance. A paradox of substance, according to Burke, is a declaration 
of what something is not in order to determine what something is.
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 Rhetorically, it was 
necessary to look at the language the Commission uses to explain its relationship with the federal 
legal agencies. The Commission‘s declaration of what its relationship was, based on Burke‘s 
characterization, is indicative of what it is not. In essence, it was necessary to look at how the 
Commission attempted to resolve the paradox of being dependent on and independent of federal 
investigative agencies.  
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The Commission took on other generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. In 
attempting to overcome the lack of a discernible motive for Oswald‘s actions, the Commission 
faced a substantial task in piecing together something that would be creditable for the public to 
believe in explaining why Oswald shot the president. The Commission examined everything 
from Oswald‘s own writings, to reports from his childhood, to what information they could 
harvest from Oswald‘s time in the Soviet Union. However, there was no single tangible reason 
the Commission found to explain Oswald‘s action. As Hofstadter, Creps, Young, Launer, and 
Austin, and Dean note, conspiracists churn out massive amounts of tangentially related evidence 
in order to convince the audience of the soundness of their conclusions.
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 Instead of being an 
accumulation of the evidence that arrives at a sound conclusion, it is a desperate attempt to 
provide the audience with overabundant proof in order to overcome the doubt that exists about 
the conspiracist‘s conclusions.‖154 In piecing together a motive for Oswald the Commission 
produced and overwhelming amount of tangentially related evidence in order to provide a 
creditable motive for the alleged assassin and is indicative that the Commission was attempting 
to overcome both its own, and the public‘s, doubt about why Oswald murdered the president.  
Finally, it was necessary to uncover how the Commission attempted to overcome the 
problems the evidence of the location of the shots, the nature and location of the president‘s 
wounds, and the maneuverings the magic bullet posed. Significant contradictions existed among 
the evidence. Conflicting reports about the location and nature of the president‘s wounds existed 
between the doctors who attempted to save the president‘s life and the results of the autopsy 
report. The FBI report‘s discussion of the number and targets of the shots fired directly 
contradicted with the Commission‘s own explanation. In attempting to overcome the evidentiary 
inconsistencies, the Commission resorted to drafting an internally consistent narrative in order to 
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overcome the problems the evidence posed. Conspiracy arguments, according to Hofstadter, 
allow ―no room for mistakes, failures, or ambiguities.‖155 The Commission went to great pains to 
resolve any contradictions that existed between the varying accounts of the evidence. No 
contradictions went unresolved, no ambiguities were left unexplained, all of the evidence the 
Commission ushered to present its case had to unequivocally back its conclusion. 
Examination of the 9/11 Commission Report was, in some ways, remarkably similar to 
that of the Warren Commission, and completely different in others. Like the Warren 
Commission, conspiracy theories were already in circulation within the public sphere before the 
formation of the Commission. And, like the Warren Commission, conspiracy theories have 
continued to flourish after the release of the 9/11 Commission‘s report. The 9/11 Commission, 
unlike the Warren Commission, chose to handle conspiracy claims largely only indirectly rather 
than directly. In examining the 9/11 Commission Report at looked at the areas of contestation 
that existed between the conspiracy theories in the public and how the Commission handled 
those of areas of conflict within its text. 
While the 9/11 Commission did only indirectly disputed conspiracy claims, it still took 
on some of the generic characteristics of conspiracy arguments. Specifically, the 9/11 
Commission adopted the stance of the hyper-objective observer diagnosing the causes for the 
evils that were unleashed. In recounting the failures that befell the coordination of the country‘s 
defenses, the Commission used massively documented technical information. Accounting for the 
financing of al Qaeda operatives and the flights of Saudi nationals from U.S. airspace saw the 
Commission adopting argument from absence to refute conspiratorial understandings. Finally, 
the Commission cast blame onto the shoulders of a single enemy cast into the role of the perfect 
enemy. 
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Conspiracists were overtly concerned with the reasons as to why the country invaded Iraq 
after 9/11. In examining the 9/11 Commission Report, I looked at the Commission‘s explanation 
for the war and, noticeably absent was the Commission‘s conclusions as to why Iraq was 
invaded. Instead of taking on conspiracists claims, and rather than supporting the Bush 
administrations reasons for war, the Commission, instead, cast itself in the role of the hyper-
objective observer. According to Hofstadter, the use of hyper-objectivity is a defensive move. 
Conspiracists, rather than attempting to persuade their audiences, simply relay the facts and let 
them speak for themselves.
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 In other words, hyper-objectivity is the absence of explanation for 
information that confronts the one‘s stance. The information that is provided neither confirms 
nor denies other positions, it only supports the position of the conspiracist.  
While the linchpin in most 9/11 conspiracy theories centers on the War in Iraq, 
significant concerns were raised about the failures of the FAA and NORAD to effectively 
coordinate and prevent some of the damage. Conspiracists posited that the failures of the FAA 
and NORAD were the result of a stand-down order issued by those in the highest reaches of 
government and backed their claims by citing the protocols that were in existence between the 
agencies as well as pointing to the inaccurate testimony provided by the agencies‘ officials. In 
handling the failures of the FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate, the Commission 
employs a massively documented myriad of technical details to back their conclusion that the 
failures of the FAA and NORAD stemmed from inexperience and a lack of information. Because 
technical information is not the result of carefully constructed, replicable experiments, the 
information can be carefully constructed to back anyone‘s position if argued correctly.157 
Conspiracists used the protocols to make their case, and the 9/11 Commission used them to make 
their case. In presenting its evidence, the 9/11 Commission provides an explanation of the 
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protocols of in dense, technical prose. Instead of explaining what the protocols mean, the 
Commission simply provides its evidence and arrives at its conclusion.      
The Commission also had to account for the flights of the Saudi nationals who allegedly 
left the U.S. prior to the re-opening of national airspace and the financing behind al Qaeda. 
Conspiracists charged that the ability of the Saudi nationals to leave the country was evidence 
that the White House was involved in covering-up the real causes behind the terrorist attack. As 
Kean and Hamilton note, they chose to focus on the conspiracy theories about the Saudi 
nationals and the financing of al Qaeda operatives because examination of these two areas of 
contestation could provide insight into the operational maneuverings of the terrorists.
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 In 
confronting the evidence, however, the 9/11 Commission employs the absence of evidence as 
evidence that no conspiracy existed. As noted above, the use of absence of evidence as evidence 
that there is no conspiracy is an attempt to shift the burden of proof onto those who would 
contend otherwise. It is a negative argument used in an attempt to prove a proposition that cannot 
possibly proven.  
The final conspiratorial strategy used by the 9/11 Commission was the construction of the 
perfect enemy. Conspiracists had long charged that the real culprit behind the terrorist attacks 
was the Bush administration. After all, how could anyone but a state power overcome the 
defenses of the country? Instead of lending such claims any credence, the Commission cast 
blame for the attacks solely onto the shoulders of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda using a 
carefully constructed perfect enemy. Hofstadter argues that the perfect enemy holds almost 
mythical power, is infinitely cunning, can bend the will of history, and is motivated by evil.
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Rhetorically, depictions of the enemy are dramatic in form and contain lurid imagery in order to 
impress on the audience the power the enemy possesses and the danger the audience is in.   
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The constellation of argument from absence, paradox of substance, massively 
documented evidence, and internal consistency is indicative that the Warren Commission, at 
least to a degree, participated within the genre of the conspiracy argument. Unlike mature 
conspiracy theories, the Warren Commission is unable to take on the signature element of the 
conspiracy genre, its self-sealing nature, because the discourse is a closed, fixed narrative. 
Similarly, the combination of the 9/11 Commission‘s use of hyper-objectivity, massively 
documented technical information, argument from absence, and the construction of the perfect 
enemy is indicative that it, too, participated within the conspiracy genre. And, like the Warren 
Commission the 9/11 Commission lacked the hermetically-sealed signature element of the 
conspiracy genre. The consonance of the substantive characteristics of the Warren and 9/11 
Commission reports is indicative that both commission‘s arguments participated within the 
conspiracy genre. 
The rhetorical sleight-of-hand conspiracy arguments employ make them a particularly 
slippery subject of study. Current conceptions of conspiracy offer that these tricky arguments are 
based on absences, are self-reinforcing, and are hermetically sealed. Rather than the previously 
diagnosed pathology, contemporary belief in conspiracy is indicative of a general suspicion of, 
and cynicism about, institutions of power. Official discourses enter the public sphere severely 
hampered by the loss of central authority and the indeterminacy of information, but also by the 
persuasive force of conspiracy beliefs. Official discourses are no longer able to simply advance 
affirmative arguments; they are forced to respond to the conspiracy discourses already existing 
within the public sphere, which enters the two disparate discourses into a dialogue. Official 
discourse is no longer in control of its own agenda and the intersection between conspiracy 
beliefs and official discourse is a battleground for legitimacy being waged through, on the one 
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hand, a discourse that is able to adapt to cultural and temporal changes, and on the other hand, a 
discourse that is fixed and static but is supposed to signify the ―definitive‖ and ―final‖ 
conclusion. The Warren and 9/11 Commissions‘ reports, in particular, are examples of official 
discourse affected by pervasive belief in, and power of, conspiracy in our era. 
The significance of this dissertation is threefold; most significantly, it contributes to a 
more precise and comprehensive understanding of the rhetorical power of conspiracy arguments 
in contemporary society, specifically by demonstrating how conspiracy narratives shape official 
narratives. Secondly, the study provides insight into the interaction of official discourses and 
conspiracy discourses (especially as they currently exist). Finally, such a study has implications 
for understanding the direction of political life under our current social and political conditions. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter two provides an analysis of the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the 
discourse of the Warren Commission Report. I pay particular attention to instances where the 
Warren Commission directly, and indirectly, confronts both the conspiracy theories that were in 
circulation within the public sphere, and those that were reasonably expected to surface. These 
moments of conflict are instructive as to how the Warren Commission employs rhetorical 
techniques to construct its discursive authority, as well as its attempts to maintain its authority 
over conspiracy theories. Moreover, I examine the Warren Commission‘s attempt to diminish 
beliefs in conspiracy theories reasonably expected to surface as a result of the Commission‘s 
discourse. Specifically, I examine the Commission‘s use of evidence in making its case for what 
would come to be termed by conspiracists as the magic bullet as well as its attempt to construct a 
compelling motive for the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. A thorough examination of 
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situational cues, constraints, and the instances where the report diminishes its own authority 
gives insight into the agenda-setting capabilities of conspiracies and the inability of official 
discourse to handle these claims in our era. 
Chapter three examines the 9/11 Commission Report, my second case study. As with the 
Warren Commission Report, I focus on the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the 9/11 
Commission Report, paying attention to the ways in which the discourse confronted conspiracy 
claims and how the 9/11 Commission dealt with these claims. Furthermore, the 9/11 
Commission came into a time in which conspiracy theories had already reached a level of 
maturity unseen by the Warren Commission. While the Warren Commission had to anticipate 
how conspiracy theories would burgeon, many of the conspiracy theories the 9/11 Commission 
confronted had already displayed the trajectory of their arguments. The 9/11 Commission‘s 
rationale for, and how they ultimately dealt with these more mature conspiracy theories is 
particularly insightful, especially in the wake of the failures of the Warren Commission to 
contain similar conspiracy claims. Finally, the terrorist attacks were a conspiracy and, in some 
regards, there is a closer affinity between the discourse of the 9/11 Commission and those of 
conspiracy arguments, especially as they pertain to the characterization of the enemy.  
Chapter four highlights the implications of this study. This dissertation is ultimately 
about the agenda setting power of conspiracies and the inability of official discourse to deal with 
these claims effectively. The loss of central authority and the indeterminacy of information have 
given rise to the power and belief in conspiracy theories. Roughly forty years exists between the 
exigencies calling the two texts of this study into being. The 9/11 Commission Report, although 
called into being by different exigencies but with a similar purpose to the Warren Commission 
Report, built upon the strengths of the Warren Commission and attempted to alleviate any of its 
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weaknesses. There is a discernable difference between the ways both texts handled claims of 
conspiracy, but there are also remarkable similarities. The similarities and the differences 
between the two discourses are expanded upon. Finally, the chapter focuses on how conspiracy 
theories in our contemporary times affect governance. When conspiracy theories are unable to be 
quelled by official discourse, when conspiracy theories become the preferred way of significant 
segments of the public‘s understanding of the ways things are, then the ability for government 
officials to do anything for the public good, be it enacting healthcare reform, expanding social 
programs, or even attempting to cut taxes or create jobs, these attempts by officials can, and do, 
get labeled as a conspiracy against the people. The ability to effectively govern is seriously 
diminished because everything can be labeled, and be believed, as a conspiracy.    
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AUTHORITY, ETHOS, AND PARADOX: 
REFUTING CONSPIRACY IN THE WARREN COMMISSION REPORT 
”The very word ‘secrecy’ is repugnant in a free and open society; and we are  
as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret societies, to secret  
oaths and to secret proceedings. We decided long ago that the dangers of  
excessive and unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far outweighed the  
dangers, which are cited to justify it.” 
—President John F. Kennedy 
Conspiracy theories about the assassination of President Kennedy circulated within the 
public sphere nearly as soon as the first bullet rang out on that ill-fated November day in Dallas. 
The events that continued to play out during that remarkable weekend—the capture and 
detention of Lee Harvey Oswald, the subsequent uncovering of Oswald‘s defection to the Soviet 
Union and his Cuban sympathies, and Oswald‘s murder by Jack Ruby—all led the country, its 
leaders, and, indeed, leaders throughout the world, to believe that the death of President Kennedy 
was the result of a conspiracy. Within a week of the assassination nearly 70 percent of the 
American public, including President Johnson and Jacqueline Kennedy, believed that the deaths 
of the president and Oswald were part of a conspiracy, despite the fact that the media latched 
onto what Barbie Zelizer termed the master narrative of the lone gunman.
1
 Not surprisingly, 
given the Cold War context in which the assassination took place and the fact that the suspect, 
Oswald, had at one time defected to the Soviet Union, some of the first conspiracy theories 
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circulating within the public sphere posited that President Kennedy‘s assassination was the result 
of a vast Communist conspiracy.
2
 The fear that a Communist conspiracy was in place to 
assassinate President Kennedy politicized the event and caused fear and anxiety within the 
public. 
Several notable historians and cultural scholars assert that because so many people 
suspected a conspiracy, and because President Johnson believed that conspiracy beliefs left 
unchecked could lead to nuclear war, the President‘s Commission on the Assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy (which would become popularly known as the Warren Commission) 
was convened.
3
 Thus, if the Warren Commission was convened, at least in part, to combat 
conspiracy beliefs, then it was incumbent upon the Warren Commission to respond to and 
investigate such claims.
4
 The subsequent investigation of, and response to, conspiracy claims is 
indicative of a relationship between the Warren Commission and conspiracy theories that has 
either not been recognized or has remained largely unexplored, a relationship that existed prior 
to the compilation of the Warren Commission Report.
5
 
The need to address conspiracy claims made it impossible for the Warren Commission to 
simply make an affirmative argument by laying out the case against Oswald in the assassination 
of President Kennedy, and telling the American people what happened, who was responsible, 
and why it occurred. The cultural force of conspiracy theories complicated the means by which 
the Commission could combat the very real fear that conspirators involved in the assassination 
were still at large. Rather than providing the American public with discourse with which it could 
relate, the Warren Commission attempted to contain belief in conspiracy by asserting its 
authority in making its case. This turn to authority also led to the excesses and peculiarities of the 
Warren Commission Report, and is what firmly grounds the report within the contemporary 
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social and cultural conditions, namely, the loss of central authority. As Alan Nadel explains, 
―The inability to produce a coherent narrative, because it is, and necessarily must be, duplicitous, 
amoral, and promiscuous,‖ lies with the loss of central authority that is no longer recognized as 
―monologic, theologic, and sexually domesticated.‖6 The attempt to reconstitute a monologic 
authority, as engendered in the metanarrative of the Warren Commission Report, I argue, was a 
direct result of the need to undermine belief in conspiracy, and it is this need that drew the 
Warren Commission Report into a dialogue with conspiracy theories and led to the rhetorical 
excesses in the text. In attempting to dispel conspiracy beliefs, the Warren Commission took an 
aggressive stance against conspiracy theories through argument from absence, the paradox of 
substance, the use of massive evidence, and the construction of an internally consistent narrative 
that used technical language which made the narrative inscrutable to the general American 
public. If conspiracy discourse is able to contort the official accounts of significant historical 
events, then the cultural force and argumentative power of conspiracy theories is revelatory of 
significant political and social implications, especially as they exist in our times. 
 
The Early ’60s: A Center That Would Not Hold 
The belief that President Kennedy was killed as a result of a Communist conspiracy was 
engendered in the pervasive fears of communism in the postwar world. After World War II, the 
United States emerged as the reigning military and political power in the world. The sole ability 
of the U.S. to harness the power of nuclear weaponry gave a tactical advantage to the political 
and militaristic moves of the country. Beliefs in American superiority permeated the cultural 
landscape, but, regardless of those beliefs, there was a sense of anxiety that also permeated 
society. The specter of communism loomed large over the U.S. As the horrors of Stalin‘s purges 
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became more widely known, and as Stalin continued to occupy more and more political states 
and put them under his regime under what would become known as the Eastern Bloc, tensions 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union grew. Tensions between the two powers mounted in 
postwar America, especially after it was learned that the Soviets had successfully detonated their 
first nuclear bomb in September 1949.
7
 The loss of the monopoly the U.S. had over the nuclear 
arsenal fueled fear and anxiety, and, as a result, Stephen Whitfield argues, a new kind of Cold 
War warrior emerged consisting of a super-patriot who adopted draconian policies to contain not 
only the threat of communism from abroad, but the perceived fear of communism within the 
country.
8
 Nadel explains that while the official foreign policy of the United States was one of 
containment, containment was also the rhetorical strategy used ―to foreclose dissent, preempt 
dialogue, and preclude contradiction‖ among the American people.9 This politicization of 
American culture, according to Whitfield, led to ―the suffocation of liberty and the debasement 
of culture itself, frequently from Americans imposing repression on themselves.‖10 The super-
patriots to which Whitfield alludes restricted freedoms and adopted the totalitarian ―methods of 
their Communist enemies‖ in order to combat communism abroad and at home. Anyone who 
was perceived as being sympathetic to the Communist cause was inherently suspect in the hyper-
sensitive postwar world.  
Fears of Communism played out in the battle that was waged in the 1960 election 
between the Democratic candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy, and the Republican candidate, 
Vice President Richard M. Nixon. Both candidates renounced Communism as a matter of course. 
Nixon, in the 1952 campaign, had claimed ―there‘s one difference between Reds and Pinks. The 
Pinks want to socialize America. The Reds want to socialize the world and make Moscow the 
world capital.‖11 Nixon went further and identified ―the progressive wing of the Democratic 
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Party‖ as Pinks.12 Since Nixon‘s anti-Communist stance was well known by the 1960 election, 
Whitfield asserts that suspicion was directed at Kennedy for potential Communist sympathies.
13
 
Kennedy fought such suspicions by arguing that the Republicans had allowed a missile gap 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and that they had allowed Communism to invade too 
close to home on the island of Cuba.
14
 Kennedy won the 1960 election in one of the narrowest 
margins in American history; his victory signaled a liberal re-awakening in the country and 
fueled communist fears on the political right.
15
 
          One of President Kennedy‘s challenges was how to handle the problem of Communism. 
Just months after his inaugural address, President Kennedy would give the go-ahead for the top-
secret invasion of Cuba, which had been in the works of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
since the previous year under the Eisenhower administration. The Bay of Pigs Invasion, as it 
became known, was a complete fiasco and dealt a crushing blow to President Kennedy and his 
administration. According to David Steigerwald, the aftermath of the invasion ―won [Castro] an 
enormous propaganda victory, and Kennedy looked weak.‖16 Critics on the right claimed that 
President Kennedy‘s involvement in the Bay of Pigs Invasion was, as Revilo P. Oliver wrote, a 
―disgrace … not merely by ignominious failure, but by the inhuman crime of having lured brave 
men into a trap and sent them to suffering and death.‖17 Rightist critics would even find cause to 
criticize President Kennedy‘s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred a little over a 
year after the Bay of Pigs Invasion.  
On October 16, 1962, U.S. intelligence revealed that the Soviet Union was building 
missile sites in Cuba and President Kennedy issued a demand to the Soviet premier, Nikita 
Khrushchev, for them to be dismantled. Six days after President Kennedy first learned of the 
missiles, he ordered the U.S. Navy to blockade Cuba and then went on television and announced 
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the crisis to the American people. The United States was on the brink of nuclear war with the 
Soviets. But President Kennedy‘s strategy worked and Premier Khrushchev ―agreed to remove 
the missiles in exchange for Kennedy‘s promise that the United States would never invade Cuba‖ 
and, in a secret deal between the two world leaders, President Kennedy agreed to remove U.S. 
nuclear weapons from Turkey.
18
 Both the Americans and the Soviets were able to claim victory 
over each other, and the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed President Kennedy to ease tensions with 
the Soviets.
19
 The outcome of the crisis and the easing of tensions with the Soviets caused some 
to believe that President Kennedy was working ―in close collaboration with Khrushchev … [in 
order] to provide for several months a cover for the steady and rapid transfer of Soviet troops and 
Soviet weapons to Cuba for eventual use against us.‖20 
President Kennedy‘s support of the Civil Rights Movement also spurred criticisms from 
the right. Marilyn Young argues that Robert Welch and the John Birch Society forwarded 
arguments that the method the communists might use to take over the United States included 
―fomenting … internal civil strife in this country, with the Communists aiding their side in every 
way.‖21 As Young argues, the John Birch Society‘s position, as it pertained to the Civil Rights 
Movement, was that the ―racial turmoil‖ that was occurring ―has been and is being fomented by 
Communists.‖22 Thus, any aid that President Kennedy provided to the Civil Rights Movement, 
including federalizing the Mississippi National Guard and sending regular Army troops to force 
James Meredith‘s acceptance into the University of Mississippi, and the Kennedy 
administration‘s proposed legislation that would lead to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, could, and 
was, viewed as evidence of a Communist takeover by Welch and those who followed him.
23
   
The early 1960s, plagued with fears of communism, fueled beliefs that the Communist 
hold on America was increasing. Actions by President Kennedy that were perceived as soft on 
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communism and his actions that backed the Civil Rights Movement served as proof for some of 
the pernicious Communist influence running rampant in the United States. As the 1960s would 
play out, the political left, too, would forward claims of a vast establishment conspiracy, but 
those only largely gained hold after the publication of the Warren Commission Report. Instead, 
the Warren Commission was thrust into an environment that was pervaded by fears of a 
Communist takeover and nascent fears of an establishment coup. In such an environment, it 
comes as no surprise that the explanation for the assassination of President Kennedy would 
generate so much skepticism. 
 
Forming an Authoritative Body  
Upon release of the news that President Kennedy had been shot, bedlam erupted. The people 
clamored for immediate information and the press tried to keep up with their demands. As 
reporters waited outside of Parkland Memorial Hospital, inaccurate accounts of the president‘s 
wounds, the number of shots fired, and even the premature announcement of the president‘s 
death occurred as the press endeavored to gain information and to understand how, and most 
especially why, such a young and vigorous man became the victim of an assassin‘s bullet.24 
Tension and misinformation mounted upon the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald. 
With Oswald‘s arrest, Dallas Police Headquarters became the scene of utter 
pandemonium. Reporters jammed into hallways and corridors, virtually blocking entrances and 
exits. The police were unable to control the flow of information, which resulted in fragments 
being reported and skewed.
25
 Speculation abounded, and questions of conspiracy flooded 
newswires as well as television and radio broadcast accounts of the assassination, especially after 
it was learned that Oswald had attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship in favor of the Soviet 
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Union and that he was a Cuban sympathizer.
26
 Newspapers reported on Oswald‘s guilt, dropping 
the presumption of innocence, and while the world conveyed its shock and dismay over the 
events in Dallas, fear and tension climbed as people claimed President Kennedy‘s death had all 
of the earmarks of a government coup.
27
 
 Fear of a foreign conspiracy mounted when, fewer than forty-eight hours after the 
president‘s death, Oswald, in full view of the cameras of national news networks, was shot and 
killed while in police custody.
28
 Fidel Castro and the Soviet Union claimed the assassination was 
part of a right-wing plot, and Castro blamed Mexico for implicating him in the murder of 
President Kennedy.
29
 Others looked to the reputation of Dallas as a bastion of right-wing 
radicals; the liberal Adlai Stevenson had been the victim of an attack only a month earlier while 
visiting Dallas.
30
 While the media was attempting to assert its narrative authority over the 
happenings in Dallas, blame and finger-pointing ensued as different legal agencies attempted to 
explain the events surrounding the president‘s assassination. 
 As the press fought for access to information, local, state, and federal investigative 
agencies lobbied for the authority to investigate the president‘s death. Initially, responsibility for 
conducting the investigation of the assassination fell under the purview of the Dallas police. 
After Oswald‘s death, the Dallas police issued a statement indicating they considered the case 
closed. However, leading Dallas and state officials sought to reassure the public that the 
importance of the case made it necessary for their investigation to continue. Texas Governor 
John Connally, also wounded from the shots that felled President Kennedy, called for a state 
inquiry. The Secret Service, worried about its reputation as the protector of the president, was 
quick to look at what went wrong. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) launched its 
investigation immediately after it became known the president was shot. President Johnson 
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encouraged the FBI to continue its investigation after Oswald‘s death. The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) sent Assistant Attorney General Herbert J. Miller, Jr., to Dallas in an advisory capacity, 
despite the fact that the DOJ had no control over state and local investigations.
31
 The uncertainty, 
questions, and claims of conspiracy circulating among the public, including beliefs that President 
Kennedy was killed as part of a Communist plot, that there was a connection between Oswald 
and Jack Ruby, that racists were the cause of the assassination, and that the bullet wound in 
President Kennedy‘s neck was an entrance wound, coupled with the various legal agencies 
posturing for the authority to investigate the assassination, necessitated that a unified and 
communal means be constructed by which the assassination would be investigated and 
understood.
32
 
The exigencies of the assassination needed to be interpreted rhetorically; a coherent 
narrative that would give meaning to the event was called for. The chaotic flow of information 
surrounding the assassination, filled with as many facts as there were suspicions, and the 
posturing for authority to investigate the president‘s and Oswald‘s murders culminated in a 
climate filled with uncertainty about what had happened, who was responsible, why it had 
happened, and, more important, who was in charge. Uncertainty engenders fear and requires an 
explanation, one that reassures the public and simultaneously provides it with a means by which 
to interpret the situation.
33
 In an effort to streamline information and to assuage the American 
public‘s, and indeed the international community‘s, fears and anxiety, Kennedy‘s successor, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, called for a presidential inquiry into the events of President 
Kennedy‘s assassination and Oswald‘s murder.34 The New York Times stated, ―President Johnson 
has acted with wisdom and dispatch to clear up all the doubts surrounding President Kennedy‘s 
assassination and the cycle of horror it initiated.‖35 This inquiry, as it became popularly known, 
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was the Warren Commission. Headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, the seven-
person Warren Commission brought a wealth of legal knowledge to the investigation of 
President Kennedy‘s death. The Warren Commission was to serve as the voice, the rhetorical 
audience, of the assassination. 
Significant constraints were leveled against the Warren Commission before it even began 
its investigation, what Lloyd Bitzer, borrowing from Aristotle, refers to as artistic and inartistic.
36
 
Although the Commission was given broad legal powers, including subpoena and immunity 
powers, it lacked the funding and resources to conduct a completely independent investigation.
37
 
Furthermore, the Commission was constrained by time. On the one hand, the Commission was 
pressured by President Johnson to conduct its investigation quickly, pressure viewed by some as 
inspired by the upcoming 1964 presidential election. On the other hand, the members of the 
Commission were enormously busy men, dividing their time among such entities as the U.S. 
House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Supreme Court, the World Bank, and their 
responsibilities to the Commission.
38
  
In addition to time and responsibility constraints, the Commission faced significant 
problems with the evidence. The primary suspect, indeed the only suspect, in the assassination of 
the president was dead, which made it impossible for the Commission and the American people 
to reach closure through trial proceedings. Key elements of the investigation were completed 
(i.e., the collection of evidence at the scene and the autopsy of the president) before the 
Commission had an opportunity to take part in the investigation, or to direct any subsequent 
actions. Key pieces of evidence were overlooked, mishandled, or disappeared.
39
 Secret Service 
agents, and other critical law enforcement officials, failed to secure the ―scene‖ of the 
assassination with the first agents not returning until ―approximately 20 to 25 minutes after the 
59 
shots were fired,‖ which opened up the possibility that witnesses were not detained to take their 
statements.
40
 Governor Connally‘s shirt was sent to the dry cleaners before being examined by 
forensic and ballistic experts; only two bullets were found (although the Commission repeatedly 
asserts that three shots were fired); the original notes taken during the autopsy of President 
Kennedy‘s body were burned; x-rays of the president‘s body went unexamined by the 
commissioners (allegedly to protect the privacy of the president and his family); and the autopsy 
report issued by the pathologists at Bethesda Naval Hospital directly conflicted with the autopsy 
report issued by the FBI, which was largely summarized by the press after its release to the 
Warren Commission.
41
 Similarly, conflicting evidence existed between the FBI report on the 
assassination, which was released mere weeks after the assassination, and what the Warren 
Commission would forward to the public, which would pose problems that the Commission 
would have to overcome in its narrative. 
Most significant, however, was the Commission‘s dependence on the secretive and 
territorial federal legal agencies that were not only responsible for carrying out their own 
investigations of the assassination and on which reports the Commission would largely rely, but 
such agencies, especially the FBI, were implicated in conspiracy charges. Commissioner Gerald 
Ford, in his memoir on the Warren Commission, wrote that, just weeks after the Warren 
Commission convened for the first time, Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr informed the 
Commission of an allegation that Oswald was an FBI informant.
42
 The commissioners 
immediately met to determine what could be done to not only determine the veracity of the 
claim, but to also discuss how to proceed. According to Ford, Commissioner Allen Dulles, who 
was the former director of the CIA, stated, ―This is a terribly hard thing to disprove.‖43 
Moreover, Ford penned, ―Mr. Boggs observed with some uneasiness, ‗What you do is make out 
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a problem, if this be true—make our problem utterly impossible, because you say this rumor 
can‘t be dissipated under any circumstance.‘‖44 The inability to disprove such allegations, 
according to Ford, weighed heavily on the Commission. Ford wrote, ―These observations by 
Allen Dulles pinpointed the difficulty the Commission would face in dealing not only with the 
possibility that Oswald might be an FBI agent but also with all the myriad rumors that the 
imaginations of thousands of writers would create in the next thousand years. They dramatized 
the complexity of the Commission‘s charge.‖45 Ford‘s passage is important for three reasons. 
First, it demonstrates that the Commission was aware of the claims of conspiracy that were 
circulating within the public. Second, it alludes to the overwhelming burden the Commission 
would have in dispelling conspiracy beliefs. Finally, it demonstrates that the Commission was 
cognizant of conspiracy claims that would undoubtedly come to light in the ensuing months and 
years.  
The Commission had to form a narrative that provided the American people with a 
coherent accounting of the assassination and the myriad information that addressed the rhetorical 
exigencies of the assassination, including the murder of Oswald, the conflicting news reports, 
and the claims of conspiracy.
46
 Not only did the Warren Commission have to determine who was 
responsible for the deaths of President Kennedy and Oswald, they simultaneously had to 
overcome the serious constraints the evidence posed, and compete with other entities for 
authority over the investigation; and, as Ford illustrated in his memoir, at least one underlying 
reason for the discourse was to disprove conspiracy beliefs. Instead of simply telling the people 
who killed the president, the Warren Commission was forced into creating a discourse that, in 
Edward Jay Epstein‘s words, ―restore[d] public confidence, dispel[led] rumors of foreign 
intrigue, and protect[ed] the national interest.‖47 In other words, the task of the Warren 
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Commission was to contain the claims of conspiracy, both those that existed and those that could 
be reasonably expected to arise. Attempting to dispel conspiracy beliefs forced the Commission 
to take on an enormous burden of proof and undermined the Commission‘s authority to narrate 
the events of the assassination of President Kennedy. 
 
Authority, Presumption, Invention, and the Burden of Proof  
The Warren Commission‘s reaction to, and subsequent dialogue with, conspiracy claims is 
dependent upon the interrelationship between authority, presumption, invention, and the burden 
of proof. The interplay among these elements inherently colors how the arguments within a 
discourse are constructed. In any argument, it is incumbent for opposing sides to determine 
where presumption and the burden of proof lie. Presumption, as Richard Whately characterizes 
it, is ―such a pre-occupation of the ground, as implies that it must stand good till some sufficient 
reason is adduced against it; in short, that the Burden of proof lies on the side of him who would 
dispute it.‖48 The question of which side carries presumption is the determining factor for how, 
in Whately‘s words, ―the whole character of a discussion will often very much depend.‖49 If one 
has presumption on his/her side, then the rhetor has the option of simply refuting the claims 
being brought against him/her. However, if it is the case that the rhetor is shouldering the burden 
of proof, then he/she must make an affirmative case, and must provide the audience with enough 
evidence that his/her position is viable. Generally, presumption resides with existing institutions 
and with the status quo, thus the burden of proof rests with the side that counters prevailing 
beliefs. If the goal in an argument is to change popular assumptions, it is necessary to shoulder 
the burden of proof, which means it is necessary to give the audience good reasons to give up its 
convictions in favor of a new attitude.
50
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The distinction between presumption and the burden of proof, however, is not static. 
Instead, the interplay between presumption and the burden of proof is dynamic; it changes 
according to what is being argued. Whately states, ―It is to be observed, that a Presumption may 
be rebutted by an opposite Presumption, so as to shift the Burden of proof to the other side.‖51 It 
is within this counter-play between presumption and the burden of proof, claim and counter-
claim, that the concepts of authority and invention enter into how a rhetor should, or could, 
characterize his/her arguments. While presumption and the burden of proof exist in a dynamic 
state, it is no stretch to say that authority usually maintains presumption, and, therefore, authority 
rests with the status quo, existing institutions, and the like. Whately states, ―The person, Body, or 
book, in favour of whose decisions there is a certain Presumption, is said to have, so far, 
‗Authority‘: in the strict sense of the word. And a recognition of this kind of Authority,—an 
habitual Presumption in favour of such one‘s decision or opinions—is usually called 
‗Deference.‘‖52 Whately‘s characterization implies that audiences, in general, defer to authority, 
and audiences defer to authority because, as Lincoln asserts, audiences subject to authority 
operate under the assumption that authority has the ―‗capacity for reasoned elaboration.‘‖53  
Lincoln posits that authority has ―the capacity to produce consequential speech, quelling 
doubts and winning the trust of the audiences whom they engage.‖54 The ability for authority to 
produce consequential speech leads Lincoln to unfold another type of authority, discursive 
authority, which comes from the effect discourse has on an audience. Lincoln explains, 
―Discursive authority is not so much an entity as it is (1) an effect; (2) the capacity for producing 
that effect; and (3) the commonly shared opinion that a given actor has the capacity for 
producing that effect.‖ When a speaker‘s discourse has the effect of rendering an audience silent, 
then it is said to have discursive authority. When discursive authority is assured, it is not 
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necessary for authority to forward an argument. Instead, if authority is sufficiently satisfied that 
it is retaining presumption, and that the audience will be satisfied with authority‘s position, then 
all authority need do is provide the audience with assertions, or claims that it ―knows‖ in order to 
effectively silence an audience. 
Possessing discursive authority, however, does not mean that authority cannot be 
challenged. When assertions made by authority are challenged, according to Lincoln, it is 
changed in subtle, but significant, ways because ―the relation of trust and acceptance 
characteristic of authority is suspended, at least temporarily, in that moment.‖55 When assertions 
from authority are not enough to appease the audience‘s expectations, and authority must, 
instead, provide the audience with an argument, Lincoln states that, ―it ceases to be authority for 
the moment and becomes (an attempt at) persuasion.‖56 It is this site of conflict that serves as a 
determining factor in invention and inherently determines how a rhetor will argue his/her case.  
Historically, rhetorical invention has been viewed as determining what to say and how to 
say it. But, according to Yameng Liu, determining what to say is just one task of the rhetor. Liu 
states, ―Equally important, and probably more difficult, is defining and redefining her own 
rhetorical responsibilities in such a manner that she is justified, or, we may say, authorized,  in 
saying what she has to say, stopping where she feels like stopping, and bypassing what she does 
not want to touch on.‖57 Liu argues that determining where a rhetor is authorized to speak not 
only occurs prior to invention, but serves a different function than invention. Determining 
―[w]hether, where, when, and in what detail‖ is something rhetors deal with throughout the 
invention process.
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 Moreover, invention occurs at the site of conflict over who has authority. 
―To invent is, in this sense,‖ according to Liu, ―to pit one authority or presumption against one 
another, or against itself, for the achievement of a new, relatively stable alignment of ‗reputable‘ 
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opinions.‖59 In essence, invention is dependent upon where the rhetor has, or is trying to 
establish, authority and colors how the argument will be carried forth.
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Presumably, if an entity such as the Warren Commission has presumption and authority, 
the Commission could simply lay out its case asserting what had happened, who had done it, and 
why it was done. Furthermore, if the Warren Commission retained authority and presumption, 
then it would have the option of choosing ―whether, where, when and in what detail‖ to refute 
any counterarguments leveled against its discourse. If the Commission chose not to address 
claims of conspiracy, that is, if it believed it maintained its argumentative presumption, then 
addressing conspiracy claims would not be necessary. However, if the Commission believed that 
its presumption was being challenged, if it believed that conspiracy claims had an equal or 
greater presumption, then the Commission would be compelled to come out of its fortified 
position and attack those claims. The choices the Commission made in confronting conspiracy 
claims is indicative that it felt its authority and presumption were being challenged. Attacking 
conspiracy claims provided them with legitimization. Whether or how the Commission chose to 
confront claims of conspiracy is manifested within the corpus of the Warren Commission Report 
and is most noticeable in the Commission‘s treatment of conspiracy theories.  
 
Establishing and Challenging Authority 
Various claims of conspiracy existed in the public sphere prior to the release of the 
Commission‘s report, claims that had the capability, if left unanswered, to undermine the 
Commission‘s conclusions. While the media may have lauded the efforts of President Johnson to 
convene the Warren Commission, there were others who challenged not only President 
Johnson‘s right to do so, but also questioned whether the Commission would uncover the ―truth‖ 
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about the assassination. Critics on the right of the political spectrum argued that the truth of the 
assassination would never be known because of a vast and sinister Communist conspiracy. 
Critics on the left believed that the truth would not be uncovered because the real power behind 
the conspiracy would make sure that the ―real‖ evidence would never come to light. Both the 
political right and left forwarded similar claims, although the villain behind the conspiracy 
differed between the accounts, and both challenged the authority of the Warren Commission, 
albeit in different ways.
61
 
Critics on the political right claimed that the Warren Commission was an illegal act that 
attempted to hide the truth of a vast Communist conspiracy from the American people. For 
instance, Congressman Martin Dies, in the American Opinion, wrote:  
What Constitutional authority is there for such a Presidential commission? Why was not  
the Committee on Un-American Activities, or the Senate Internal Security Sub- 
Committee permitted to conduct the probe? And why did President Johnson ignore the  
proposal of a close personal friend of the President and a member of the Presidential  
commission, that a bipartisan Committee of Congress conduct the investigation? Why  
was it deemed necessary to establish a commission of dubious Constitutional authority— 
to say the least—handpicked by a President seeking reelection?62 
Dies further iterated he doubted whether the Warren Commission would arrive at the truth 
because ―there are strong and compelling political reasons, as well as present international 
factors, to influence this probe and prevent a full disclosure of all of the ugly facts that have been 
camouflaged for years but have now come to a climax in the assassination of President 
Kennedy.‖63 Similarly, Oliver wrote, ―In a hasty and thus far successful attempt to thwart an 
investigation by legally constituted Authorities … an illegal and un-Constitutional ‗special 
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commission‘ was improvised with the obvious hope that it could be turned into a Soviet-style 
kangaroo court.‖64 While the right expressed doubts, not only about the legality of President 
Johnson convening a commission, but also that the Warren Commission would uncover the truth, 
i.e., the Communist conspiracy to take over the United States, the political left also expressed 
doubts that the Warren Commission was capable of arriving at the truth and challenged the 
actions of the Commission.    
Members of the political left believed that the Warren Commission would fail to uncover 
the truth because the powers that be, the secretive and territorial agencies of the federal 
government who were the real power in the Washington establishment, would make sure that the 
evidence the Commission received showed only what the power establishment desired. M.S. 
Arnoni, in the Minority of One, wrote that the Warren Commission was ―primarily intended as a 
whitewash, to convince the people that everyone has done his job and that no significant parts 
are missing from the jig-saw puzzle.‖ Arnoni asserted that the Commission would ―primarily 
review evidence gathered by other investigative bodies.‖ Such investigations would, according to 
Arnoni, make any evidence ―indiscernible‖ because ―[t]he possibility can by no means be 
dismissed that important men in Washington do know the identity of the conspirators, or at least 
some of them, and that these conspirators are so powerful that prudence dictates that they not be 
identified in public.‖65 Bertrand Russell similarly asked ―Why were all the members of the 
Warren Commission closely connected with the U.S. Government?”66 Even though the 
commissioners‘ ties to the government were damaging enough in Russell‘s mind, the conduct of 
the Commission ―confirmed one‘s worst fears‖ about the veracity of the Commission‘s 
findings.
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In essence, the right was challenging the authority of the president to convene a 
commission (which was evidence of a conspiracy), while the left was challenging the 
verifiability of the information the Commission would receive and the veracity of its actions 
(which was evidence of a conspiracy). Both the right and left claimed that truth about the 
assassination would never come to light because of a vast and sinister conspiracy existing within 
the government.  
The Warren Commission attempted to combat such claims by strenuously arguing that it 
had authority over the narrative of President Kennedy‘s assassination. Even in establishing its 
authority, however, the Commission faced challenges that had to be dealt with within the text 
and is indicative that the Commission was not wholly in charge of its own agenda, that its 
authority was being challenged by other forces. Historically, Lincoln tells us that authority is 
categorized into two types: executive and epistemic. Executive authority comes from those who 
are ―in authority‖ and epistemic authority consists of those people who are ―experts.‖68 Because 
both forms of authority have the capacity to ―produce consequential speech,‖ it is necessary to 
demonstrate, through discourse, the type of authority the rhetor possesses. Both executive and 
epistemic authorities were retained by the Warren Commission in investigating and narrating the 
happenings of the assassination of President Kennedy.  
The Warren Commission was empowered, was authorized, by President Johnson to 
narrate the happenings of President Kennedy‘s assassination and the subsequent murder of his 
alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. The Commission writes, ―President Lyndon B. 
Johnson…created this Commission to investigate the assassination … of John Fitzgerald 
Kennedy, the 35
th
 President of the United States. The President directed the Commission to 
evaluate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination and the subsequent 
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killing of the alleged assassin and report its findings and conclusions to him.‖69 The Warren 
Commission, by way of executive authority, was given the right to tell the story of the 
assassination. Additionally, by way of being the investigative body, the Warren Commission also 
took on the mantle of epistemic authority.  
In order to demonstrate its epistemic authority, the Commission underscores the legal and 
investigative expertise of the commissioners and its staff. For instance, the Commission states, 
―As Chairman of the Commission, President Johnson selected Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the 
United States, former Governor and Attorney General of the State of California.‖70 All of the 
commissioners are introduced along with their current titles, which enhances their executive 
authority through the mantle of their offices, or former offices, along with other information that 
might heighten their epistemic authority. The same tactic is used in introducing the 
Commission‘s staff when it states, ―The Commission has been aided by 14 assistant counsel with 
high professional qualifications … This staff undertook the work of the Commission with a 
wealth of legal and investigative experience and a total dedication to the determination of the 
truth.‖71 In highlighting the credentials of the staff, the Commission was establishing its 
epistemic authority.  
 Through its executive and epistemic authority, the Warren Commission established its 
mandate to provide the American public with ―consequential speech,‖ which has the capacity to 
―quell doubts and win the trust‖ of the American public in its narration of the assassination. To 
do so, the Commission stated that its objective was ―to identify the person or persons responsible 
for both the assassination of President Kennedy and the killing of Oswald through an 
examination of the evidence,‖ ―and [to] report its findings and conclusions to [President 
Johnson].‖72 The Commission further states, ―The task has demanded unceasing appraisal of the 
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evidence by the individual members of the Commission in their effort to discover the whole 
truth.‖73 It was important for the Commission to set forth its epistemic authority in investigative 
matters to instill confidence in the audience that it had the capacity for reasoned elaboration. 
Indeed, the Commission was so concerned with establishing its epistemic authority that it framed 
its report as an extension of the guiding principles of the United States, ―a country dedicated to 
the concepts of reasoned argument and peaceful political change‖ through the recognition of ―the 
right of people everywhere to full and truthful knowledge.‖ 74 As a matter of course, the Warren 
Commission ―endeavor[ed] to fulfill that right and to appraise this tragedy by the light of reason 
and the standard of fairness … with a deep awareness of [its] responsibility to present to the 
American people an objective report of the facts relating to the assassination.‖75 The 
Commission was arguing that its report was an extension, not only of its own epistemic 
authority, but also the epistemic authority of the American people. 
Given the executive and epistemic authorities of the Warren Commission, it should come 
as no surprise that the commissioners viewed their mandate as the singular, definitive, and final 
narrative of the assassination. The Commission states that it ―viewed … [its task] as an 
unequivocal Presidential mandate to conduct a thorough and independent investigation.‖76  The 
Commission‘s method for arriving at its conclusion ―necessarily differed from those of a court 
conducting a criminal trial of a defendant before it, since under our system there is no provision 
for a posthumous trial.‖77 As a result of its objective, and the necessary departure from criminal 
proceedings, ―the Commission functioned neither as a court presiding over an adversary 
proceeding nor as a prosecutor determined to prove a case, but as a factfinding [sic] agency 
committed to the ascertainment of the truth.‖78 In essence, the Commission asserted that it was 
serving what Kenneth Burke classified as a subordinate of the scene from an essentially 
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materialist philosophical view.
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 In other words, the Commission claimed that it was simply 
providing unvarnished information, simply the facts of the president‘s and Oswald‘s deaths. 
The Commission, however, had to address the fear that the president‘s murder was the 
result of a conspiracy. The opening paragraphs of the report build emotive intensity for the 
necessity of an independent investigation. ―The subject of the Commission‘s inquiry was a chain 
of events which saddened and shocked the people of the United States and of the world ... In the 
United States and abroad, these events evoked universal demands for an explanation.‖80 
Essentially, the Commission was attempting to tap into the grief of the nation in order to 
legitimize its existence, which is further iterated two paragraphs later. The Commission writes:  
The events of these 2 days were witnessed with shock and disbelief by a Nation grieving  
the loss of its young leader … Theories and speculations mounted regarding the  
assassination. In many instances, the intense public demand for facts was met by partial  
and frequently conflicting reports from Dallas and elsewhere. After Oswald‘s arrest and  
his denial of all guilt, public attention focused both on the extent of the evidence against  
him and the possibility of a conspiracy, domestic or foreign. His subsequent death  
heightened public interest and stimulated additional suspicions and rumors.
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While the Commission acknowledges that rumors and suspicions mounted as a consequence of 
the media frenzy that ensued in the wake of the assassination, the promise behind the 
Commission‘s prose is that it, in its subsequent pages, will reveal the answer to the mystery 
surrounding the assassination. It was aware of the fears gripping the public, but the Commission 
was committed to finding the truth.         
Interestingly, while the Commission goes to great lengths to establish its authority, the 
emotional needs of the public center on addressing the fears that a conspiracy was responsible 
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for the death of President Kennedy. If the Commission felt it was maintaining its argumentative 
presumption, and if the Commission felt it was maintaining its discursive authority, then the 
choice by the Commission to address conspiracy fears would not be necessary. The fact that the 
Warren Commission felt compelled to address claims of conspiracy within its discourse is 
indicative that it felt that its presumption and authority was being challenged by other forces. The 
conflict between the authority of the Warren Commission to narrate the story of the 
assassination, and that of conspiracy theories, is indicative of the burdens the Commission was to 
bear throughout the corpus of the text. These sites of contestation are not only a challenge to 
authority, but are also the locations where the Warren Commission is drawn into a dialogue with 
conspiracy theories.  
Walter Fisher contends that dialogues are not only a literary form, but (citing Martin 
Buber) are instances ―‗where each of the participants really has in mind the other or others in 
their present and particular being and turns to them with the intention of establishing a living 
mutual relationship between himself and them.‘‖82 While the Warren Commission may not have 
wanted to establish a dialogue, a relationship, between itself and conspiracy claims, its 
acknowledgement of ―rumors and suspicions,‖ and its investigation of them, gives such claims a 
modicum of legitimacy. And, in creating a dialogue with conspiracy theories, it was important 
for the Commission to know what the counter-position was so that it could argue against it. 
Michael Billig argues, ―The rhetorical approach emphasizes that any attitude is more than an 
expression in favour of a position: it is also implicitly or explicitly an argument against a 
counter-position. Thus, in order to understand an attitudinal position, one must know the counter-
attitudinal position. This is especially relevant to the conspiracy theory of politics.‖83 Inherently, 
by being aware of, and attempting to combat claims of, conspiracy, the Warren Commission 
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established a dialogue with conspiracy arguments and, in doing so, took on some of the generic 
characteristics of the conspiracy narrative.  
While the Commission went to great lengths to establish its authority to investigate the 
assassination of President Kennedy, the need for it to address conspiracy theories within the text 
is indicative of the erosion, however slight, of authority. Had the Commission had simple 
authority, then the need to address conspiracy claims would not have come into play. However, 
because conspiracy claims were already believed by a significant portion of the population, it 
was necessary for the Commission to address such claims. What is particularly salient is how, 
rhetorically, the Commission chose to respond and, equally important, where it believed it had 
presumption and where it was shouldering the burden of proof.  
   
Presumption, Authority, and Argument from Absence 
The interrelationship between presumption and authority is manifested in the Commission‘s use 
of argument from absence and serves as an indicator that not only is the Commission engaged in 
a dialogue with conspiracy arguments, but, in doing so, takes on the characteristics of conspiracy 
argument. Using argument from absence suggests that the Commission was attempting to negate 
beliefs in conspiracy by attempting to make conspiracy arguments shoulder the burden of proof, 
an indication that, at the very least, there were two entities, in Whately‘s words, vying for 
presumption—the Warren Commission and the status quo (or conspiracy arguments). The 
Commission attempted to win this presumptive war through its use of argument from absence. 
The ability of proponents of conspiracy theories to shift the burden of proof onto their 
opponents has long been noted by rhetorical scholars and serves as one of conspiracy theories‘ 
most powerful tools.
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 David Zarefsky notes that, because conspiracy theories are virtually 
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impossible to prove or disprove, the side that wins—the conspiratorial side or the side arguing 
against a conspiracy—depends ―upon who shoulders the burden of proof.‖85 Generally, when 
offering a claim, it is incumbent upon the proponents to provide a prima facie case to support 
their contention. Conspiracy theories, however, reverse this position. Conspiracists offer claims 
and then defy disputants to disprove such claims. Frequently, those countering conspiracy 
arguments are forced into arguing there is no conspiracy by asserting that there is no evidence to 
support the claims. In the logic of conspiracy arguments, however, the absence of evidence 
becomes evidence that there is a conspiracy afloat. The use of absence of evidence, then, allows 
for those making conspiracy claims to retain presumption. Whately states, ―If you have the 
‗Presumption‘ on your side, and can but refute all the arguments brought against you, you have, 
for the present at least, gained a victory: but if you abandon this position, by suffering this 
Presumption to be forgotten, which is in fact leaving out one of, perhaps, your strongest 
arguments, you may appear to be making a feeble attack, instead of a triumphant defence.‖86 The 
Commission‘s use of argument from absence to counter conspiracy claims is indicative that it 
was attempting to force the burden of proof onto the shoulders of conspiracists and assert its 
authority. 
 There was a very real fear within the public that the assassination of President Kennedy 
was the result of a conspiracy. Considering that the Warren Commission was, in part, convened 
in order to root out conspiracy claims, the Commission was forced to take on a double burden of 
proof—proving that Oswald was the lone assassin while simultaneously proving that there was 
no conspiracy. The Commission was placed into an untenable situation; it was forced to attempt 
to disprove claims of conspiracy, a task that is impossible. In its attempt to disprove conspiracy 
theories, the Commission resorted to the use of argument from absence.   
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The narrative of the Commission‘s report is bedeviled with places where argument from 
absence, rather than accumulation of evidence, is used to make the argument, although the most 
telling examples are contained within the chapter titled, ―Investigation of Possible Conspiracy‖ 
and the Appendix titled ―Speculations and Rumors.‖87 The Commission asserts that most of the 
conspiracy claims brought to bear centered on four basic questions: ―Was Lee Harvey Oswald 
really the assassin of the President; why did he do it; did he have any accomplices; and why did 
Ruby shoot Oswald?‖88  While most of the chapter is dedicated to the investigation of Oswald‘s 
background, including his time in the Soviet Union and his political activities once he returned to 
the United States, a significant amount of rhetorical energy centers on refuting the possibility of 
Oswald having a confederate in planning the assassination. 
  The Commission, in several instances, used argument from absence as a means to combat 
conspiracy claims. For instance, Oliver argued that  Oswald might ―have missed connections 
with some agent of the Conspiracy who was to transport him to the airport, and it may be 
significant that, when observed on the street, he was walking directly toward the apartment of the 
Jakob Rubenstein (alias Jack Ruby) who later silenced him.‖89 The Commission countered such 
claims by asserting, ―There is no evidence that Oswald and Ruby knew each other or had any 
relationship through a third party or parties. There is no evidence that Oswald knew where Ruby 
lived. Accordingly, there is neither evidence nor reason to believe that Oswald was on his way to 
Ruby‘s apartment when he was stopped by Tippit.‖90 In essence, the Commission was not only 
negating claims that Oswald and Ruby knew each other, it was similarly negating beliefs that 
there was more to the conspiracy than simply the assassination, that Oswald, as a result of getting 
caught, had to be ―taken out.‖  
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Similarly, if other testimony existed that seemingly linked Oswald with a confederate, the 
Commission impugned the testimony of the witnesses by calling into question the credibility of 
the witnesses and the veracity of their claims. For instance, numerous claims were made 
implying a relationship between Oswald and Ruby. Far too frequently, no real evidence is given 
to support the Commission‘s stance. For instance, ―Wilbryn Waldon (Robert) Litchfield II‖ 
claimed to have seen Ruby and Oswald together at the Carousel Club. The Commission 
responded to this claim by asserting that it ―had substantial doubts concerning Litchfield‘s 
credibility‖ because he had failed to inform the Commission of ―his observation until December 
2, 1963,‖ and he ―had twice been convicted of offenses involving forged checks.‖91 The 
Commission furthers its stance by proclaiming, ―All assertions that Oswald was seen in the 
company of Ruby or anyone else at the Carousel Club have been investigated. None of them 
merits any credence.‖92 A great deal of time is spent attempting to negate the Ruby-Oswald 
connection because of beliefs that the mafia was somehow involved in the assassination plot. In 
order to combat claims of a mafia motive behind the actions of Ruby, who is, as Eric Norden 
writes, ―A petty hoodlum with ties to Chicago and Los Angeles gangs and a record of union 
racketeering,‖ the Commission responds with, ―There is no credible evidence that Jack Ruby was 
involved in the criminal underworld. Investigation disclosed that no one in either Chicago or 
Dallas who had any knowledge that Ruby was associated with any organized criminal activity.‖93 
The Commission is attempting to negate an organized crime angle by asserting that there was 
―no evidence to support‖ such claims. 
The Commission concluded that Oswald acted alone in the assassination because it 
―found no evidence that anyone assisted Oswald in planning or carrying out the assassination,‖ it 
―found no evidence that Oswald was involved with any persons or group in a conspiracy to 
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assassinate the president,‖ and it ―found no evidence to show that Oswald was employed, 
persuaded, or encouraged by any foreign government to assassinate President Kennedy.‖94 
Because there was no evidence to support conspiracy claims, there was, by the Commission‘s 
logic, no conspiracy. But, a negative argument, by definition, cannot be proven. Although hardly 
a representative sample, the prolific use of argument from absence by the Commission is being 
used as evidence to refute conspiracy claims, thus attempting to shift the burden of proof onto 
those who had raised conspiracy charges by attempting to cast doubt onto the evidence that was 
used to support beliefs in conspiracy. 
 The Commission similarly uses argument from absence to disabuse the American public 
of the belief that Oswald was acting under the direction of a foreign power. The Commission 
notes that there were allegations that Oswald ―received aid from one or more persons or political 
groups, ranging from the far left to the far right of the political spectrum, or from a foreign 
government, usually either the Castro regime in Cuba or the Soviet Union.‖95 For instance, Dies 
asserts that Oswald‘s communist beliefs are proof that he was operating under the direct 
commands of the Soviet Union because ―Communists never commit political crimes except in 
obedience to orders of superiors.‖96 To back up his assertions, Dies offers an excerpt taken from 
―the first Report issued unanimously by the Dies Committee—composed of Democrats, 
Republicans, ‗Liberals,‘ and conservatives.‖ The Dies Committee disclosed that ―The 
Communists in the United States openly admit their allegiance to the Communist International at 
Moscow, and glory in the fact that they obey all the orders issued from there immediately and 
implicitly.‖ Furthermore, Dies adds, ―The Communist International is dominated by the Russian 
Communist party and Soviet officials, and could not exist without the wholehearted support of 
the leaders of the Russian Communist party and the financial backing of the Soviet 
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Government.‖97 By Dies‘ logic, the fact that Oswald had defected to the Soviet Union and was 
an avowed Marxist, which Dies asserts is synonymous with Communist, and because 
Communists never enact political crimes without express commands from the leaders in the 
Soviet Union, the only possible explanation was that the assassination of President Kennedy was 
the result of a Communist conspiracy.
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  While the Commission acknowledges that there may have been a political motive 
behind Oswald‘s actions, it does virtually everything within its power to liberate the audience 
beliefs that the USSR was involved in a conspiracy. For instance, the Commission asserts that 
Oswald ―volunteered to give the Soviet officials any information that he had concerning Marine 
Corps operations, and intimated that he might know something of interest.‖99 However, the 
Commission immediately follows the passage by cautioning that ―[n]o evidence had been found 
that they used him for any particular propaganda or other political informational purposes.‖100 
Similarly, the Commission quotes Secretary of State Dean Rusk as saying, ―I have seen no 
evidence that would indicate to me that the Soviet Union considered that it had an interest in the 
removal of President Kennedy or that it was in any way involved in the removal of President 
Kennedy.‖101 Secretary Rusk further iterated, ―I have not seen or heard of any scrap of evidence 
indicating that the Soviet Union had any desire to eliminate President Kennedy nor in any way 
participate in any such event.‖ Secretary Rusk concludes by stating that ―it [orchestrating the 
assassination of President Kennedy] would be an act of rashness and madness for Soviet Leaders 
to undertake such an action as an active policy. Because everything would have been put in 
jeopardy or at stake in connection with such an act. It has not been our impression that madness 
has characterized the actions of the Soviet leadership in recent years.‖102 The Commission used 
an absence of evidence, almost to the point of inanity, to reiterate the point that there was no 
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evidence to indicate there was a political conspiracy involving the USSR afloat. The 
overabundant use of phrases such as there ―is no evidence‖ is indicative that there was doubt, 
suspicion, of a political conspiracy. The Commission further attempted to deflate beliefs in a 
political conspiracy by including Secretary Rusk‘s characterization that such actions would be 
―rash‖ and ―mad‖ on the part of the Soviets. Thus, the Commission was attempting to negate 
beliefs that there was a political conspiracy, but they were further attempting to prove that a 
political conspiracy would have been ―mad‖ on the part of the Soviet Union. 
 The double burden of proof into which the Warren Commission was thrust, proving 
Oswald was the lone gunman and proving that there was no conspiracy, necessitated that the 
Commission alleviate any doubt that there was a conspiracy behind the assassination of the 
president. In essence, the Warren Commission was forced into disputing conspiracy claims by 
using the same type of argument conspiracists use to forward their own claims of conspiracy. 
The Commission‘s use of argument from absence was an attempt to shift the burden of proof 
onto conspiracy charges in order to cast doubt upon the assertions of conspiracists, but 
conspiracy theories, by definition, refuse to shoulder the burden of proof. As Whately stated, 
when one is shouldering the burden of proof, then one must provide the audience with good 
reasons to give up its beliefs. Instead, the Warren Commission was simply providing the 
American public with negations of conspiracy claims; it was providing the audience with a set of 
assertions that there was no conspiracy instead of providing the audience with reasons. The logic 
the Commission used to arrive at its conclusion, that there was no conspiracy, was based on the 
absence of evidence that there was a conspiracy.  
While arguments from absence are most notably used by conspiracy theorists, they are 
not isolated to conspiracy arguments. Darsey notes that such arguments may be made in haste, 
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desperation, or even disinformation.
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 Inherently, in order to assuage the conspiratorial fears and 
doubts of the audience, the Commission had to resort to using a defensive argument, a legislative 
strategy used by an entity that was not conducting a trial. Using the absence of evidence as 
evidence makes the argument become tautological, one that echoes the age-old debate between 
parents and their offspring that answers the question ―why‖ with ―because I said so‖ rather than 
an actual attempt to persuade the audience that there was no conspiracy. But, the absence of 
evidence as evidence is more than tautological; it is a paradox, and paradox is used to counter 
other conspiracy beliefs and to attempt to resolve the problem of authority.  
 
Authority and Paradox 
The Warren Commission faced far more complex claims of conspiracy, ones that could not be 
simply refuted by the Commission through argument from absence or argument from authority. 
Instead, the Commission was forced into a paradox of substance because of its dubious 
relationships with the secretive and territorial agencies of the federal government. What made the 
relationship between the Warren Commission and federal agencies so problematic was that these 
agencies themselves were implicated in conspiracy claims to assassinate the president. As noted 
above, the Warren Commission was made aware of claims that Oswald was a paid informant of 
the FBI early in its investigation. The American people were similarly made aware of such 
claims. For instance, an article in The Nation asserted that the Warren Commission ―must tell us 
if the FBI or any other government intelligence agency was in any way connected with the 
alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. At this moment, the possibility of such associations in the 
young man‘s life is intolerably a subject for speculation.‖104 The Commission acknowledges that 
there were ―[r]umors and speculations that Oswald was in some way associated or used by the 
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agencies of the U.S. Government … Insinuations were [also] made that Oswald had been a CIA 
agent or has some relationship with the CIA.‖ In addition to the alleged relationship with the 
CIA, there were also allegations that Oswald was an operative for the FBI. The Commission 
notes that there was ―[s]peculation that he [Oswald] had some working relationship with the 
FBI.‖105 Yet the Commission was utterly reliant on using these same agencies to investigate the 
assassination, thus setting up a paradox the Commission could not completely reconcile. 
Burke notes that the ―word ‗substance,‘ used to designate what a thing is, derives from a 
word designating something that a thing is not.‖106 For Burke, this moment represents alchemy, 
where a rhetor is able to capitalize on the inability to resolve two incommensurate claims and 
exploit the situation for their own personal gains. Hark Paul Moore offers that the conjunction of 
the two opposing claims that form the paradox allow for a more ―insightful truth‖ than either 
claim, separately, could produce.
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 What Burke and Moore are alluding to is that through an 
examination of what a proposition is stated to be, compared to what the competing proposition is 
stated not to be, we can uncover the actual relationship between the two propositions. What 
makes paradox so compelling in conspiracy theories, Darsey notes, is that ―Paradox is a form of 
innuendo and … lacks refutable substance; it is purely formal argument.‖108 One of the reasons 
paradox is so compelling for the conspiratorial argument is that it leads to what Jodi Dean 
identifies as the signature element of the modern conspiracy: suspicion.
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 Suspicion, according 
to Dean, serves to reinforce what we don‘t know rather than clarifying what we do.110 The most 
obvious place where the Warren Commission is drawn into a paradox is its treatment of the 
evidence provided by the FBI and other legal agencies. 
The Commission had to make some interesting rhetorical maneuvers in order to make its 
case that the FBI or CIA were not involved in a conspiracy, and these moves led the Commission 
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into paradox. Rather than simply relying on the FBI, CIA, Secret Service and other agencies to 
conduct the investigation of the assassination, ―The Commission concluded that the public 
interest in insuring [sic] that the truth was ascertained could not be met by merely accepting the 
reports or the analyses of Federal or State agencies … [T]he premises and conclusions of those 
reports [were] critically reassessed.‖111 Instead of simply asserting that their investigation was 
independent and thorough, the Commission further amplifies its stance by stating it ―directed 
requests to the 10 major departments of the Federal Government, 14 of its independent agencies 
or Commissions, and 4 congressional committees for all information relating to the assassination 
or the background and activities of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby.‖112 The critical 
reexamination to which the Commission alluded consisted of examining the agencies‘ reports, 
asking for all ―underlying investigative materials,‖ and submitting ―detailed requests for 
statements of witnesses and examinations of physical evidence.‖113 In essence, the Warren 
Commission examined the reports, determined if there were points of contention, asked for 
further information from the same agencies, and then had agents and directors of the agencies 
testify under oath. 
The Warren Commission, however, could not completely conduct its own investigation, 
partially because it lacked the funding and resources necessary to accomplish such a feat, and 
partially because of the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover.
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 Instead, the Commission 
couched its dependence by asserting, ―Because of the diligence, cooperation, and facilities of 
Federal investigative agencies, it was unnecessary for the Commission to employ investigators 
other than the members of the Commission‘s legal staff.‖ The due diligence to which the 
Commission referred consisted of approximately 25,500 interviews conducted by the FBI along 
with 25,400 pages of text submitted in its subsequent reports and the 1,550 interviews 
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administered by the Secret Service and the 4,600 pages of information delivered to the 
Commission.
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 Certainly the sheer volume of information the agencies supplied was impressive. 
Still, in essence, the Warren Commission is praising the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA for 
their commitment to helping solve the murder of the president. Yet the Commission is forced to 
reiterate its recognition ―that special measures were required whenever the facts or rumors called 
for an appraisal of the acts of the agencies themselves.‖ The fact that there were allegations that  
implicated the secretive and territorial agencies of the federal government as part of a larger 
conspiracy forced the Commission into a paradoxical position where, in order to conduct a 
complete investigation, it would have to investigate the same institutions that it was reliant on, 
partly because the scope of the Commission‘s investigation necessitated that they investigate the 
conduct of the agents protecting the president and keeping tabs on Oswald and partly because no 
other investigative agencies had the access to the information the Commission desperately 
needed. 
Conspiracy beliefs that federal legal agencies were involved in a conspiracy to 
assassinate President Kennedy was not the only paradoxical position into which the Commission 
was thrust; the Commission also faced a paradoxical position between the inner workings of the 
secretive agencies on which it relied and the public interest these agencies served. Edwin Black 
notes the paradox that institutions that inherently deal with lies, innuendo, and secrets are the 
same institutions that are frequently called upon to disclose the truth. Black states, ―And so the 
paradox is, to put it crudely, that an institution bound to artifice is formed to yield disclosure. 
Drama puts fakery at the service of truth.‖116 Black‘s observation needs only minor extension 
when dealing with secretive and territorial federal investigative agencies. 
83 
Secrecy, by its very nature, breeds distrust; it is an intentional concealment that 
represents a commodity, a privilege, one that is akin to mystery. Sissela Bok states, ―To think 
something secret is already to envisage potential conflict between what insiders conceal and 
outsiders want to inspect or lay bare.‖117 Only those who have access understand the mystery 
because they have the benefit of full disclosure. In politics, secrets serve a hierarchical function. 
Black observed, ―We must observe the general associations of the term ‗classified‘ with ideas of 
having been contained, enclosed, encompassed within a category, placed in a class, ranked. We 
have but to extend these associations to the political sphere to see again a remarkable consonance 
between the idea of secrecy and the ideas of hierarchy.‖118 ―Confidential,‖ ―classified,‖ ―eyes 
only‖ are all determinants of order and serve to regulate who gets to view what information 
while simultaneously protecting it from being seen by those unworthy. 
The actions of FBI and CIA operatives are, themselves, secret, only open to those 
initiated, those worthy of inclusion. Yet through their actions they are attempting to ascertain the 
truth, the truth to serve the public interest. Having entities implicated in a conspiracy charge 
conducting significant portions of the investigation of the alleged conspiracy is, by its very 
nature, paradoxical. It stands to reason that if the FBI, CIA, and/or Secret Service were somehow 
involved in a conspiracy, then those agencies would be unlikely to provide evidence to the 
Warren Commission of their involvement.  
The Commission not only had to try to reconcile the problems encountered in relying on 
the investigative prowess of entities implicated in conspiracy beliefs, they had to reconcile 
claims that measures that should have been taken to protect the president were not, or, even 
worse, that they were consciously neglected. For instance, Bertrand Russell wrote:  
The President‘s route for his drive through Dallas was widely known and was printed in  
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the Dallas Morning News on November 22. At the last minute the Secret Service changed  
a small part of their plans so that the President left Main Street and turned into Houston  
and Elm Streets. This alteration took the President past the book depository building from  
which it is alleged that Oswald shot him. How Oswald is supposed to have known of this  
change has never been explained. Why was the President’s route changed at the last  
minute to take him past Oswald’s place of work?119  
What is significant about this claim is that it implies that the Secret Service consciously made the 
decision to take the motorcade past the place of employment of a known subversive. As Russell 
argues, Oswald was the first person identified on a list of twenty-three known subversives. Yet, 
while most of the known subversives on the list were followed, Oswald was left alone.
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 If 
Russell‘s assertions were true, that the Secret Service changed the motorcade route at the last 
minute to facilitate it passing the Book Depository in order to facilitate the assassination, then 
claims that Oswald was working in concert with governmental agencies in the assassination of 
the president could promote greater belief in a conspiracy. 
To combat claims the Secret Service was negligent, or even that it willfully chose the 
route in order to facilitate the assassination, the Commission asserts that, ―the route was not 
finally selected until November 18; it was announced in the press on November 19, only 3 days 
before the President‘s arrival. Based on the circumstances of Oswald‘s employment and the 
planning of the motorcade route, the Commission has concluded that Oswald‘s employment in 
the Depository is wholly unrelated to the President‘s trip to Dallas.‖121 The fact that the 
Commission felt compelled to explain that the choice of the route was ―wholly unrelated‖ to 
Oswald is an attempt to refute conspiracy charges. Furthermore, the Commission repeatedly 
asserts that the route was the most expedient and most logical route to maximize President 
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Kennedy‘s exposure to the public within the forty-five minutes allotted. The report states, ―The 
police officials agreed that the route recommended by Sorrels was the proper one and did not 
express a belief that any other route might be better.‖122 Additional testimony was added 
offering, ―The route impressed the agents as a natural and desirable one‖ and ―Selection of the 
motorcade route was … entirely appropriate and based on such legitimate considerations as the 
origin and destination of the motorcade, the desired opportunity for the President to greet large 
numbers of people, and normal patterns of traffic.‖123 While these statements seemingly 
underscore the logic used to arrive at the route of the motorcade, they are simultaneously 
attempting to quell conspiracy charges that the route was chosen to facilitate the assassination. 
Additional moves to reaffirm that Secret Service agents were in compliance with their 
duties but were not complicit in a conspiracy include such observations that before, during, and 
after the assassination, agents were operating according to ―standard procedure.‖  For example, 
the Commission states, ―No arrangements were made for police or building custodians to inspect 
buildings along the motorcade route since the Secret Service did not normally request or make 
such a check. Under standard procedures, the responsibility for watching the windows of 
buildings was shared by local police stationed along the route and Secret Service agents riding in 
the motorcade‖ (emphasis added). The Commission adds, ―The agents in this car (the 
presidential follow-up car), under standard procedure, had instructions to watch the route for 
signs of trouble‖ (emphasis added).124 Secret Service agents were also in compliance when they 
left behind the bubbletop frequently used to cover the open limousine because the weather was 
clear and sunny. The bubbletop was not bulletproof, so it would not have afforded any additional 
protection for President Kennedy.
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 Moreover, under President Kennedy‘s own instructions, he 
preferred that Secret Service agents not ride on the running boards of the presidential limousine 
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―except when necessary.‖126 By appealing to the standard, normal, and logical actions of the 
Secret Service, the Commission is attempting to allay suspicions that the route was changed in a 
last minute effort to facilitate the assassination and that the Secret Service was not part of a 
larger conspiracy to assassinate the president. 
Relying on information provided to the Commission by entities implicated in conspiracy 
claims forced the Commission into a paradoxical position. On the one hand, the Commission was 
charged with investigating the assassination and stated that they investigated the ―rumors and 
suspicions‖ alleging a possible conspiracy. On the other hand, the Commission relied on the 
investigations of federal legal agencies, agencies implicated in claims of conspiracy, for 
significant parts of their own investigation. If the FBI, CIA, or Secret Service were involved in a 
conspiracy, it is unlikely that those agencies would willingly disclose information that implicated 
them in the same conspiracy. What the Commission‘s position indicates is that it was forced into 
an untenable situation by the conspiracy theories already in the public sphere, and that it was in a 
battle for discursive authority over the investigation. The Commission attempted to assuage the 
audience‘s fears and doubts about the independence of its investigation by offering a series of 
assertions that spoke to the thoroughness of the investigation and the dedication of the agents of 
the FBI, CIA, and Secret Service. Yet, the Warren Commission was combating fear by appealing 
to ethos. It also underscores, however, that the Warren Commission believed that its authority 
would be enough to overcome the incommensurability between the its stated independence and 
its utter reliance. The tenuous hold the Commission had over discursive authority is further 
manifested in the attempt to determine a motive for President Kennedy‘s alleged assassin.  
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Authority by (Massive) Evidence 
One of the larger problems the Commission faced in its investigation and subsequent report was 
the lack of a discernible motive on Oswald‘s part. There was no manifesto uncovered revealing 
Oswald‘s reasons for murdering President Kennedy; there was no single event for which Oswald 
was seeking revenge by slaying the president. Instead, the Commission was forced to guess as to 
why Oswald would perform such a dastardly deed. As mentioned above, there were conspiracy 
theories in place that linked Oswald to a political motive to assassinate President Kennedy, but 
the Commission attempted to denigrate such claims by using argument from absence. In the Cold 
War world, where the world was divided between capitalists (us), and communists (them), a 
political motive to kill the president of the most powerful capitalist country carried considerable 
weight. Depicting Oswald as a profligate traitor would have been a simple and believable motive 
for the American public, but could also have served as a potential death knell for the relatively 
stable, albeit strained, relations that existed between the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
Cuba. In essence, the Warren Commission had to come up with a motive that could compete 
with the compelling and believable motives being forwarded by conspiracists such as Dies, 
leading the Commission to generate massive amounts of evidence to make its case, further 
demonstrating that it had to argue for authority rather than simply being vested with it. 
The massive amount of evidence the Warren Commission uses to ―convince‖ the 
audience of Oswald‘s motive not only mimics one of the major tools of conspiracists, it also 
indicates that the Commission felt the need to persuade the audience that such a mundane villain 
had a compelling enough motive to murder the president. Richard Hofstadter noted, ―One of the 
most impressive things about paranoid literature is precisely the elaborate concern with 
demonstration it almost invariably shows … The very fantastic character of its conclusions leads 
88 
to heroic strivings for ‗evidence‘ to prove that the unbelievable is the only thing that can be 
believed.‖127 Earl Creps similarly demonstrated that conspiracy arguments present evidence en 
masse, overwhelming audiences with the sheer volume of information and making it virtually 
impossible for the audience to assess it all.
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 Creps states, ―[T]he persuasive force of the 
conspiracy case is produced not by a single portion of testimony, but by simultaneous 
consideration of hundreds of pieces of evidence,‖ which are tangentially related and allow the 
conspiracist to, according to Marilyn Young, Michael Launer, and Curtis Austin, give the 
impression that the conspiracists know more than can be proven.
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 Jodi Dean, however, takes 
these observations a bit further when she notes that ―conspiracy theory‘s irreconcilable doubt [is 
what] generates massive amounts of evidence.‖130 Conspiracy theories contain massive amounts 
of evidence because, in Dean‘s words, ―conspiracy thinking is so uncertain that one is rarely 
fully convinced; instead, one becomes involved in a reiterative back-and-forth that mobilizes 
doubt and reassurance into a never-ending, never-reconciled account of possibility.‖131 One need 
only look at the massive amount of tangentially related evidence used to provide Oswald with a 
motive to illustrate the Commission‘s own doubt and, therefore, uncertain authority. 
The quest for the Warren Commission to determine a satisfactory motive behind 
Oswald‘s actions that could compete with the political motives being forwarded by conspiracists 
forced the Commission to shoulder the burden of proof, indicating that the Commission, at least 
as far as motive was concerned, did not have discursive authority, that it was attempting to invent 
a motive that would resonate with the American public. In order to do so, the Commission had to 
provide the American people with a compelling reason why Oswald would do such an 
unspeakable act. In its attempt to determine Oswald‘s motive, the Commission stated that it 
―considered many possible motives for the assassination, including those which might flow from 
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Oswald‘s commitment to Marxism or communism, the existence of some personal grievance, a 
desire to effect changes in the structure of society or simply to go down in history as a well 
publicized assassin.‖132 While the Commission states that ―[n]one of these possibilities 
satisfactorily explains Oswald‘s act if it is judged by the standards of reasonable men,‖ the 
Commission attempts to discern a motive by linking Oswald‘s psychological and ideological 
states, which are peppered throughout the commission‘s report garnishing, everything from the 
narrative of the assassination to Oswald‘s alleged ties with Jack Ruby. Indeed, the Commission 
provides Oswald‘s biography in three separate places within its report.133 Taken together, 
Oswald‘s psychology and his ideology (though only tangentially related) ―and the many other 
factors which may have molded the character of Lee Harvey Oswald,‖ states the Commission, 
―there emerged a man capable of assassinating President Kennedy.‖134   
One of the other means by which the Commission teases out a possible motive for 
Oswald is through the use of psychoanalysis, even though the Commission could not ―reach any 
definite conclusions as to whether or not he was ‗sane‘ under prevailing legal standards.‖135 By 
using reports garnered during Oswald‘s childhood, and interviewing those who knew him as an 
adult, the Commission used psychoanalysis to demonstrate that Oswald was an alienated and 
disaffected loner incapable of establishing any meaningful relationships. For instance, the 
Commission includes excerpts detailing the emotional neglect Oswald suffered at the hands of 
his mother coupled with the absence of a father figure and family life, which led psychologists 
from Oswald‘s troubled youth to diagnose him with ―‗personality pattern disturbance with 
schizoid features and passive-aggressive tendencies‘‖ and to urge Mrs. Oswald to get Oswald the 
help he needed.
136
 To reiterate its claims about Oswald‘s emotional problems, the Commission 
offered that Oswald was ―‘disturbed about disrobing in front of‖ other boys who resided with 
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him while at Youth House in New York and that he ―slept with his mother‖ until he was nearly 
eleven.
137
 Oswald, according to the Commission, attempted to compensate for his emotional 
neglect by virtue of a ―‗vivid fantasy life‘ turning around the topics of omnipotence and power, 
through which he tried to compensate for his present shortcomings and frustrations‖ and led him 
to believe he would be recognized as a ―political prophet‖ and linked with other great historical 
leaders.
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 Similarly, the Commission notes that Oswald had ―a severe inability to enter into 
relationships with other people.‖139 Oswald was ―profoundly alienated from the world in which 
he lived. His life was characterized by isolation, frustration, and failure. He had very few, if any, 
close relationships with other people and he appeared to have great difficulty in finding a 
meaningful place in the world. He was never satisfied with anything.‖140 In essence, in order to 
combat conspiracy claims of a political motive the Warren Commission was attempting to 
assemble an overwhelming amount of evidence in order to paint Oswald as a kook, as a 
malcontent, as a man who was unwilling and incapable of forming any type of relationship.  
Not only did the Commission generate a massive amount of evidence to characterize 
Oswald as a disaffected loner incapable of maintaining any kind of relationship, the Commission 
employed the same strategy to assert that Oswald was intensely dissatisfied with capitalism and 
with his adopted communist ideology. In order to support its claim, the Commission offered the 
testimony positing that ―[s]ome of his [Oswald‘s] acquaintances in Dallas and Forth Worth had 
the impression that Oswald was dissatisfied in having been given a menial job and not assigned 
to an institution of higher learning within the Soviet Union.‖141 The Commission‘s inclusion of 
this testimony bridges Oswald‘s beliefs in his own importance and his growing dissatisfaction 
with the Soviet Union. To further iterate Oswald‘s dissatisfaction with Communism specifically, 
and the Soviet Union more generally, the Commission offers some of Oswald‘s own writings. 
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For example, Oswald wrote ―‗there can be no mediation between those systems [capitalism and 
communism] as they exist to-day [sic] and that person. He must be opposed to their basic 
foundations and representatives.‘‖142 Moreover, Oswald penned, ―‘No man, having known, 
having lived under the Russian Communist and American capitalist system, could possibly make 
a choice between them, there is no choice, one offers oppresstion [sic] the other poverty. Both 
offer imperilistic [sic] injustice, tinted with two brands of slavery.‖143 Writings such as these led 
the Commission to conclude that ―Oswald‘s decided rejection of both capitalism and 
communism seemed to place him in a situation in which he could not live with satisfaction either 
in the United States or in the Soviet Union.‖144 Furthermore, in providing the audience with these 
writings, the Commission was reiterating Oswald‘s disaffection with the world and also 
undermining the possibility that he was working for a foreign power. If Oswald was unable to 
form any lasting relationships and if he was unhappy with both communism and capitalism, then, 
by the Commission‘s logic, Oswald was incapable of entering into a relationship with anyone to 
form a conspiracy, let alone to work on behalf of powers he hated. 
In order to combat beliefs that Oswald was acting within a vast and sinister Communist 
conspiracy, the Warren Commission used the absence of evidence (noted above) coupled with 
the presentation of an overwhelming amount of evidence to pound home the idea that Oswald 
was a deeply troubled man whose intense dislike of the United States, his problems with 
authority, his proclivity for violence, and his desire to make his mark on history, taken together, 
made him capable of the assassination of President Kennedy. Yet, these reasons for Oswald‘s 
behavior can only tangentially be related to the assassination. There is no direct link, no smoking 
gun, between Oswald and President Kennedy. Oswald, instead, was characterized as a scared, 
lonely, angry man, a portrayal that was not strong enough to withstand conspiracy claims that 
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more sinister, more evil, and more destructive forces were at large, although the Warren 
Commission did try, repeatedly. The incredible amount of rhetorical sweat the Commission 
exerts to provide Oswald with a motive is indicative of the Commission‘s own doubt about the 
motive and is an acknowledgement that it did not ―know‖ the answer. The massive evidence 
garnered in support of the Commission‘s stance indicates that the Commission was attempting to 
persuade itself of the reasons for the assassination on November 22, 1963. The Commission‘s 
irreconcilable doubt, indicative of its increasing uncertainty about its discursive authority, 
continued to play out and is most notably exemplified in the tension between the Commission‘s 
own account of the assassination, and that of the FBI, especially as they pertain to a single 
disputed projectile. 
 
Authority by Internal Consistency 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle the Warren Commission had to overcome was the inconsistencies 
in testimony and evidence related to the number of shots fired and the location and nature of the 
president‘s wounds. For instance, The New Republic published a story that questioned:  
(1) How Lee Oswald, from a position behind and slightly to the right of President  
Kennedy, fired a shot which entered the President‘s neck just below the Adam‘s apple;  
(2) how Oswald, using a bolt-action rifle, fired three shots with deadly accuracy in five  
and one-half seconds at a target 75–100 yards away moving about 25 miles an hour;  
[and] (3) how the three shots could have produced four bullets.
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Questions such as these raised concerns that there was more than one gunman involved in the 
assassination because, if the president‘s neck wound was an entrance wound, then a second 
shooter would have had to have been involved. 
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Complicating the Commission‘s charge to tell the ―truth‖ about the assassination of the 
president was evidence from the FBI report that directly conflicted with the Commission‘s. The 
FBI report concluded that three shots had been fired from Oswald‘s rifle, and that each of those 
three shots had found a target. However, during the Commission‘s investigation, evidence was 
found that either directly disputed the FBI‘s three shots/three hits scenario, or left open the 
possibility that a second shooter was involved, thereby leaving room for future conspiracy 
beliefs. If the Warren Commission‘s conclusion, that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, was to be 
believed, and if the Commission was to retain its discursive authority, then it had to reconcile 
any inconsistencies in the testimony pertaining to the number of shots fired, and the location and 
nature of the president‘s wounds; it also had to resolve any inconsistencies that existed between 
its report and that of the FBI‘s and disabuse any potential future notions that a second shooter 
was involved. This put the Warren Commission into the unenviable position of shouldering the 
burden of proof to make its case that its explanation of the shots was what happened because the 
position of the FBI was already widely circulated, and, therefore, had presumption. 
 The doubt existing between conflicting testimony and the position of the Warren 
Commission caused the Commission to overwhelm the audience with evidence to back its 
claims. The Commission had to assemble its ―facts‖ into what Walter Fisher terms an internally 
coherent narrative in order to arrive at its conclusion.
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 In reconciling inconsistencies, the 
Commission‘s report, again, falls into the realm of the conspiracy argument. Hofstadter argues:  
The typical procedure of the higher paranoid scholarship is to start with such defensible  
assumptions and with a careful accumulation of facts, or at least what appear to be facts,  
and to marshal these facts toward and overwhelming ‗proof‘ of the particular conspiracy  
that is to be established. It is nothing if not coherent—in fact, the paranoid mentality is  
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far more coherent than the real world, since it leaves no room for mistakes, failures, or  
ambiguities.‖147 
In essence, Hofstadter is claiming that conspiracy theories attempt to display a pseudo-scholarly 
concern in marshalling evidence to back its claims. In putting forth such an argument, every 
piece of contradictory evidence, every discrepancy existing among witnesses, every potential 
source of conflict has to be discredited, omitted, or refuted, characteristics attributed to 
conspiracy narratives. 
The single most disputed element in the entire Warren Commission Report centers on 
what critics have dubiously labeled the ―magic‖ or ―pristine‖ bullet. Conspiracy claims were 
made that there were at least four shots fired and the FBI‘s position asserted that President 
Kennedy received two bullet wounds taken from two different shots and that Governor Connally 
was wounded from the third shot. Both conspiracy charges and the FBI‘s report directly 
confronted the Commission‘s assertion that the first shot, or the ―magic‖ bullet, hit President 
Kennedy in the back, passed through his neck, hit Governor Connally in the back, ―passed 
through his chest; tumbled through his wrist with very little exit velocity, leaving small metallic 
fragments from the rear portion of the bullet; punctured his left thigh after the bullet had lost 
virtually all of its velocity, and had fallen out of the thigh wound‖ where it ended up on a gurney 
in the corridor of Parkland Memorial Hospital with very little damage to the bullet.
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 The 
second shot, according to the Commission, was the fatal head wound received by the President. 
The third and final shot missed. Even though the Commission asserted that it was ―not necessary 
to any essential findings to determine just which shot hit Governor Connally,‖ the Commission 
spent an enormous amount of time arguing that the ―pristine‖ bullet was the same one that 
produced President Kennedy‘s neck wound as well as the injuries Governor Connally 
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received.
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 The Commission, instead of simply asserting its case for the single bullet, goes 
through exacting detail as to how it arrived at its conclusion. 
The Commission used several strategies to overcome the evidentiary inconsistencies. One 
of the most noticeable ways the Commission attempts to alleviate any doubt about its stance on 
the magic bullet is by clearing up any inconsistencies that existed in the testimony and evidence. 
For instance, the Commission attempted to mitigate inconsistencies that occurred between the 
doctors at Parkland Hospital who attended the president and those of the doctors who performed 
the autopsy on the president. The Commission offers, ―Considerable confusion has arisen 
because of comments attributed to Dr. [Malcom] Perry concerning the nature of the neck wound. 
Immediately after the assassination, many people reached erroneous conclusions about the 
source of the shots because of Dr. Perry‘s observations to the press.‖150 Dr. Perry, during the 
press conference to which the Commission alludes, stated that the neck wound suffered by 
President Kennedy ―appeared to be one of entrance.‖151  
To clear up the misperception that the neck wound the President sustained was an 
entrance wound, the Commission disclosed the findings of the autopsy report stating that the 
neck wound was one of exit and located the back wound at ―approximately 5 ½ inches (14 
centimeters) from the tip of the right shoulder joint and approximately the same distance below 
the tip of the right mastoid process, the bony point immediately behind the ear.‖152 Furthermore, 
the Commission iterated:  
The autopsy examination further disclosed that, after entering the President, the bullet  
passed between two large muscles, produced a contusion on the upper part of the pleural  
cavity (without penetrating that cavity), bruised the top portion of the right lung and  
ripped the wind pipe (trachea) in its path through the President‘s neck. The examining  
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surgeons concluded that the wounds were caused by the bullet rather than the  
tracheotomy performed at Parkland Hospital.
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After revealing the autopsy findings, the Commission then disclosed the testimony of Dr. Perry. 
When asked, ―Based on the appearance of the neck wound alone, could it have been either an 
entrance or an exit wound?‖ Dr. Perry answered, ―It could have been either.‖ However, when 
asked to take into consideration the findings of the autopsy report, Dr. Perry stated, ―A full 
jacketed bullet without deformation passing through the skin would leave a similar wound for an 
exit or an entrance wound and with the facts which you have made available and with these 
assumptions, I believe that it was an exit wound.‖154 The pattern the Commission used is 
consistent; the report stated that a potential controversy existed over the evidence or testimony 
pertaining to the magic bullet, provided the ―real‖ findings, and then cleared up any 
inconsistencies in the testimony. 
 Clearing up inconsistencies is something the Warren Commission would have had to 
accomplish regardless of its task, and, in itself, is not enough corroboration to assert that its 
concerns over conspiracy beliefs caused it to produce so much evidence. But more insight is 
gleaned based on the nature of the evidence provided to the audience to prove that the same 
bullet did hit both President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Sophisticated recreations of the 
shots fired from the sniper‘s nest in the Book Depository and simulations of the same caliber 
bullet and the assassin‘s rifle were enacted to determine that not only was it possible to get three 
shots off with the necessary accuracy in the time allotted by the Zapruder Film, but that one 
bullet could cause so much damage and remain largely intact and unscathed.
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Recounting the recreations entails traversing through a myriad of details from the type of 
car and physical characteristics of the stand-ins, to the repositioning of cardboard boxes in the 
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Book Depository, which were explained as measures taken to recreate the scene of the 
assassination in order to determine precisely when the shots were fired and in how much time.
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To give an example, when discussing the minute examination of the Zapruder Film and the 
trajectory of the shots taken from the Texas Book Depository in relation to the film, the 
Commission argues: 
The President‘s reaction is ‗barely apparent‘ in frame 225, which is 15 frames or  
approximately eight-tenths second after frame 210, and a shot much more before 210  
would assume a longer reaction time than was recalled by eyewitnesses at the scene … A  
surveyor then placed his sighting equipment at the precise point of entry on the back of  
the President‘s neck, assuming that the President was struck at frame 210, and measured  
the angle to the end of the muzzle of the rifle positioned where it was believed to have  
been held by the assassin. That angle measured 21° 34‘. From the same points of  
reference, the angle at frame 225 was measured at 20°11‘, giving an average angle of 20°  
52‘30‖ from frame 210 to frame 225 … That angle was consistent with the trajectory of a  
bullet passing through the President‘s neck and then striking Governor Connally‘s  
back.
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In essence, the Commission was attempting to quell doubts raised about whether one bullet could 
cause seven separate wounds based on from where the shot was fired. In doing so, the 
Commission is also refuting charges that the president‘s neck wound was one of entrance.  
Similarly, the Commission provides testimony to ―prove‖ that there were only three shots 
fired by providing the audience with as much detail as possible in order to ―convince‖ the people 
that Oswald had ample time to carry out three shots. For instance, the Commission notes that 
―Examination of the Zapruder motion picture camera by the FBI established that 18.3 pictures or 
98 
frames were taken each second, and therefore, the timing of certain events could be calculated by 
allowing 1/18.3 seconds for the action depicted from one frame to the next.‖158 ―Tests of the 
assassin‘s rifle,‖ states the Commission, ―disclosed that at least 2.3 seconds were required 
between shots.‖159 Based on the recreation of the assassination coupled with the examination of 
the Zapruder Film, the Commission concluded that ―the evidence indicated that the President 
was not hit until at least frame 210 and that he was probably hit by frame 225.‖160  From yaw to 
trajectories, angles to velocity, frames to seconds, seconds to actions, the terms that the 
Commission used in presenting its ―overwhelming‖ evidence that Lee Harvey Oswald was the 
lone gunman is indicative that the Warren Commission was not only attempting to refute 
conspiracy claims, but that it was also attempting to establish and maintain discursive authority 
through the use of precise, scientific information.  
Questions raised about the location of the president‘s wounds, the number of shots fired, 
and the time it would have taken to fire three shots forced the Commission to clear up any 
inconsistencies that existed in the evidence. Moreover, such questions, which would, if left 
unanswered, give credibility to claims that there was a second shooter involved in the 
assassination, forced the Commission to overwhelm the audience with evidence asserting its 
case. The massive amount of evidence the Commission uses to make its case against conspiracy 
is far too frequently built upon driving the audience to an inevitable conclusion based on not the 
argumentation contained within, but from sheer volume. If the Commission had simple authority, 
if it had presumption, then the need for it to argue in great detail as to why its interpretation of 
the ―magic bullet‖ was correct would not exist. But, because of conflicting evidence and 
testimony and because the Commission could reasonably deduce that such a discrepancy could 
lead the American public to doubt the Commission‘s findings and undermine its entire 
99 
investigation and report, the Commission had to prove a virtually unprovable position, which led 
the Commission into generating massive amounts of evidence in great scientific detail in order to 
reconcile the discrepancies and led to the Warren Commission‘s unbelievable conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
The peculiarities of the Warren Commission Report stem, at least in part, from the Commission‘s 
attempt to establish its monologic authority over the narrative of the assassination of President 
Kennedy. Most of the Commission‘s report focuses on proving that Oswald acted alone in the 
slaying of President Kennedy. However, the Commission was similarly forced into proving that 
there was no conspiracy in place to assassinate the president. In essence, the Commission was 
forced into a double burden of proof, a direct result of the wide belief that the assassination of 
the president and the subsequent murder of Oswald were the result of a conspiracy and thus 
entered into a dialogue with conspiracy theories. The Commission‘s need to address conspiracy 
claims is indicative that it was not wholly in charge of its own agenda or argumentative burdens. 
If the Warren Commission had possessed naked authority, then there would have been no need to 
prove that there was not a conspiracy. More troubling, however, was the Commission‘s inability 
to contain conspiracy beliefs about the assassination. In attempting to prove there was no 
conspiracy, the Commission‘s report took on some of the generic elements of conspiracy 
argument and participated within the conspiracy genre. 
The Warren Commission, though not the characteristic conspiracy argument, participated 
within its genre by demonstrating the elements of argument from absence, paradox of substance, 
the generation of a massive amount of evidence, and an internally consistent narrative. While the 
Commission may have many of the constitutive elements of the conspiracy argument, the 
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foremost element of the conspiracy argument, its self-sealing ability, is noticeably absent from 
the Commission‘s arguments. The conspiracy theories present prior to the release of the Warren 
Commission Report largely consisted of queries, questions, and demands directed at the 
Commission. The Commission responded by addressing the conspiracy fears through using 
many of the same techniques the conspiracists, themselves, use in making their cases. However, 
conspiracy theories that came into being after the completion of the report did demonstrate the 
self-sealing attribute of the conspiracy argument. 
While conspiracy theories about the assassination were never a marginal belief, after the 
completion of the Warren Commission Report, they were able to gain greater prominence in the 
public sphere. The first mainstream criticisms of the Warren Commission, i.e. Mark Lane‘s Rush 
to Judgment, and Edward Jay Epstein‘s Inquest, were not the full-blown conspiracy theories of 
the assassination; they were simply criticisms pointing out the flaws and inaccuracies of the 
report.
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 Even though the conspiracy theories about the assassination had yet to take on the 
signature self-sealing characteristic of the conspiracy argument, the early critics laid the 
foundation for such a task.  
Epstein and Lane pointed out the most troubling areas of the Commission‘s report, which 
cast doubt onto the veracity of the findings within, and fueled fear within the public that, at the 
very least, the Warren Commission had covered up salient information about the assassination.
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As Knight and Kurtz point out, the controversies that surrounded the Commission‘s report after 
its publication centered on where the shots came from, the magic bullet and the problems the 
autopsy evidence posed, the lack of a discernible motive on the part of Oswald, the underworld 
ties of Jack Ruby, and the possibility that agents of the government were complicit in the 
assassination.
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 Significantly, all of the areas of contestation focused upon after the completion 
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of the Warren Commission Report were present before its completion and are the same areas 
where the Commission took on some of the characteristics of the conspiracy argument. In 
essence, the narrative of the Commission was influenced by conspiracy claims, and then served 
to inform later conspiracy theories. As more evidence was uncovered, as more questions were 
raised, conspiracists were able to point to the areas of contestation between conspiracy theories 
and the Warren Commission and make a compelling case that there was a conspiracy in the 
assassination of President Kennedy. In essence, the Warren Commission was unable to prevail 
over conspiracy theories because it was an integral step in the development and maturity of the 
conspiracy theories about the assassination. 
  The Warren Commission participated within the conspiracy genre both by way of 
addressing conspiracy claims while simultaneously adopting some of the substantive elements of 
the conspiratorial form, and by serving as a necessary informational step in the maturity of the 
conspiracy arguments about the assassination. It was not until after the release of the Warren 
Commission Report that the conspiracy theories about the assassination took on their self-sealing 
form. Conspiracists were able to point to the absence of evidence, the inscrutable prose, the lack 
of a discernible motive on the part of Oswald, along with new information that came to light 
after the investigation, and tie their theories into compelling narratives rife with victims, villains, 
and a dramatic plot. In taking on conspiracy theories, the Warren Commission inherently 
resigned itself to falling victim to the supremely more seductive and flexible conspiracy 
argument. It is difficult, if not impossible, to refute a conspiracy, and agents of the government 
are inherently constrained in what they can reveal. The inability to disclose all of the information 
available allows for an opening for conspiracy theories because there will always be something 
that has yet to be revealed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HIDDEN AGENCY: CONSPIRATORIAL CONTROL 
OVER THE SHAPING OF THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 
 
Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the 
attacks of September the eleventh; malicious lies that attempt to shift 
the blame away from the terrorists, themselves away from the guilty. 
      —President George W. Bush  
 
September 11, 2001, at 8:46 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, American Airlines flight 11 
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. The first reports of 
the crash were sketchy. While some reports openly wondered if the aircraft was a commuter or 
private plane and if pilot error caused the aircraft to hit the North Tower, others speculated 
whether the crash might have been an act of terrorism; those speculations were effectively 
silenced when a second plane, United Airlines flight 175, crashed into the South Tower of the 
World Trade Center at 9:03. There was no longer any doubt; the United States was witnessing 
the largest terrorist attack in its history. As the country watched in horror, two more planes 
would crash: American Airlines flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon at 9:37, and United 
Airlines flight 93, which crashed outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03. In addition to 
the hijacked aircraft, the nation watched the majestic buildings of the twin towers crumble to the 
ground, with the South Tower falling at 9:59 and the North Tower at 10:28. Thousands of people 
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died, and that day, which would colloquially come to be known as 9/11, left an indelible mark on 
the American psyche.  
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush, speaking from 
Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, reassured the American people that the ―full resources of 
the federal government [were] working to assist local authorities to save lives and to help the 
victims of [the] attacks.‖ The president affirmed that ―The United States will hunt down and 
punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.‖1 Later that same day, President Bush asserted 
that ―America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and 
opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw 
evil—the very worst of human nature—and we responded with the best of America.‖2 Although 
the president reassured the public that the culprits of 9/11 would be punished in the following 
days, the White House was remarkably silent on the formulation of a commission to investigate 
the flaws in America‘s defenses, a surprising move considering that virtually all national 
tragedies have had the benefit of independent commissions to investigate how the tragedies 
occurred and how they could be prevented in the future.
3
 Indeed, it would take over fourteen 
months for a commission to be formed to investigate the terrorist attacks.  
The securities in place to protect the American people failed at all levels of the federal 
government on and before 9/11. Our intelligence agencies were unable to assemble enough 
information on the perpetrators and the plot of 9/11 to disrupt them before their deeds were 
carried out in New York, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. Our security in the skies was 
compromised by insufficient security measures at airports and while aloft. Our military was 
unable, once the hijackings occurred, to prevent any of the death and destruction. For the world‘s 
only superpower, for the world‘s mightiest and most technologically advanced military, for the 
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world‘s greatest economic power, the ability of a ragtag group of terrorists to topple the towers at 
the center of the global capital and to damage the epicenter of the U.S. military defied belief and 
required explanation. While the American people were told by government officials, rather 
quickly, that the failures of U.S. intelligence stemmed from a lack of interagency communication 
and collaboration, the remarkably long time it took to convene the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which would come to be known as the 9/11 
Commission, and the years that elapsed between the terrorist attacks and the release of the 
Commission‘s final report, left an explanatory void, one conspiracists were able to capitalize on 
to spin their own tales of deceit and corruption. 
In the nearly three years that elapsed between the terrorist attacks and the issuance of The 
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (9/11 Commission Report), a deluge of alternative theories arose as to what 
happened on 9/11 and why. Theories spouted by the political right insisted that, at the very least, 
President Bill Clinton had had the opportunity to kill Osama bin Laden but chose not to, while 
others argued the attacks were planned and carried out by Israeli agents.
4
 The conspiracy theories 
that garnered the most support, however, were the product of the political left. Such theories 
asserted that the Bush administration either had prior knowledge of the terrorist attacks and 
chose to let them happen, or that it was active in the planning and implementation of the attacks 
so that it would have an excuse to invade, and then gain greater control of, the oil-rich Middle 
East.
5
 The hesitancy of the White House to back a bipartisan independent commission, the War 
in Iraq, scandals such as Abu Ghraib and the outing of CIA operative Valerie Plame, and other 
information that came to light before and during the 9/11 Commission‘s investigation 
exacerbated the situation and created a climate ripe for conspiracy theories.  
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Conspiracy theorists pointed to all of the peculiarities surrounding the terrorist attacks 
and the actions of the Bush administration and claimed that not all was as it seemed. Even those 
without a conspiratorial bent were at a loss to explain the oddities of the actions of the Bush 
administration and the failures of the U.S. intelligence agencies and the military in protecting the 
American people. In the absence of a compelling explanation for such failures, conspiracy 
theories were able to gain a foothold in the public sphere. It is this uncertainty, this 
indeterminacy of information, this inscrutability of human motivations that makes conspiracy 
theories so popular and powerful. 
As the body of conspiracy claims grew, and as the public outcry for an investigation into 
the terrorist attacks increased, the need to form an independent bipartisan commission was 
finally realized. Haunted by the failures of past commissions to contain conspiracy theories, the 
9/11 Commission Report, I argue, was shaped in part by the number of conspiracy theories 
burgeoning within the public sphere and implicating the federal government as complicit in the 
terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Commission, in combating conspiracy beliefs, adopted elements of the 
conspiracy argument in shaping its discourse, including the hyper-objective stance of an observer 
diagnosing the problems associated with the military response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11. 
Similarly, the Commission ascertained the reasons behind the inability of the federal intelligence 
agencies to effectively gather, share, and prevent the terrorist attacks. The hyper-objective stance 
the Commission adopted was a defensive move, designed to prevent the Commission‘s discourse 
from being drawn into conspiracy debates. When the Commission could not completely sidestep 
claims of conspiracy, it adopted the use of argument from absence in order to cast the burden of 
proof onto conspiracists. Ultimately, the Commission‘s approach left it able to cast blame for the 
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terrorist attacks onto a cabal of terrorists, led by, in Peter Knight‘s words, an ―enemy‖ portrayed 
―as completely alien, inhuman, all-powerful, and, above all, evil.‖6 
 
Considering Contexts 
Understanding the proliferation of conspiracy theories within the public sphere following 9/11, 
and the conspiracy theories with which the 9/11 Commission would eventually grapple, requires 
careful consideration of the greater social and political climates between the times of the terrorist 
attacks and the release of the 9/11 Commission Report. The environment into which the 9/11 
Commission Report was propagated was rife with indeterminacy precipitated by the actions of 
the Bush White House and the greater social and political climates, all of which gave rise to 
alternative theories of the events of 9/11 within the public. It is no great secret that the United 
States was deeply politically divided prior to the terrorist attacks. The presidential election in 
2000, which resulted in the Supreme Court declaring the winner of the election, cast a pall over 
the presidency of George W. Bush. Embittered leftists claimed that President Bush won the 
election because of the machinations of a conspiracy. It was simply too convenient that the 
contested votes, which would eventually result in the Supreme Court‘s decision, were in Florida, 
the same state where the president‘s brother, Jeb, was governor.7  
While such sentiments may have gained play in the public for a while, after the terrorist 
attacks they were effectively silenced. As is common during times of crisis, the American people 
rallied around the flag and backed the president. President Bush was able to maintain remarkable 
control over how the country responded to, and interpreted, the terrorist attacks for several 
months after 9/11. However, this control began to wane with a series of disclosures indicating 
that U.S. intelligence agencies possessed far more information about the terrorist attacks than 
107 
was first disclosed, the linking of the terrorist attacks to Iraq and the resultant invasion of Iraq, 
and a series of revealed scandals and perceived acts of retribution for defying President Bush‘s 
authority, all of which left an opening for the proliferation of alternative explanations of 9/11. 
The control President Bush exerted over the narrative of 9/11 was exhibited, at least in 
part, during the series of speeches he gave in the aftermath. In a speech delivered to a joint 
session of Congress on September 20, 2001, President Bush addressed the American people and 
identified those who were ultimately responsible for the terrorist attacks. Stating that ―loosely 
affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda,‖ and its leader, ―a person named Osama bin 
Laden,‖ were to blame, the president went on to assert that ―The leadership of al Qaeda has great 
influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country.‖8 
The President then leveled a series of demands to the Taliban in Afghanistan warning that, 
―These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act 
immediately.‖ If the Taliban did not ―hand over the terrorists …, then they [would] share in their 
fate.‖ ―You are either with us,‖ stated President Bush, ―or you are with the terrorists.‖9  
Herbert Simons argues that the ―short-term effectiveness‖ of the ―basic melodramatic 
binaries‖ used in ―[t]he president‘s post-9/11 rhetoric … conferred enormous power upon the 
president, which he has been able to use not just to persuade, but also to intimidate, coerce, and 
control,‖ most notably as the binaries under which ―the ‗war on terror‘ was launched.‖ 10 
President Bush‘s post-9/11 rhetoric, asserts Simons, was able to ―gain control over the terms and 
limits of permissible debate.‖11 Within a year, however, the president began to lose interpretive 
control over the terrorist attacks with the revealed information that the FBI, CIA, and the White 
House knew far more about the impending attacks than was first disclosed. 
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Troubling disclosures revealed by the media in the spring of 2002 raised concerns about 
how much the Bush administration and the FBI knew prior to September 11 about the possibility 
of a terrorist attack. In May 2002, the media revealed that weeks prior to the attacks FBI agents 
in Phoenix and Minneapolis had forwarded intelligence memos to the FBI about the behaviors of 
―Middle Eastern men‖ at flight schools in their respective cities, reports that were effectively 
ignored. FBI agents in Phoenix, concerned about the actions of some Middle Eastern men who 
―attended civil aviation colleges and universities in the state of Arizona,‖ sent a memo to the 
Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters warning that the actions of such men might be 
indicative ―of the possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the 
United States‖ to attend such schools. The memo suggested that the FBI should discuss the 
memo with the CIA and other intelligence agencies and that the FBI ―should consider securing 
authority to obtain visa information on persons seeking to attend flight schools.‖12 It was also 
revealed that FBI agents in Minneapolis had arrested a French citizen, Zacarias Moussaui, nearly 
a month before the terrorist attacks. Although agents in Minneapolis requested a ―Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act‖ (FISA) warrant to search Moussaui‘s belongings, ―FBI lawyers,‖ 
according to David Kohn, ―decided they would not even try to get a warrant.‖13 When agents 
searched Moussaui‘s computer after 9/11, it was revealed that Moussaui was intimately involved 
in the terrorist plot. Even more troubling was the fact that French authorities had Moussaui on an 
international terrorist watch list as early as 1999, information that CBS News said French 
officials made available to the FBI.
14
 At the very least, the disclosures that the FBI had warnings 
about suspected terrorists in the months prior to 9/11 raised questions as to whether 9/11 could 
have been prevented. 
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The FBI was not the only entity that raised questions about what was known, or should 
have been known, about the impending terrorist attacks. Within days of the disclosures of the 
missed opportunities at the FBI, President Bush also came under fire after it was revealed that he 
had received an intelligence briefing from the CIA about the possibility of Bin Laden planning to 
hijack airplanes in the U.S.
15
 The White House, while admitting that President Bush had received 
such a briefing, stated ―that the warnings did not contemplate the possibility that the hijackers 
would turn the planes into guided missiles for a terrorist attack.‖16 CBS News reported, however, 
that a 1999 analysis ―prepared for U.S. intelligence warned that Osama bin Laden's terrorists 
could hijack an airliner and fly it into government buildings like the Pentagon.‖17 Again, the 
White House acknowledged that the president knew of the 1999 analysis, but countered by 
asserting that ―the document did not contain direct intelligence pointing toward a specific plot 
but rather included assessments about how terrorists might strike.‖18 CBS further noted that 
―Former CIA Deputy Director John Gannon, who was chairman of the National Intelligence 
Council when the report was written, said officials long have known a suicide hijacking was a 
threat.‖19 Gannon stated, ―‘If you ask anybody could terrorists convert a plane into a missile, 
nobody would have ruled that out.‘‖  
The combination of the missed opportunities by the FBI and the disclosure that the CIA 
had not only warned the president that Bin Laden was ―determined to strike‖ in the United 
States, but that intelligence analysis suggested that Bin Laden and al Qaeda might hijack planes, 
fill them with explosives, and fly them into the Pentagon or the White House launched the first 
salvo against the Bush administration‘s iron-fisted control over the narrative of the terrorist 
attacks. Congressional leaders began to raise concerns that the government had far more 
foreknowledge about the terrorist attacks than was first believed. The Minority Leader, 
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Representative Richard Gephardt, stated, ―I think what we have to do now is to find out what the 
president, what the White House knew about the events leading up to 9/11, when they knew it 
and, most importantly, what was done about it at that time.‖20 CBS reported that ―Sen. Charles 
Grassley, a senior member of the Senate Judiciary and Finance Committee, demanded the CIA 
inspector general investigate the report, which he called ‗one of the most alarming indicators and 
warning signs of the terrorist plot of Sept. 11.‘‖21 Similarly, ―Senator Richard C. Shelby of 
Alabama, the ranking Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said the intelligence 
information should have spurred action.‖22 With Congressional leaders of both parties alarmed at 
the intelligence failures of the FBI and CIA, and with the added knowledge that the president had 
been warned of an impending attack, renewed cries for an independent investigation into the 
terrorist attacks began to mount. Questions about the government‘s knowledge and subsequent 
actions persisted and were further fueled by the War in Iraq. 
As early as the State of the Union Address in 2002, the Bush administration began 
linking the 9/11 terrorist attacks to Saddam Hussein and Iraq.
23
 The rhetorical maneuverings of 
the president and his administration would have over 60 percent of the American public 
believing that Saddam Hussein was somehow involved in the attacks of 9/11.
24
 On March 20, 
2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and some of their allies began the invasion of Iraq 
under the guise that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that could 
be used against the United States. In essence, the Bush administration constructed a conspiracy 
argument in order to gain support to combat a conspiracy theory. The U.S. was engaged in 
another war despite the fact that Osama bin Laden had yet to be captured and things in 
Afghanistan were anything but stable.
25
 By May 1, 2003, when President Bush, on the deck of 
the USS Abraham Lincoln, declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended, no WMDs 
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had been uncovered.
26
 While the War in Iraq continued to rage, and while the rhetorical reasons 
for war continued to change, larger segments of the public began questioning why the U.S. was 
in Iraq, questions that gained momentum with revealed scandals in relation to the War on Terror 
and continued to tear apart the remarkable unity that had existed among the public after the 
terrorist attacks. 
Joseph Wilson, former ambassador to Gabon under President George H. W. Bush and 
former head of African Affairs at the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton, 
wrote an editorial in The New York Times on July 6, 2003. Wilson had been chosen by the CIA 
to travel to Niger and investigate whether there was any foundation to the claims that Saddam 
Hussein had attempted to purchase any uranium in the country.
27
 In his piece, Wilson concluded 
that the Bush Administration ―had manipulated intelligence on Saddam Hussein‘s weapons 
programs‖ to justify the invasion of Iraq.28 Wilson‘s comments were particularly damaging 
because they implied the Bush administration had knowingly lied in making its case for invading 
Iraq, which pointed to a conspiracy on the part of the Bush administration. 
Kathryn Olmsted argues that members of the Bush administration immediately began 
denouncing Wilson ―as an attention-seeker, a liar, and a beneficiary of nepotism.‖29 On July 14, 
just eight days after Wilson‘s editorial, Robert Novak of the Chicago Sun Times ―outed‖ Valerie 
Plame, Wilson‘s wife, as an operative for the CIA and implied that Plame had arranged for 
Wilson‘s trip to Niger.30 In essence, the Novak article argued against conspiracy claims by 
implying that there was a different conspiracy. This information, provided to Novak by senior 
officials in the Bush White House, launched a maelstrom in Washington.
31
 More important, 
however, is the doubt it cast on the reasons the United States entered into the war in Iraq; 
Wilson‘s disclosure gave conspiracists fuel for their charges that the Bush administration had, at 
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the very least, ignored intelligence about the impending terrorist attacks so that it could pursue its 
own agenda in the Middle East.  
The Plame affair, however, was not the only scandal connected to the War in Iraq. In 
April 2004, pictures taken at Abu Ghraib prison, a U.S.-controlled detention facility in Iraq, 
documented the sexual humiliation of inmates by American soldiers. The acts of abuse were bad 
enough, but they were amplified by images of U.S. soldiers grinning and giving a ―thumbs up.‖ 
Exacerbating the scandal were allegations that the abuse was encouraged by military intelligence 
officers.
32
 Editorials in The New York Times and The Washington Post voiced concerns that the 
U.S. military, in particular, and the Bush administration more generally, were running roughshod 
over the Geneva Convention and that Congress should assert its authority.
33
 The New York Times 
added that the abuse witnessed at Abu Ghraib was a result ―of a morally dubious culture of legal 
expediency and a disregard for normal behavior fostered at the top of this [the Bush] 
administration. It is part of the price the nation must pay for President Bush‘s decision to take the 
extraordinary mandate to fight terrorism that he was granted by a grieving nation after 9/11 and 
apply it without justification to Iraq.‖34 At best, the scandals surrounding Abu Ghraib diminished 
the notion that the War in Iraq was a noble pursuit; at worst, such actions caused speculation in 
the public sphere about what was really happening and how much control the Bush 
administration had over what had occurred, and would continue to occur. 
The continued revelation of information about what and how much was known before 
9/11, coupled with the War in Iraq and the scandals involving the outing of Plame and the 
prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib, led to a climate filled with indeterminacy. On the one hand, the 
Bush administration was implicated in secretive and conspiratorial activities by the media and 
members of the FBI. On the other hand, those who were uncovering the secretive dealings of the 
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Bush administration were being accused of engaging in secretive and conspiratorial activities by 
the Bush administration. In essence, the American people were left with no real means to 
determine which of the competing stories was true; the climate was marked with scandal and the 
information indeterminate. Once ―‗scandal,‘‖ according to Mark Fenster, moves from ―an event 
[to] a structure of feeling, legitimacy can no longer be produced through normal channels.‖ 35 
The public is left with questions that can never be satisfactorily addressed because there is no 
way to determine who is telling the truth.  
Conspiracy theories were able to take root because of the continual revelation of 
information and the inability to ascribe a fixed meaning to the actions of the Bush administration 
and other governmental agents and agencies. The discovery that the intelligence agencies had far 
more knowledge about an impending attack than was first revealed, the War in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, 
and the Plame affair exacerbated public concerns. The continued actions of the Bush 
administration, which pushed through legislation in the name of the War on Terror ―ranging 
from corporate tax giveaways, fast-track trade negotiating authority, and the enhancement of the 
surveillance state, to raiding the Social Security trust fund and weakening environmental laws,‖ 
aided in the growth of conspiracy theories, in Michael Niman‘s words, ―like dandelions on a 
suburban lawn.‖36 Even for those without a conspiratorial bent, the greater social and political 
contexts had, at the very least, raised serious doubts and concerns about the Bush administration 
and created a highly partisan atmosphere. Such concerns would continue to flourish with the 
Bush administration‘s stonewalling of an investigation into the 9/11 attacks. 
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Regarding the Rhetorical Situation  
The exigencies in the wake of the terrorist attacks, coupled with the persistent rumors and 
conspiracy theories, were remarkable enough to call for the creation of a Blue Ribbon 
Commission. The United States had seen terrorist attacks before, both instigated and carried out 
by foreign and domestic terrorists, but none of the scope and degree that 9/11 wrought, and the 
public needed a means by which to view and make sense of the events.
37
 Generally, commissions 
are convened to investigate the policy concerns of the administration in power and have included 
everything from employment to education reform.
38
 In the face of national tragedies, however, 
commissions are typically assembled to provide the American people with the perception that the 
president and Congress are doing something to account for the tragedy and are frequently a 
means, according to Kenneth Kitts, to ―defuse crises, deflect criticism, and maintain the initiative 
in national security decisionmaking [sic.].‖39 
 Congressional leaders launched the idea of forming an independent commission within 
days of the terrorist attacks. Legislation authorizing an investigation into the terrorist attacks was 
introduced and discussed on the floors of the House and Senate no fewer than seven times 
between September 12, 2001 and September 18, 2002.
40
 The attempts by legislators to bring 
about a commission and the delays they encountered can largely be attributed to squabbling that 
occurred between Congressional Democrats and Republicans. To a large degree, President Bush 
lacked political capital until 9/11. After the terrorist attacks, however, President Bush gained the 
backing of the American people and Republicans wanted to ensure that the president and other 
Republican leaders were not unduly assigned blame. Democrats, on the other hand, wanted to 
protect the legacy of President Bill Clinton.
41
 The New York Times, anonymously quoting a 
member of Congress, reported that ―‗Democrats were trying to stop going back too far into what 
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President Clinton did or did not do, or his functionaries. The Republicans tried to stop Bush and 
his functionaries from having to take any bullets for what they did in the run-up to 9/11.‘‖42 As 
questions mounted as to how much the president, the FBI, and the CIA knew prior to the attacks, 
Congressional leaders began renewing their interests in an independent investigation, a desire 
that was, in part, further fueled by the very public demands of the families of the victims of 9/11. 
 The victims‘ families had long supported the notion of an independent commission to 
investigate the terrorist attacks. In the summer of 2002, during a rally held outside the Capitol 
designed to drum up support for an independent investigation into the terrorist attacks, Kristen 
Breitweiser, the widow of one of the 9/11 victims, told the Washington Post, ―‗Our call for an 
independent commission has nothing to do with politics. … It has everything to do with seeking 
answers that we so rightly deserve.‘‖43 Even though Congress did institute a Joint Commission to 
investigate the intelligence failures of 9/11, Stephen Push, who headed the organization Families 
of September 11, stated, ―We still need an independent commission that would have a broader 
mandate to look at all of the elements of Sept. 11.‖44 Similarly, Kathy Ashton recounted to 
Newsweek, ―‗Look at all of the investigations that have been held to examine the Enron collapse, 
a financial thing … Why, eight months later, are we not investigating the mass murder of 3,000 
human beings on American soil by an enemy of the United States that was enabled to carry out 
this mass murder because many agencies in this country dropped the ball.‘‖45  
The increased demand from members of Congress as well as the increasing public 
demands of the families of the victims of 9/11 covered by a sympathetic media was an indication 
that the president‘s narrative control over 9/11 was waning. As Michael Hirsh and Michael 
Isikoff wrote, ―Once upon a time, a stern word from George W. Bush on the war on terror would 
have been enough. But this time the Democrats, and even Republicans like Richard Shelby and 
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John McCain, weren‘t buying the Teflon patriotism.‖46 With the growing demand for an 
independent commission, President Bush conceded that he would ―cooperate with an 
investigation if it's done the right way.‖47 
President Bush and Vice President Cheney had publicly argued that a commission 
―would divert time and attention from the war on terror,‖ ―waste resources,‖ and ―‗tie-up‘ key 
administrators.‖ Vice President Cheney also argued that a commission would increase the risk 
that sensitive U.S. intelligence information would be leaked during the course of the 
investigation.
48
 In line with the concerns of the president and vice president, and in line with the 
Bush administration‘s desire to control as much of the 9/11 narrative as possible, the legislation 
authorizing the commission was remarkably narrow in scope.  
In order for President Bush to provide support for an independent commission to 
interrogate the terrorist attacks, it was stipulated in the legislation that a commission subpoena 
required the backing of both the chair and vice chair and a minimum of four of the other eight 
commissioners. Such requirements assured that subpoenaed information would not be a matter of 
partisan interests.
49
 Furthermore, the legislation required that ―unnecessary duplication‖ of 
investigations be avoided. In other words, the 9/11 Commission had to base its investigation on 
the findings and conclusions of previous investigations into the terrorist attacks unless these prior 
investigations were deemed insufficient or if they failed to investigate some ―area the 
commission deemed pertinent.‖50 Added to the narrow scope of the commission was a grossly 
inadequate $3 million allotted to the Commission to conduct its investigation and a demand that 
its investigation be completed by May 2004.
51
 On November 27, 2002, over fourteen months 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush signed the legislation creating the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The legislation called for a ten-person 
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committee with the chair being chosen by the president and the vice chair by the Democratic 
leaders in the Senate and House of Representatives.
52
  
While the Bush administration was forced into acquiescing to public demands to back the 
creation of an independent commission, the president still attempted to control the Commission‘s 
investigation into 9/11, a move that would lead to questions about what the president was trying 
to hide and why. In what was seen as an attempt to control the investigation of the commission, 
President Bush‘s initial choice to chair the commission was former Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger. The choice of Dr. Kissinger was controversial from the onset. Editorials sprang up 
commenting on Dr. Kissinger‘s secretive and duplicitous nature. Some of those editorials posited 
that President Bush‘s selection was an attempt to block the 9/11 Commission from uncovering 
anything potentially damaging to the president and the intelligence agencies. Maureen Dowd of 
The New York Times wrote, ―If you want to get to the bottom of something, you don‘t appoint 
Henry Kissinger. If you want to keep others from getting to the bottom of something, you 
appoint Henry Kissinger.‖53 Not all of the editorials about the choice of Dr. Kissinger were so 
obviously negative; William Safire argued that there was no one better to uncover the problems 
plaguing the intelligence agencies than one of the people who was instrumental in bringing them 
about.
54
 The choice of Dr. Kissinger fueled beliefs, especially on the political left, that the 
president was less than serious about finding the truth and more concerned about covering up his 
own misdeeds.
55
 After a contentious two weeks, ones where the families of the victims‘ of 9/11 
demanded that Kissinger turn over the names of all his clients to ensure that there were no 
conflicts of interest, Kissinger resigned from the Commission.
56
 The president‘s choice for chair 
of the Commission then fell to Thomas H. Kean, former Republican governor of New Jersey and 
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president of Drew University, while the Democratic leadership chose former House member Lee 
Hamilton as the vice-chair of the Commission.
57
 
 Even with the acceptance of Kean and Hamilton serving as chair and vice-chair of the 
Commission, significant doubts were raised about the independent nature of the Commission. To 
fill the role of executive director of the Commission, Kean and Hamilton appointed Philip 
Zelikow. The choice of Zelikow was controversial from the outset. Having co-authored a book 
with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and having served on the transition team of 
the George W. Bush White House, conspiracists argued that the Commission, with Zelikow at its 
helm, was doomed to be a whitewash.
58
 Conspiracists were not the only ones uncomfortable with 
Zelikow‘s appointment. According to Philip Shenon, ―many of the 9/11 families‖ saw Zelikow 
as a White House ―mole‖ who had been put in place ―to make sure that George Bush and 
especially [his] close friend Condoleezza Rice were protected from too much scrutiny, 
particularly over the seeming failure of the White House to act on dire terrorist threats in the 
months before September 11.‖59 Zelikow‘s perceived role as a mole was just one of the many 
problems conspiracists and the 9/11 families would have with the Bush White House.      
  Doubts about the White House‘s commitment to investigating the terrorist attacks 
continued to swirl within the public sphere and were bolstered by insufficient access to 
information. In a battle that would play out in a media storm, when asked by the 9/11 
Commission to supply it with access to the highly classified Presidential Daily Briefings (PDBs) 
of both the Bush and Clinton White Houses, the Bush White House summarily denied the 
Commission access. After months of negotiations and the threat of a subpoena, the White House 
finally agreed that members of the Commission could view the documents, but with very 
stringent conditions. Philip Shenon of The New York Times wrote that ―under the accord two 
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members … of the commission would have access to the full library of daily briefings prepared 
in the Bush and Clinton administrations and that two other members would be allowed to read 
just the copies of the briefings that the White House deemed relevant to the inquiry.‖60 Some 
members of the Commission, as well as members of the victims‘ families, found such restrictions 
too empowering for the White House. The Washington Post reported that Max Cleland and 
Timothy Roemer stated ―that the arrangement gives too much power to the White House to 
withhold information.‖61 The same article stated that family members of the victims of 9/11 
―condemned the agreement, arguing that ‗all 10 commissioners should have full, unfettered and 
unrestricted access to all evidence‘ related to the attacks. ‗As it now stands, a limited number of 
commissioners will have restricted access to a limited number of PDB documents,‘… [which] 
‗will prevent a full uncovering of the truth and is unacceptable.‘‖62 The Commission‘s quest for 
access to information, however, was not over. 
Newsweek reported that the White House was contemplating invoking ―executive 
privilege over key documents relating to the attacks in order to keep them out of the hands of 
investigators for‖ the 9/11 Commission.63 Members of the Commission were frequently denied 
access to classified information, even if they were part of the team that had assembled the 
information. For instance, according to Mark Isikoff and Mark Hosenball of Newsweek, ―former 
democratic [sic] congressman‖ Timothy Roemer was denied access ―to read transcripts of three 
days of closed hearings that had been held [in the fall of 2002] by the House and Senate 
Intelligence Committees—hearings that Roemer … had actually participated in.‖64 Isikoff and 
Hosenball further reported that before members of the Commission were allowed access to 
classified material, White House lawyers would ―review‖ the material for ―privileged‖ 
information.
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 In another peculiar move, the White House refused to allow members of the 
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Commission to review the notes they took on the PDBs they had reviewed, which prompted the 
Commission to threaten to subpoena the White House for a second time.
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 While the 
Commission did gain access to the information it sought, it was not until after a very lengthy and 
very public battle. Similar moves would be used to deny the Commission access to top Cabinet 
officials in the Bush White House, including the president himself. 
Questions arose as to whether the Commission was receiving the level of cooperation 
from government officials necessary for a full investigation. Interviews with members of the 
president‘s Cabinet, such as National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, were severely 
restricted. For example, Kitts argues that when Rice met with the Commission, the meeting was 
conducted in private; was considered ―voluntary;‖ and was classified as a ―meeting‖ instead of 
an interview; Rice was not placed under oath; there was an imposed time limit; and there was a 
limit on the number of commissioners and/or commission staff who were allowed to be present 
for the ―meeting.‖67 When the commission requested that Rice testify in public and under oath, 
the request was denied outright with the White House arguing that providing ―formal testimony 
was a matter of constitutional principle and that to do so could erode the separation of powers 
between the executive branch and Congress.‖68 However, after the public testimony of Richard 
Clarke (former counterterrorism chief in the administrations of Presidents George H. W. Bush, 
Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush), where he leveled a searing public indictment against the 
George W. Bush administration for what he claimed was its lax attention to the threat Bin Laden 
and al Qaeda posed, the White House reversed its decision and allowed Rice to testify.
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 As an 
article from The New York Times stated, the ―credibility‖ of the Bush administration and its 
handling of the terrorist threat rested on the testimony of Rice.
70
 The Commission‘s work, 
however, could not be viewed as complete without the testimony of President Bush. 
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When asked by the Commission to meet with them, President Bush at first only agreed to 
be questioned by Kean and Hamilton. After Clarke‘s riveting testimony and after it was made 
known that President Clinton had agreed to meet with the Commission, the White House 
changed its stance. The president would meet with the entire Commission if he were allowed to 
make a joint appearance with Vice President Cheney, and if the commission only took notes and 
did not record what was said during the interview. Furthermore, the Commission was required to 
put, in writing, that it would not ask for any public testimony from the president or vice 
president, and that neither the president nor the vice president would testify under oath.
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 The 
chair of the Commission, Kean, told The New York Times that the White House‘s reversal 
―seemed [like] a good compromise ‗in exchange for getting all 10 commissioners to be able to 
ask any questions they wanted to.‘‖72  
For each constraint leveled against the Commission, Kean and Hamilton engaged in a 
public fight in order to gain access to information, funding, time, and officials. As Kean and 
Hamilton note, when they met an obstacle, they would take their case to members of Congress, 
the media, the families of the victims, and to the executive branch.
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 In making their fights with 
the Bush administration public, the Commission exposed the Bush administration‘s repeated and 
continual derision for an independent investigation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Even though 
the Commission was eventually given enough funding to conduct its investigation, more time in 
which to conduct it, and access to information and key White House officials, there was still the 
sense that the Commission had, in the words of Kean and Hamilton, been ―set up to fail.‖74  
The hesitancy of the White House to convene a commission, the severe restrictions it 
leveled against the Commission, and its continued stonewalling of information had already 
inflamed suspicion among certain segments of the public. If President Bush had nothing to hide, 
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so the logic went, then why was he attempting to do everything in his power to prevent the 9/11 
Commission from conducting a thorough investigation? Such questions, taken together with the 
indeterminacy of the social and political contexts, provided conspiracy theorists ample fodder for 
their musings. Conspiracists posited that the only logical explanations for the actions and 
scandals of the Bush administration, in concert with the War on Terror and the continued 
stonewalling of the 9/11 Commission, was that the Bush administration either knew more about 
the terrorist attacks than it first let on but effectively ignored the information so that it would 
have an excuse to invade, and thus gain greater control over, the oil-rich Middle East, or that the 
Bush administration was complicit in the planning and implementation of the terrorist attacks. 
Indeed, David Ray Griffin, in his book The New Pearl Harbor, offers a twenty-four part 
argument positing that the Bush administration was complicit in the attacks.
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The official discourse the 9/11 Commission crafted in response to the exigencies of the 
terrorist attacks had to address the rhetorical situation from which it was created, including the 
constraints leveled against it during its investigation and the broader social and political climates 
into which it was thrust. The political climate included the growing alternative explanations for 
the terrorist attacks making the rounds in the public sphere. Ultimately, the Commission had to 
craft a narrative that assuaged any doubts the public had about the completeness of the 
Commission‘s investigation, accounted for the exigencies of the terrorist attacks, accounted for 
the failures of the government to protect the public, united the public against a common enemy, 
and dispelled any fears of governmental involvement, a task that had the Commission adopting 
some of the narrative and rhetorical strategies used by conspiracy theories.  
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Ghosts of Commissions Past and Hyper-Objectivity 
On July 22, 2004, nearly three full years after the terrorist attacks, the 9/11 Commission issued 
its final report ―to the president of the United States, to the United States Congress, and the 
American people;‖ the report served as the official perspective from which the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 were to be viewed.
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 The response from the press was overwhelmingly positive. Citing the 
openness and honesty of the Commission, the press concluded that the 9/11 Commission had 
conducted a fair, thorough, and open investigation into the horrors of 9/11.
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 Not only was the 
content of the report lauded, but the Commission‘s report was so celebrated that it became a 
finalist for the National Book Award in 2004, a feat no other federal commission can claim.
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Despite the celebratory atmosphere in which the 9/11 Commission Report was received, the 
Commission‘s prose attempted to accomplish far more than its stated purpose, ―to provide the 
fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.‖79 The 
9/11 Commission, haunted by the failure of past commissions to contain conspiracy theories, 
adopted a hyper-objective stance in order to keep the Commission out of the fray of the 
conspiracy theories already in existence, as well as those that would come to light, a technique 
conspiracy theorists employ to defend themselves from counter-attacks.  
 Members of the 9/11 Commission were certainly aware of the conspiracy theories 
circulating within the public sphere. Kean and Hamilton noted that the Commission received 
―emails, letters, pamphlets, articles, books, videotapes, and Web site addresses from conspiracy 
theorists‖ throughout their investigation.80 Moreover, Kean and Hamilton acknowledged that, ―In 
public forums or on call-in television and radio shows, we often confronted questions about one 
conspiracy theory or another. Before and after our public hearings, it was common for somebody 
to approach us and demand to know why we weren‘t taking questions about one theory or 
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another.‖81 These theories, according to Kean and Hamilton, ―ranged from small to large, 
rational to irrational.‖82 Explicit within this statement is the division between what Kean and 
Hamilton deemed as ―rational‖ conspiracy theories, and those that were considered ―irrational.‖ 
 Kean and Hamilton argued that the more ―irrational‖ theories were ones that questioned 
whether ―the U.S. government [had] foreknowledge of the attacks,‖ or if ―the military issue[d] a 
‗stand-down‘ order on 9/11 to allow the attacks to take place.‖ 83 Kean and Hamilton conceded 
that the 9/11 Commission ―talked … about how to deal with such theories;‖ what is particularly 
noteworthy is Kean‘s and Hamilton‘s acknowledgement that ―we established core principles for 
our inquiry in part to avoid the kinds of conspiracy theorizing that have followed in the wake of 
other inquiries.‖84 Two Commissions, in particular, were ―cautionary tales‖ on what to avoid 
when devising the 9/11 Commission Report: the Roberts Commission, which investigated the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Warren Commission, which investigated the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
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The Roberts Commission, and the conspiracy theories surrounding it, provided a 
cautionary tale about the role of partisanship in writing a report. Kean and Hamilton noted that, 
―There are still … theories that the United States or the United Kingdom had foreknowledge of 
the Pearl Harbor attack,‖ but these theories were able to flourish, stated Kean and Hamilton, 
partially because, ―Neither the Roberts Commission nor the subsequent congressional inquiry 
into Pearl Harbor in 1946 provided an authoritative account of the Japanese attack on Hawaii.‖86 
Instead, Kean and Hamilton wrote, ―the Pearl Harbor inquiries were seen as partisan—intent on 
finding individuals to blame, and not looking at the flaws across the government that had enabled 
the attack to take place.‖87 Moreover, the Roberts Commission ―looked at the attack from only 
one side: ours. The other half of the story—the Japanese intent, planning, and execution of the 
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strike—was ignored.‖88 Assigning partisan blame and failing to address Japan‘s side of the story 
inevitably led to the doubt and rumors circulating within the public about what was, and was not, 
known before the Japanese attack. 
 The 9/11 Commission, however, found its most cautionary tale from the workings of the 
Warren Commission. Kean and Hamilton wrote, ―There is of course a veritable industry around 
the question of who killed John F. Kennedy.‖89 ―For decades,‖ Kean and Hamilton stated, ―the 
Warren Commission‘s findings have been poked and prodded by conspiracy theorists, in large 
measure because the commission is not perceived as having full access to the most secretive 
material in the government.‖90 In addition to not having access to all of the available evidence, 
the Warren Commission ―convinced‖ Kean and Hamilton ―of the need to clearly reference our 
sources.‖91 The ability for conspiracy theories touting that President Kennedy was killed at the 
hands of a conspiracy rather than the lone gunman Lee Harvey Oswald to gain prominence 
occurred, in part, because the Warren Commission failed to look at all of the evidence and 
because it failed to provide the American people with easy access to the evidence. ―To avoid 
such accusations,‖ stated Kean and Hamilton, ―we had to be able to stand up in front of the 
American people and say, ‗We have asked for everything that has to do with the 9/11 story, and 
have seen everything that we asked for.‘‖92 Furthermore, Kean and Hamilton asserted that 
―[S]ecrecy is a precursor to cynicism and conspiracy theories. … We wanted to give an 
authoritative account of 9/11; we did not want to give fodder to the conspiracy theorists who 
could question why we were undertaking our investigation in secret.‖93 Taken together, Kean 
and Hamilton asserted that if the 9/11 Commission were to combat conspiracy claims, it could 
not make the mistakes of assigning partisan blame, failing to see and to clearly reference all of its 
evidence, or operating in secret. The fact that the 9/11 Commission discussed, and then 
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implemented, methods specifically designed to avoid the conspiracy theories that float in the 
wakes of commissions past, is an affirmative acknowledgement of the power of conspiracy 
theories to shape the agenda of official discourse. 
 Conspiracy theories, at least in part, were able to force the Commission into adopting a 
hyper-objective stance. The hyper-objectivity of the Commission reflects Hofstadter‘s concern 
with the pedantic nature of conspiracy discourse. Hofstadter wrote, ―The plausibility of the 
paranoid style … lies, in good measure, in this appearance of the most careful, conscientious, 
and seemingly coherent application to detail, the laborious accumulation of what can be taken as 
convincing evidence for the most fantastic conclusions.‖94 Frequently, according to Hofstadter, 
the evidence conspiracists amass is not an attempt to convince those hostile to their claims, 
rather, according to Hofstadter, such actions are defensive rather than offensive. Hofstadter 
wrote that the evidence a conspiracist procures ―protects him from having to attend to disturbing 
considerations that do not fortify his ideas. He has all of the evidence he needs; he is not a 
receiver, he is a transmitter.‖95 In essence, the 9/11 Commission crafted a hyper-objective 
narrative to defend itself against the conspiracy theories about 9/11. 
The discourse of the 9/11 Commission Report largely echoes the musings of Kean and 
Hamilton. The Commission noted, ―We have come together with unity and purpose because our 
nation demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented shock and suffering in the 
history of the United States. The nation was unprepared. How did this happen, and how can we 
avoid such tragedy again?‖96 ―We have sought,‖ stated the Commission, ―to be independent, 
impartial, thorough, and nonpartisan.‖97 To provide force for its assertions, the 9/11 Commission 
was not simply able to put together a report where a majority of the Commissioners reached their 
conclusions; it had to be unanimous. In providing a document where ―five Republicans and five 
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Democrats chosen by elected leaders from our nation‘s capital at a time of great partisan 
division‖ presented their findings ―without dissent,‖ the Commission was offering a document 
that did not speak to the right or left of the political spectrum (both of which had their own 
theories about 9/11), but was rather making an argument against politics itself.
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 Unanimity also 
necessitated that the Commission forgo blame. The Commission noted, ―Our aim has not been to 
assign individual blame. Our aim has been to provide the fullest possible account of the events 
surrounding 9/11 and to identify lessons learned.‖99 In asserting that it was providing a 
nonpartisan unanimous report that did not assign blame for the causes of the terrorist attacks, the 
Commission was applying what it learned from the problems associated with the Roberts 
Commission Report and was, as Hofstadter noted, making a defensive attempt to combat the 
conspiracy theories surrounding the terrorist attacks and to stifle dissenting opinions as to what 
really occurred on that awful day. 
The Commission could not simply rely on forgoing blame and providing the American 
people with a unanimous report; it also, if it were to avoid the mistakes made by the Warren 
Commission, had to make a case for the openness and thoroughness of its investigation. To this 
end, the Commission stated that it ―endeavored to provide the most complete account [it could] 
of the events of September 11‖ by sharing ―as much of the investigation with the American 
people‖ as possible, holding ―19 days of hearings,‖ taking ―public testimony from 160 
witnesses,‖ and maintaining a discourse project on the Web so that the audience could track the 
progress of the Commission‘s recommendations.100 What was divulged to the Commission was 
laid bare for the public to see. But the Commission also had to make a case for the thoroughness 
of its investigation. The Commission stated, ―In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more 
than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten 
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countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous 
administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate.‖101 In addition to the 
myriad documents read and the endless people interviewed, the Commission‘s report contains 
over 100 pages of endnotes, a testament, at the very least, to the ―elaborate concern with 
demonstration‖ to which Hofstadter alluded. Again, the Commission‘s adherence to openness 
and thoroughness is a defensive move to counteract any claims of conspiracy. The core 
principles of forgoing partisan blame and demonstrating the thoroughness of its investigation 
served as defensive tactics against conspiracy claims, and ultimately shaped the form of the 
Commission‘s narrative, but the Commission‘s adherence to hyper-objectivity and its need to 
defend itself against claims of conspiracy also determined the form of other arguments the 
Commission encountered within the bulk of its discourse.   
One of the most illustrative ways the Commission‘s adherence to hyper-objectivity 
determined the form of its text pertained to the War in Iraq. On the one hand, the Bush 
administration made its case for the War in Iraq by implying that Saddam Hussein and Iraq were 
involved in the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Carol Winkler noted that, while making the case against 
Iraq, the Bush administration linked the known personal ties of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Osama 
bin Laden, and Zarqawi‘s presence in Iraq, as evidence that, if the United States were to be free 
from future terrorist attacks, it would have to adopt a ―blend of defensive and preventive 
measures.‖  The Bush administration, according to Winkler, ―made the U.S. move on Iraq a 
portion of the war that began with the attacks of 9/11.‖102 In essence, the Bush administration 
linked seemingly disparate pieces of evidence into a narrative that, while not explicitly stating 
that Hussein was involved in the terrorist attacks, implied that he and Iraq were involved. A 
conspiracy narrative was constructed in order to legitimize invading Iraq.  
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On the other hand, conspiracists claimed that the Bush administration‘s penchant for the 
War in Iraq was evidence of its complicity in the terrorist attacks. The War in Iraq was the 
linchpin for conspiracists‘ claims that the Bush administration was, at the very least, using the 
terrorist attacks as an excuse to promote its hyper-agenda in the Middle East. Citing a letter 
written in 1998 to President Bill Clinton from the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), 
and signed by some of the soon-to-be top leaders within the Bush administration, conspiracists 
pointed to the central thesis of the letter, which indicated the United States needed to rid Iraq of 
its despot leader, Saddam Hussein, and implement a hyper-aggressive foreign policy in the 
Middle East. The letter implored President Clinton ―to take the necessary steps, including 
military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf … American policy cannot continue to be 
crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the U.N. Security Council.‖103  However, the 
letter stated that the American people would never support such actions unless a tragic event, 
such as Pearl Harbor, occurred. In a bit of serendipity for advocates of PNAC, the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 occurred and gave the Bush administration an excuse to invade Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The War in Iraq, coupled with the desires of PNAC, were ―proof‖ of the Bush 
administration‘s complicity in the terrorist attacks.104  
Taken together, the Commission faced a conundrum. If Saddam Hussein and Iraq were 
involved in the terrorist attacks, then it would be required to investigate such ties. But, if there 
were no ties between Iraq and 9/11, then the pretense under which the U.S. invaded Iraq would 
be invalidated. In order to avoid being drawn into the debate between the competing 
conspiracies, Kean and Hamilton asserted that they were ―the 9/11 Commission, not the Iraq War 
Commission.‖105 Regardless of the desire to stay out of the Iraq debate raging within the public, 
the Commission was forced to deal with the question of Iraq because ―the subject came up 
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repeatedly throughout our hearings and our work.‖ In essence, the cultural force of conspiracies 
involving the War in Iraq required the Commission to address the issue. In order to maintain its 
hyper-objective stance, the 9/11 Commission confirmed, at least to some degree, claims on both 
sides of the conspiracy debate without passing judgment about the information the Commission 
provided.    
The Commission gave the Bush administration purchase for its arguments for the War in 
Iraq when it acknowledged that there were ties between Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda and Iraq. 
For instance, the Commission noted that as early as 1991, ―Bin Ladin was … willing to explore 
cooperation with Iraq.‖106 While there was not much contact between Hussein and bin Laden for 
years, after bin Laden publicly announced his fatwa against the United States in 1998, in March 
of that year, ―al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence.‖107 
Furthermore, the following July ―an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with 
the Taliban and then with bin Ladin.‖108 ―Similar meetings between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin 
or his aides,‖ stated the Commission, ―may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some 
reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a 
safe haven in Iraq.‖109 The Commission further indicated that the reports it examined ―described 
friendly contacts [between Iraq and al Qaeda] and indicate some common themes to both sides‘ 
hatred of the United States.‖110 By identifying that there were ―friendly ties‖ between Bin Laden 
and Hussein, the Commission was providing support for the Bush administration‘s reasons for 
invading Iraq. In essence, the Commission was arming itself against attack from the Bush 
administration. Had the 9/11 Commission not uncovered ties between Iraq and al Qaeda, then it 
would have been susceptible to acts of retribution as evidenced by the White House‘s treatment 
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of Joseph Wilson. At the same time, however, the 9/11 Commission also gave further fuel to 
conspiracy claims. 
The Commission was careful to note, ―To date we have seen no evidence that these 
earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship. Nor have we seen 
evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out any attacks 
against the United States.‖111 In adding the caveat that there ―was no evidence‖ that Iraq and al 
Qaeda worked in concert to plan and implement 9/11, the Commission provided evidence to 
conspiracists that the Bush administration lied its way into war in order to implement its agenda 
in the Middle East. The Commission furthered such beliefs when it noted the actions and beliefs 
of the Bush administration in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks. According to the 
Commission, Richard Clarke testified that ―on the evening of September 12, President Bush told 
him and some of his staff to explore the possible Iraqi links to 9/11 … While he believed the 
details of Clarke‘s account to be incorrect, President Bush acknowledged that he might well have 
spoken to Clarke at some point, asking him about Iraq.‖112 Similarly, the Commission wrote that 
Donald Rumsfeld ―thought the U.S. response should consider a wide range of options and 
possibilities. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time—not 
only Bin Ladin.‖113 Indeed, the Commission acknowledged that several Bush administration 
officials, especially Paul Wolfowitz, argued in favor of attacking Iraq if ―there was even a 10 
percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack.‖114 By providing evidence that 
members of the Bush administration were very concerned about the possibility that Iraq was 
somehow involved in the 9/11 attacks, and that they were arguing for an immediate attack, the 
9/11 Commission provided conspiracy theorists with ―proof‖ that, at the very least, the Bush 
administration used 9/11 as an excuse to invade Iraq and implement its hyper-agenda in the 
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Middle East, or, even worse, that the Bush administration was complicit in the planning and 
implementation of the terrorist attacks. Again, the 9/11 Commission was defending itself against 
attacks from conspiracists, ones who could impugn the veracity of the Commission‘s findings for 
failing to investigate the Bush administration‘s desire to invade Iraq. 
As an independent bipartisan investigation into the terrorist attacks, it stands to reason 
that the 9/11 Commission would act as an objective observer. But, as Richard Posner wrote, the 
Commission‘s determination to have unanimity among all of the commissioners ―encourages just 
the kind of herd thinking now being blamed for that other recent intelligence failure—the belief 
that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.‖115 ―Unanimity,‖ Posner furthers, 
―deprives decision makers of a full range of alternatives … The premium placed on unanimity 
undermines the commission‘s [sic] conclusion that everybody in sight was to blame for the 
failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks.‖116 Moreover, unanimity required that the Commission cast 
blame equally on both the Bush and Clinton administrations, ―whatever the members actually 
believe.‖ Compromises may also have had to be made in order to achieve a unanimous report. In 
essence, the desire for complete unity casts the Commission into the realm of the hyper-
objective. The lack of dissenting opinions, while giving the perception of unity, was more of a 
smokescreen to hide the ―real‖ considerations the Commission would have to attend to if it were 
to allow for dissention among its ranks, and dissenting opinions would open the Commission up 
for attack from all segments of the conspiracy debate raging in the public sphere.   
In forgoing partisan blame, demonstrating the thoroughness of its investigation, and 
subscribing to hyper-objectivity, the Commission cast itself in the role of a transmitter of 
information. The Commission relayed the information and let the facts speak for themselves. In 
using defensive techniques designed to allay conspiracy charges, the Commission, in 
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Hofstadter‘s words, is protected from ―having to attend to disturbing considerations that‖ did not 
―fortify‖ the Commission‘s ―ideas.‖117 The Commission was using an element of conspiracy 
argument to protect itself from being drawn into conspiracy. The use of hyper-objectivity 
allowed the Commission to sidestep the issue of motive on the part of the Bush administration‘s 
decision to invade Iraq. In so doing, however, it leaves the question of motive, especially as it 
pertains to the War in Iraq, open. The 9/11 Commission also had to explain the failures of other 
actors within the 9/11 drama, namely those on the part of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).   
 
Hyper-Objectivity, Massive Evidence, and the Technical Sphere  
One of the more popular and troubling claims leveled by conspiracists was that a stand-down 
order was issued to NORAD on 9/11. To make their case, conspiracists cited the protocols 
existing between the FAA and NORAD, the public testimony given by FAA and NORAD 
officials, and the conflicting evidence provided by members of the Bush Cabinet and other high-
ranking officials during their public testimony as to when a shoot-down order was given, and 
even whether a shoot-down order required the coordination of the president and the Secretary of 
Defense.
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 Lending credence to conspiracists‘ arguments were the observations that the 
evidence provided by FAA and NORAD officials suggested there was ample time, based on the 
time the reports of the four hijacked flights were received, for scrambled jets to intercept the 
planes well before they crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in 
Pennsylvania.
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 Even Kean and Hamilton admitted that had ―the military had the amount of 
time they said they did … and had scrambled their jets, it was hard to figure how they failed to 
shoot down at least one of the planes.‖120 Such inconsistencies provided conspiracists with 
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―evidence‖ that not only was there prior knowledge of the 9/11 attacks, but that they were 
willfully allowed to happen.
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 For instance, Griffin argues that the evidence that ―U.S. political 
and military leaders made misleading and even false statements about their response to the 
hijackings,‖ coupled with the evidence that ―the presently accepted official account … was 
invented some days after 9/11‖ were proof that ―the attacks of 9/11 could not have succeeded 
without an order from the highest level of government to suspend normal operating procedures 
for response to hijackings.‖122  
In order to combat claims of conspiracy, while simultaneously addressing the anomalies 
among the varying accounts of what happened on 9/11, the Commission chose to use the hyper-
objectivity of technical information in concert with a massive amount of evidence to back its 
claims. Hyper-objectivity, as indicated above, is a defensive move used to protect conspiracists 
from having to consider information that does not support their contentions. Hyper-objectivity 
simply relays facts and information; there is no interpretation of the information, no explanation 
of terms, and no resolution between seemingly contradictory information. By adopting the tenets 
of hyper-objectivity and by using technical information that obscured the understanding of a lay 
public, the Commission was suggesting, according to Fenster, that ―because it happened this way 
according to this evidence, it could not have happened any other way.‖123  
Conspiracists also have a tendency, according to Earl Creps, to provide evidence for their 
claims by presenting it ―en masse.‖124 Frequently, Creps contends, conspiracists assemble a 
―huge quantity of data … simply to give the impression of ‗overwhelming‘ proof for a specific 
contention.‖125 The hyper-objectivity and massive evidence the Commission uses in explaining 
the failures of the FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate on 9/11 to prevent at least some of 
the death and destruction falls, also, into another realm where conspiratorial imaginations run 
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rampant, that of the technical sphere. According to James Darsey, technical, or scientific, 
information has long purported itself to be the ―objective‖ truth. When experts in technical fields 
fail to offer a solidified, univocal front based on carefully constructed, replicated experiments, 
and when there are competing interests using the same technical information to back their own 
interpretations of what the information means, technical information loses its presumptive 
objectivity and can be seen as the workings of a cabal of conspirators ―plotting to have their way 
with the world.‖126 One need only look at the debates over climate change to see how the role of 
―objective‖ information can be skewed to support those who support beliefs in climate change, 
vs. those who vociferously deny climate change, to see Darsey‘s point. In the same vein, 
conspiracy theorists used the conflicting testimony of FAA and NORAD officials as proof of a 
conspiracy, while the Commission was put into the position of refuting conspiracy charges using 
the same information. 
Understanding what went wrong in coordinating the United States‘ defenses on 9/11 
required careful reading of the densely technical prose used to explain the multiple procedures 
and actions of the various agents and agencies of the federal government on 9/11. For instance, 
the Commission argued, ―The protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD 
required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.‖127 The 
protocols existing between the FAA and NORAD in hijacking situations on and before 9/11 
―assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by ‗squawking‘ a 
transponder code of ‗7500.‘‖128 Once a ―hijack was confirmed, … the hijack coordinator on duty 
[was] to contact the Pentagon‘s National Military Command Center (NMCC).‖129 The hijack 
coordinator would then ask for ―a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything 
unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.‖130 From there, ―The NMCC 
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would … seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military 
assistance.‖131 Once approval was granted, the orders ―would be transmitted down NORAD‘s 
chain of command.‖132 Even with approval for military assistance, ―the protocols did not 
contemplate an intercept.‖133 Instead, the protocols ―assumed the fighter escort would be 
discreet, ‗vectored to a position five miles directly behind the hijacked aircraft,‘ where it could 
perform its mission to monitor the aircraft‘s flight path.‖134 But then the Commission 
acknowledges that, ―[b]efore 9/11, a shoot-down order had to be issued by the National 
Command Authority, consisting of the President and the Secretary of Defense.‖135  
Providing the audience with the details of the protocols between the FAA and NORAD 
required the audience to sift through an overwhelming amount of information to understand the 
prescribed procedures. Moreover, such a move also gives the impression that the Commission 
was simply laying out the ―facts‖ for the audience to consider. There is no interpretation, simply 
information; the audience is left to draw its own conclusions. For instance, the audience is left to 
determine what a discreet vectored position means. Presumably, it means that the scrambled jet 
is hidden from the aircraft it is tracking, but the technical nature of the information obfuscates 
what the protocols mean. The lack of a closed, fixed meaning is also located in the discussion 
between an interception and a shoot-down order. On the one hand, the Commission states that 
the protocols ―did not contemplate an intercept‖ of a hijacked aircraft. On the other hand, the 
Commission admits that a shoot-down order had to be given by the National Command 
Authority. While the two claims are not commensurate with one another, an interception and a 
shoot-down are not the same thing; for a lay public unschooled in the vagaries of military 
command the two claims seem to contradict one another. If the protocols did not contemplate an 
intercept, then, for an inexpert audience it might seem odd that there are protocols for a shoot-
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down. After all, shooting down an aircraft is the ultimate form of interception. Moreover, the 
audience is left to interpret whether a shoot-down order had to be agreed upon by both the 
president and the Secretary of Defense, or just one of them. The lack of a stable meaning 
ascribed to the protocols leaves the meaning behind them obscure and mysterious. 
The mystery of technical information, argues Darsey, is ―the result of the immediate 
illegibility and recondite nature of the objects of scientific inquiry, the exclusiveness of its 
methods for comprehending those objects, and the obscurity and density of the manner in which 
findings are reported.‖136 While the protocols existing between NORAD and the FAA are not 
scientific, they are technical in that full comprehension of the protocols requires that the 
audience be versed in aviation and militaristic terms and commands. As Chaїm Perleman and 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote, ―technical terms, which are supposed to be as univocal as 
possible in the context of the discipline, in fact summarize an aggregate of acquired knowledge, 
rules, and conventions. Because he is not familiar with these, the layman completely fails to 
understand these terms, as technical terms. Entry into a specialized group requires initiation.‖137 
Without possessing the necessary technical vocabulary to navigate the Commission‘s 
explanation, coupled with the Commission‘s thick description of the protocols, the audience is 
left with a baffling array of information, which it cannot wholly connect. Instead, for 
conspiracists, the Commission‘s explanation becomes a bit of legerdemain, an obfuscation of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the terrorist attacks.
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Even with the Commission‘s attempt to objectively relay the protocols between the FAA 
and NORAD, the Commission could not completely maintain its objective stance when 
explaining why the FAA failed to follow protocols on 9/11, or why NORAD officials made 
inaccurate statements during their public testimony. Instead, the Commission had to ascribe a 
138 
reason, a motive, for the failures of FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate on 9/11. As 
Darsey stated, ―The primary burden of the conspiracy theorist is to provide credible purpose as 
the preeminent element of motive. The unity of the conspiracy is grounded in the unity of 
purpose that drives it.‖139 Motive, even in the technical sphere, must, according to Darsey, be a 
purpose recognizable from and consonant with purposes we have experienced to be possible in 
everyday life.‖140 The motive has to make sense; it has to resonate with the audience in order for 
it to be believed. Generally, evil is isolated as the motive force propelling the conspiracy 
forward, whether the evil is compelled by greed or the desire for power.
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 Indeed, as has been 
noted, conspiracists argued NORAD failed to perform its duty to protect the United States 
because a stand-down order had been issued by the Bush administration. Yet, the 9/11 
Commission, if it were going to effectively dodge the conspiracy bullet of motive, had to devise 
a motive that would satisfy the public‘s desire, in Fenster‘s words, ―to make sense of the 
historical agent behind the events‖ and that would effectively combat conspiracy claims.142  
In explaining the failures of the FAA and NORAD to follow protocol on 9/11, the 
Commission offers, ―NORAD and the FAA were unprepared for the type of attacks launched 
against the United States on September 11, 2001. They struggled, under difficult circumstances, 
to improvise a homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never before 
encountered and had never trained to meet.‖143 Similarly, the Commission stated, ―The defense 
of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with preexisting training and protocols. It 
was improvised by civilians who had never handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to 
disappear, and by a military unprepared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into 
weapons of mass destruction.‖144 Ultimately, the Commission was offering that the strenuous 
situation that 9/11 posed, coupled with a lack of experience and a lack of imagination, were the 
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reasons, the motive, behind the FAA and NORAD‘s failures to follow protocol. The rather weak 
motive the Commission used to explain the failures to follow protocol was an attempt to refute 
conspiracy claims.  
In essence, the Commission was attempting to provide the simple motive of inexperience 
and human failing to explain why the FAA and NORAD failed to prevent any of the death and 
destruction on 9/11 (what conspiracists have dubiously labeled an ―incompetence‖ theory) and to 
combat beliefs that the Bush administration had issued a stand-down order. Zarefsky argues that 
when there is simple motive to explain evil, then conspiracy beliefs will not get much play 
within the public sphere.
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 To illustrate his point, Zarefsky wrote, ―It is far easier to explain the 
attack on Pearl Harbor by reference to faulty intelligence than to a conspiracy in Washington to 
drag the nation into war.‖146 Simple motives, however, are only successful if they exist in a 
relatively stable climate. In an indeterminate climate, the likelihood that the public will attend to 
a motive of evil that resolves the ambiguity existing within the public sphere is greatly 
increased.
147
   
Plagued by the failure of other commissions to avoid being drawn into conspiracy 
theories, the 9/11 Commission used the strategy of hyper-objectivity to keep its discourse from 
falling into the realm of conspiracy theories. In so doing, however, the 9/11 Commission was 
using a tactic exploited by conspiracy theorists. In setting itself up as the objective observer, 
much like a physician providing a patient with a diagnosis, the Commission could point to the 
problems associated with the defenses in place in the United States on and before 9/11 without 
having to address the troubling problems of an evil motive. Instead, the motives behind the War 
in Iraq and the improper execution of protocol between the FAA and NORAD are either left 
unexamined, or are ascribed to the simple motive of human failing. The ―facts‖ are left for the 
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audience to interpret. Failing to address the ambiguities and anomalies of the failures for the 
FAA and NORAD to effectively coordinate the defenses of the United States creates a sense of 
mystery, of obscurity, and of doubt. If the greatest military power in the world is unable to 
prevent hijacked commercial aircraft from causing death and destruction because of human 
failing, then what does that say about the country‘s preparedness in facing an attack from a 
foreign military power? The question of motive, then, becomes obscure, secret, and mysterious, a 
problem that is exacerbated with the use of technical information. The inadequacies of motive 
provided by the Commission further create an indeterminate climate where conspiracy theories 
flourish.   
If the question of secrecy or mystery hinges upon the question of motive in the technical 
sphere, then the Commission‘s failure to address motive, coupled with the use of technical 
information, further obfuscates and mystifies what actually happened on 9/11 and why. The 
audience is left with a mystery, something that has yet to be determined, has yet to be solved to 
the satisfaction of the audience. The Commission‘s lack of a full explanation leaves open the 
possibility of multiple interpretations of what transpired on 9/11, interpretations that provide 
fuller explanations, however erroneous, of what happened and why. The audience is provided 
with reasons that resonate and provide them with a creditable motive, reasons that tap into the 
fears of the public. When held in sharp relief against conspiracists‘ claims that the evil 
machinations of the Bush administration were the cause of the terrorist attacks, the 
Commission‘s objective stance, its determination to provide the unvarnished truth, fails to 
provide a satisfactory narrative fix for the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the failure of the 
Commission to refute conspiracy claims becomes, in the logic of conspiracy theory, an 
admission of guilt, an acknowledgement that there is something behind the curtain that is too 
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nefarious for the Commission to acknowledge. Even with the Commission‘s attempt to prevent 
itself from being drawn into the fray of conspiracy arguments, the Commission does attempt to 
deal with some of what it deemed ―rational‖ conspiracy theories. 
 
Argument from Absence 
Conspiracists raised questions about the relationship among the Bush, bin Laden, and Saudi 
royal families and implied that the relationship among the three families was suspicious.
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 The 
questions raised by Griffin and others posited that ―the failure to capture bin Laden may be 
connected with the close relations between the Saudi royals, the bin Laden family, and the Bush 
administration.‖149 These same questions led some to believe that the Bush administration was 
actively seeking to impede a full investigation into the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which, conspiracists 
claimed, was evidence of the government‘s duplicity.150 To add force to their claims, 
conspiracists argued that flights loaded with Saudi nationals and members of the Bin Laden 
family left the country prior to the reopening of U.S. airspace. Considering that most of the 
terrorists hailed from Saudi Arabia, and considering that members of the Bin Laden family, who 
may or may not have contact with their infamous relative, were able to allegedly leave the 
United States before U.S. airspace reopened and without being fully vetted by the intelligence 
agencies, conspiracists argued that the Saudi flights ―could have been made possible only 
through political intervention from the White House.‖151 These flights, conspiracists posed, 
served as proof of governmental complicity in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The White House, it was 
argued, was shielding Saudi Arabia from the close scrutiny that may have resulted if the public 
became aware of just how cozy the Bush administration was with state sponsors of terrorists.
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The Commission, in attempting to dispel beliefs that there was a conspiracy in place on 9/11, 
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used the conspiracy technique of argument from absence, a technique, as I noted in chapter two, 
used to shift the burden onto the conspiracy theorists and away from the Commission. 
The 9/11 Commission explicitly took on the claims of the Saudi flights when it states, 
―Three questions have arisen with respect to the departure of Saudi nationals from the United 
States in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: (1) Did any flights of Saudi nationals take place 
before national airspace was reopened on September 13, 2001? (2) Was there any political 
intervention to facilitate the departure of Saudi nationals? (3) Did the FBI screen Saudi nationals 
thoroughly before their departure?‖153 ―[W]e found no evidence,‖ stated the Commission, ―that 
any flights of Saudi nationals, domestic or international, took place before the reopening of 
national airspace on the morning of September 13, 2001.‖154 ―To the contrary,‖ stated the 
Commission, ―every flight we have identified occurred after national airspace opened.‖155 
Furthermore, the Commission iterated, ―[W]e found no evidence of political intervention. We 
found no evidence that anyone at the White House above the level of Richard Clarke participated 
in a decision on the departure of Saudi nationals. … None of the officials we interviewed 
recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from any political appointee.‖156 Even 
though, according to the Commission, ―White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card remembered 
someone telling him about the Saudi request shortly after 9/11, he said he had not talked to the 
Saudis and did not ask anyone to do anything about it.‖157 Moreover, the commission added, 
―None of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from 
any political appointee.‖158 
In using statements such as, ―we found no evidence,‖ the Commission is not only making 
an explicit appeal that no one from the Bush administration made the operational decision to 
allow the Saudi flights to leave the United States, but is also shifting the burden of proof onto 
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conspiracists in order to put them in the position of having to ―prove‖ their case. But the use of 
the absence of evidence is doing something else; it is implicitly asserting that the absence of 
evidence is proof that there was no complicity on the part of the White House. If the White 
House was not aiding Saudi flights to leave the country, then there was no complicity on the part 
of the White House. If there was no complicity, then the White House had nothing to hide about 
its relations with the Saudi royal and bin Laden families.  
In addition to the alleged problems with the Saudi flights, claims were leveled against the 
Saudi Arabian government and the Saudi royal family asserting that they had wittingly and 
unwittingly funded the operations of al Qaeda. Senator Bob Graham implied that there was a 
conspiracy to obstruct finding out the truth about possible sources of financing for al Qaeda 
operatives in the United States. Senator Graham, who co-chaired the Joint Inquiry, argued that 
the entire twenty-seven pages of the Joint Inquiry Report pertaining to the Saudi government and 
its financing of the 9/11 terrorists; was redacted from public view ―for reasons other than 
national security.‖159 It was alleged in Senator Graham‘s book, Intelligence Matters, that some of 
al Qaeda‘s funding for the terrorist attacks came from members of the Saudi government and the 
Saudi royal family. Senator Graham revealed that two of the alleged hijackers—Nawaf al Hazmi 
and Khalid al Mihdhar—were ―friendly‖ with an FBI informant while living in San Diego and 
Hazmi even rented a room from the informant.
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 Furthermore, Senator Graham implied that 
Omar al Bayoumi, a suspected Saudi spy and a well-known acquaintance of Hazmi and Mihdhar, 
seemingly funded the two terror suspects from income garnered from a ―ghost job‖ with Ercan, 
―a contractor of the Saudi government.‖161 
The Saudi government, however, was not the only Saudi entity Senator Graham 
implicated in funding Hazmi and Mihdhar. Saudi Princess Haifa al Faisal, wife of Prince Bandar 
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bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, was alleged to have funneled money to 
terrorists, albeit unknowingly. As Senator Graham explains, Princess Haifa was sending checks 
in the amounts of ―$2,000 and $3,000 a month‖ to a Saudi woman (the wife of Osama Bassnan 
and alleged friend of Bayoumi) in need of thyroid surgery. However, the checks being sent by 
Princess Haifa to Bassnan‘s wife were being signed ―over to a woman named Manal Bajadr—the 
wife of Omar al-Bayoumi.‖162 Such revelations led Senator Graham to conclude that, ―It looked 
suspiciously like another back-door way of channeling money to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar.
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 At 
the very least, Senator Graham was implying that the Saudi government and members of the 
Saudi royal family were funneling money to terrorists under the noses of the FBI. But Senator 
Graham took these observations further by stating that he believed that 9/11 was ―an avoidable 
tragedy‖ and that the White House orchestrated a ―cover-up … to protect not only the agencies 
that had failed but also America‘s relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.‖164 If 
Graham‘s assertions were true, then they could cause a serious political firestorm in Washington, 
especially considering that conspiracists had already charged that the Bush administration‘s ties 
to the bin Laden and Saudi royal families had impeded a full investigation into the terrorist 
attacks. The Commission set out to refute claims that a foreign government, especially Saudi 
Arabia, had any part in funding the 9/11 terrorists by refuting conspiracy claims with a 
conspiracy tactic. 
The Commission wrote, ―Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al 
Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or 
senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization. (This conclusion does not exclude the 
likelihood that charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al 
Qaeda.)‖165 Here the Commission is using the absence of evidence to make a fine distinction: 
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while there was likely money given by the Saudi government for charitable purposes that was 
then given to al Qaeda, the Commission is asserting that neither the Saudi government, nor any 
of its ―senior‖ officials, were aware of such financial distributions. Similarly, in refuting charges 
that Princess Haifa either knowingly, or unwittingly, helped to fund terrorist activities, the 
Commission asserts in an endnote, ―We have found no evidence that Saudi Princess Haifa al 
Faisal provided any funds to the conspiracy, either directly or indirectly.‖166 In essence, the 9/11 
Commission is using the absence of evidence to combat conspiracy claims that the Saudi 
government and the Saudi royal family were involved in any terrorist funding.  
Finally, the 9/11 Commission used the absence of evidence to refute claims that Bayoumi 
helped to finance the terrorist attacks. ―Our investigation‖ wrote the Commission, ―has found no 
credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial 
assistance. Similarly, we have seen no evidence that any foreign government—or any foreign 
government official—supplied any funding.‖167 These statements directly refute the claims that 
Bayoumi wittingly helped to fund Hazmi and Mihdhar, and that Bayoumi was a Saudi spy. By 
definition, spies are government agents. If Bayoumi was a Saudi spy, and if he was funding al 
Qaeda operatives, then it left open the possibility that the Saudi government was funding 
terrorists. The Commission, in arguing that Bayoumi was not a spy based on an absence of 
evidence, was attempting to make Senator Graham‘s conspiracy charges suspect. They were 
fighting conspiracy claims with a conspiracy tactic. It becomes the conspiracist‘s burden to prove 
that Bayoumi did finance Hazmi and Mihdhar, and that Bayoumi was a Saudi spy. As a general 
rule, it is almost impossible to prove that someone is a spy unless, of course, the government of 
the suspected spy acknowledges the person‘s agent status.  
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There are a few implications that can be garnered from the Commission‘s use of 
argument from absence. The Commission could simply be telling the unvarnished truth. 
Everything said in the Commission‘s report could simply be stating the facts as they were found; 
there was no evidence of anything untoward. The Commission could be obfuscating some of the 
information, banking on the fact that proving Bayoumi not only funded al Qaeda members, but 
that he was also a Saudi spy, would be impossible without complete access to the information. 
The Commission could simply be intentionally concealing the truth for altruistic reasons. If the 
assertions made by Senator Graham are true, then they are pretty damning evidence of the role 
Saudi Arabia played in the terrorist attacks. Considering that Saudi Arabia is one of the United 
States‘ most staunch allies in the Middle East, and considering the U.S. was already involved in 
costly and politically polarizing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, then the Commission could have 
simply been protecting American interests by not casting blame on yet another suspect. The 
Commission could have been intentionally concealing information for a more malign purpose, 
namely that the Bush administration was complicit in preventing a full investigation of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. Finally, the Commission simply may just not know.  
The use of the absence of evidence by the Commission is used as evidence that neither 
the Saudi government nor the Saudi royal family were involved in a conspiracy to finance 
terrorism. Considering that the evidence the Commission used to back its claims was redacted 
from public view, and considering that the co-chair of the Joint Inquiry is one of the key players 
in making allegations implicating the Saudi government in financing terrorism, a game of ―We 
say‖ ―They say‖ is being employed. Who ultimately will be believed will be dependent on who 
has been able to successfully force the opponent into shouldering the burden of proof. As the 
logic of conspiracy theories goes, the Commission‘s use of absence serves as ―proof‖ that there 
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was no conspiracy, but conspiracists can then take the absence to make the claim that the 
absence is actually evidence of a conspiracy. What is certain is that the use of argument of 
absence by the Commission, instead of laying the facts bare for the audience to comprehend, 
adds to the indeterminacy of what happened and why. 
With the Commission‘s use of hyper-objectivity to combat ―irrational‖ claims of 
conspiracy, and its use of argument from absence to combat the more ―rational‖ conspiracy 
theories, the Commission then turned to casting sole blame onto Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. 
In so doing, the Commission employed some of the more signature elements of Hofstadter‘s 
paranoid style. 
   
Portraying the Perfect Enemy 
Conspiracists posit that bin Laden and al Qaeda could only have been successful on 9/11 through 
the complicity of the federal government. Citing evidence that the U.S. provided material and 
financial backing of the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, in which bin Laden participated, 
conspiracists argued that bin Laden was a product, and thus a puppet, of the U.S. government. 
For instance, Matthias Broeckers, who published the book, Verschwörungen, 
Verschwörungstheorin, und die Geheimnisse des 11.9, in Germany in 2002, posited that bin 
Laden‘s ties to the CIA during the Afghani mujahedeen and the existing ties between the Bush 
and bin Laden families are evidence of governmental complicity in the 9/11 attacks.
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 While the 
9/11 Commission freely admitted that the United States funneled money through Pakistan to 
support the Afghani mujahedeen, it denied that bin Laden received any substantial U.S.-backed 
training or financial support. The Commission stated, ―Bin Ladin and his comrades had their 
own sources of support and training, and they received little or no assistance from the United 
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States.‖169 While this statement serves as an express denial that the United States was somehow 
responsible for the power and abilities of bin Laden, what is particularly interesting is the 
Commission‘s subsequent portrayal of bin Laden as the perfect enemy described by Hofstadter, 
which bolsters the Commission‘s assertion that bin Laden was not aided in any meaningful way 
by the U.S., but also implies that bin Laden‘s overriding hatred of the United States made it 
impossible for him to act in concert with his most hated enemy. In essence, the Commission 
employed one of the most signature elements of the conspiracy narrative in order to combat 
claims of a governmental conspiracy, the construction of the perfect enemy. 
―The enemy,‖ according to Hofstadter, ―is clearly delineated: he is the perfect model of 
malice, a kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-
loving.‖170 Hofstadter further notes that the enemy ―is a free, active, demonic agent.‖ The enemy 
conspiracists paint, in essence, is the personification of evil. One of the ways the Commission 
characterizes the demonic nature of bin Laden and al Qaeda is through the use of archetypal 
metaphor to explain the motive force—evil—driving bin Laden and al Qaeda.171 For instance, 
the Commission explained that bin Laden had a unique appeal in the Middle East because, while 
other Islamic extremists focused their attention on destroying Israel, bin Laden believed that 
―[t]hey had not taken on what he called ‗the head of the snake,‘‖ the United States.172 The 
Commission reiterated bin Laden‘s use of the ―head of the snake‖ metaphor by noting that after 
bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, ―He was ready to strike at ‗the head of the snake.‘‖173 
Finally, the Commission drove home the point when it stated, ―Bin Ladin and Islamist terrorists 
mean exactly what they say: to them America is the font of all evil, the ‗head of the snake,‘ and it 
must be converted or destroyed.‖174  
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The metaphoric use of the snake to depict evil is one of the most consistent and lasting 
metaphors used throughout history. Symbolically, the snake represents the seduction of evil; Eve 
was seduced by the snake to eat the forbidden apple in the Garden of Eden, which was the cause 
of humanity‘s fall from God‘s grace. In quoting bin Laden using ―the head of the snake‖ as his 
metaphoric representation of the United States, the Commission was accomplishing three goals. 
First, the Commission is highlighting the evil motive driving bin Laden and al Qaeda. Bin 
Laden‘s belief that the U.S. is evil incarnate drives his overarching desires to destroy the United 
States and all Americans. Second, because the Commission was writing to a largely American 
audience, bin Laden‘s depiction of the U.S. as the ―head of the snake‖ served to divide the 
American people and its government from the evil machinations of bin Laden and his cohorts. 
The Commission was dividing the ―innocent‖ United States from the ―evil‖ bin Laden. As 
Darsey notes, ―[c]onspiracy argument sets a secretive and malign purpose against a noble and 
true one, or at least an innocent one.‖175 While many Americans will agree that the American 
government has many faults, most would not credit that the government, or its people, as the font 
of all evil. Finally, in dividing the United States and its people from bin Laden and his belief in 
America‘s inherent evil, the Commission was, rhetorically, turning the evil back onto bin Laden. 
Bin Laden is driven by evil, thus he is evil. 
To further promote bin Laden‘s evil and demonic nature, the Commission went on to 
note that, bin Laden ―claim[ed] that America had declared war against God and his messenger, 
they called for the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, as the ‗individual duty for every 
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.‘‖176 Bin Laden, according to 
the Commission, further stated, ―‗We believe that the worst thieves in the world today and the 
worst terrorists are the Americans. Nothing could stop you except perhaps retaliation in kind. We 
150 
do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all 
targets.‘‖177 Similarly, ―Bin Ladin has stated flatly, ‗Our fight against these governments is not 
separate from our fight against you.‘‖178 In an interview with ABC in May 1998, bin Ladin, 
according to the Commission, claimed, ―It was more important for Muslims to kill Americans 
than to kill other infidels.‖179 Bin Laden believes, quoted the Commission, that ‗―It is far better 
for anyone to kill a single American soldier than to squander his efforts on other activities.‘‖180 
The Commission‘s use of the above passages is telling; all Americans, be they 
government agents, American soldiers, or civilians, are targets of bin Laden and al Qaeda. The 
most important activity for bin Laden and his minions is to kill Americans, but not just kill them, 
―murder‖ them. Using the word ―murder‖ brings up images of the cold-blooded killer, one who 
does not kill in a rage, out of jealousy, or even in self-defense, but in a cold, calculating, 
purposeful act, an act compelled by evil. The foreign enemy, who is so obviously driven by evil, 
who so obviously hates America and all Americans, would not engage in a conspiracy with its 
arch enemy, the United States government, to achieve its means. 
The Commission did not just rest its case on painting bin Laden as evil; it further offered 
that bin Laden possesses remarkable foresight and is particularly powerful and cunning. 
Conspiracists frequently construct an enemy so cunning, powerful, and resourceful that major 
historical events are attributed to the enemy‘s malice. The enemy, Hofstadter warns, ―wills, 
indeed he manufactures, the mechanism of history himself, or deflects the normal course of 
history in an evil way. He makes crises, starts runs on banks, causes depressions, manufactures 
disasters, and then enjoys and profits from the misery he has produced.‖181 ―Very often,‖ 
according to Hofstadter, ―the enemy is held to possess some especially effective source of 
power,‖ whether it be the ability to control the press, to manage news,  to obtain unlimited 
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money, or even by ―gaining a stranglehold on the educational system.‖182 The Commission‘s 
depictions of bin Laden, true to Hofstadter‘s formula, portray bin Laden as a demonic agent who 
is particularly powerful and cunning. 
Possessing an uncanny ability to predict what was needed in the future for him to lay out 
his odious plans,  bin Laden was able to recruit and train volunteers for al Qaeda by capitalizing 
on a system of resistance that was started in the midst of the Cold War and set in place to provide 
support to the Afghani mujahedeen. The Commission explained that the success of the 
mujahedeen in Afghanistan was dependent on an ―increasingly complex, almost worldwide 
organization,‖ which ―included a financial support network that came to be known as the 
‗Golden Chain.‘‖183 ―Bin Ladin,‖ according to the Commission, ―understood better than most of 
the volunteers [participating in the mujahedeen] the extent to which the continuation and 
eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan depended‖ on this network.184 The ―Golden Chain‖ 
was ―put together mainly by financiers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. Donations 
flowed through charities or other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Bin Ladin and the 
‗Afghan Arabs‘ drew largely on funds raised by this network, whose agents roamed world 
markets to buy arms and supplies for the mujahedeen, or ‗holy warriors.‘‖185  
But the importance of the ―Golden Chain‖ did not simply rely on financial support. 
―Mosques, schools, and boardinghouses‖ according to the Commission, ―served as recruiting 
stations in many parts of the world, including the United States. Some were set up by Islamic 
extremists or their financial backers. Bin Ladin had an important part in this activity. He and the 
cleric Azzam had joined in creating a ‗Bureau of Services‘ (Mektab al Khindmat, or MAK), 
which channeled recruits into Afghanistan.‖186 The Commission notes that:  
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Bin Ladin and Azzam agreed that the organization successfully created for Afghanistan 
should not be allowed to dissolve. They established what they called a base or foundation 
(al Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad … This organization‘s 
structure included as its operating arms an intelligence component, a military committee, 
a political committee, and a committee in charge of media affairs and propaganda. It also 
had an Advisory Council (Shura) made up of bin Ladin‘s inner circle.187 
As the above passages indicate, bin Laden had a preternatural sagacity in recognizing the 
importance of the ―Golden Chain,‖ not only for the success of the Afghani mujahedeen, but also 
in foreseeing how this operational network could be used to fund bin Laden‘s jihad against the 
United States. Moreover, because bin Laden was intimately involved in receiving funds from the 
―Golden Chain,‖ and because bin Laden was able to recruit members for al Qaeda from the 
mosques and boarding schools that were part of the operational system, including ones in the 
United States, bin Laden is accorded an almost mythical power. 
 The Commission‘s explanation of bin Laden‘s use of the ―Golden Chain‖ and his 
subsequent development of al Qaeda also served to promote the idea of bin Laden‘s remarkable 
organizational skills. Bin Laden‘s development of an organization that had an ―intelligence 
component, a military committee, a political committee, and a committee in charge of media 
affairs and propaganda‖ mirrors the structure and function of a mini-government. Gathering 
intelligence, exploring military options, determining political actions, and coordinating and 
supplying the media with its propaganda all serve as evidence of bin Laden‘s extraordinary 
power and speak to his ability to affect history ―in an evil way.‖ The Commission, however, did 
not simply bolster bin Laden‘s demonic image by highlighting his evil drive, his foresight, and 
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his power, it also highlighted the remarkable cunning of bin Laden and al Qaeda in being able to 
defeat the systems of protection the United States government had in place. 
 The Commission noted that, in order to be successful on 9/11, al Qaeda‘s leaders likely 
―reflected on what they needed to do in order to organize and conduct a complex international 
terrorist operation to inflict catastrophic harm.‖188 One such requirement, and one where the 
Commission‘s description bolstered the cunning of bin Laden and al Qaeda, was ―an intelligence 
effort to gather required information and form assessments of enemy strengths and 
weaknesses.‖189 For instance, the Commission noted that al Qaeda operatives used ―flight 
simulator computer games … that featured hijackings,‖ read ―flight schedules to determine 
which flights would be in the air at the same time in different parts of the world,‖ and used ―the 
game software to increase their familiarity with aircraft models and functions, and to highlight 
the gaps in cabin security.‖190 Similarly, operatives ―were told to watch the cabin doors at takeoff 
and landing, to observe whether the captain went to the lavatory during the flight, and to note 
whether the flight attendants brought food into the cockpit.‖191 In addition to casing security on 
airplanes, an al Qaeda operative tested the ―security by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit 
onto [a] flight.‖ Even though ―security officials searched his carry-on bag and even opened the 
toiletries kit, … [they] just glanced at the contents and let him pass.‖192 Furthermore, the same 
operative ―waited until most of the first-class passengers were dozing, then got up and removed 
the kit from his carry-on. None of the flight attendants took notice.‖193 
 Al Qaeda‘s intelligence also included understanding the visa requirements for the 
different countries where al Qaeda operatives were being sent. The Commission recounted that al 
Qaeda operatives ―visited travel agents to learn visa requirements for Asian countries.‖194 
Malaysia, in particular, was considered a safe place for al Qaeda operatives to pass through 
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because ―its government did not require citizens of Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states to have 
visas‖ and ―Malaysian security was reputed to be lax when it came to Islamist jihadists.‖195 
Because it was recognized that ―individuals with Saudi passports could travel much more easily 
… particularly to the United States‖ than individuals from other countries, al Qaeda operatives 
used ―Saudi passports to conceal their prior travels to and from Pakistan‖ in order to travel from 
Malaysia to the United States without raising undue concern.
196
 
 While not an exhaustive list of the means bin Laden and al Qaeda used to overcome the 
security in place to protect, not only people in the United States, but those in other countries as 
well, the above passages illustrate the sophistication, the cunning, the foresight, and the 
dedication it took in order for bin Laden and al Qaeda to unleash the terror of 9/11 on the United 
States, and, indeed, the rest of the world. In the Commission‘s own words, the enemy ―is 
sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal.‖197 In describing bin Laden as being possessed by 
an evil agenda with an overriding desire to destroy America and Americans by demonic means 
as well as having the capability and foresight of organizing al Qaeda to carry out these aims, the 
Commission put bin Laden in the role of the perfect enemy. The Commission painted a picture 
of ruthless al Qaeda operatives who were under the control of their master and served his every 
wish and whim. Such a portrayal was an effort to not only heighten the danger the United States 
faces from the enemy, but to also stress that such an enemy will try any and all means to destroy 
America and Americans. If the singular plot behind the enemy is to destroy the United States, 
then the likelihood that bin Laden would willingly enter into a conspiracy with governmental 
leaders becomes a laughable enterprise.  
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Conclusion 
 Conspiracy theories exhibited enormous control over the form and substance of the 9/11 
Commission Report. Haunted by the failure of other commissions to keep themselves from being 
drawn into the fray of conspiracy argument, and driven by the conspiracy theories already 
circulating in the public sphere, the Commission cast itself as an objective observer laying the 
facts of 9/11 bare for the audience to consider. In so doing, the Commission was allowed to 
ignore troublesome information that failed to fall within its perceived realm of consideration. 
Even when the Commission did address what it deemed to be more ―rational‖ conspiracy 
theories, the Commission employed the use of argument from absence in order to prove there 
was no conspiracy involving the U.S. or any foreign government. Instead, blame is cast upon a 
single, foreign, perpetrator driven by an evil desire to destroy the United States. The enemy, bin 
Laden, was so powerful, so cunning and resourceful, that he and his demonic agents were able to 
overcome the security in place to protect the United States because of ―inadequate policies and 
procedures‖ that failed to take into consideration the threat non-state-supported terrorists posed 
to the United States. While the narrative the Commission employs to explain the motive force 
surrounding the terrorists and their evil leader is compelling, the Commission‘s use of hyper-
objectivity to explain the anomalies surrounding the terrorist attacks is far less so and sets the 
Commission up to be drawn into conspiracy discourse for years to come. 
The strategies the Commission employed inherently serve as a forming ground for ever 
more conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories, according to Clare Birchall, are an almost 
―necessary‖ result of indeterminacy. Birchall asserted that ―conspiracy theories … are possible 
precisely because the type of interpretation or reading privileged by the mainstream press and 
traditional academic discourses will always leave a remainder, a remainder that returns to 
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destabilize the assumptions upon which the reading implicitly relies.‖198 Evidence provided to 
support claims in official discourses serves as a foundation for further speculation because 
questions left unanswered and information that is either ignored or distorted raise doubt, 
uncertainty, and speculation. As counter-narratives about an event such as 9/11 grow, Birchall 
insisted that such narratives will ultimately ―affect the general structure and meanings of that 
story and who is entitled to interpret it.‖199  
 In its use of hyper-objectivity in order to prevent itself from being drawn into the fray of 
conspiracy theories, the Commission inherently set its discourse up to fail against the more 
satisfying and closed narratives conspiracy theories offered. In providing the facts of the terrorist 
attacks, the Commission failed to address the emotional needs of the audience and left the 
audience to determine its own motives as to why the United States invaded Iraq. The audience 
also was left to determine why FAA and NORAD officials provided inaccurate evidence during 
their public testimony. Furthermore, the audience was left to wade through the Commission‘s 
highly technical and dense explanations of the failures of the military to effectively coordinate a 
defense on 9/11. Such descriptions have fueled further questions, further remainders, because the 
audience was not properly initiated into the technical language necessary to engage the 
discourse. The information thus becomes secret and mysterious and questions continue to circle 
around what the discourse means.  
  The only place in the narrative where the Commission did interpret the information, did 
provide the audience with an emotional appeal was in its assertions that bin Laden and al Qaeda 
are not done committing acts of terrorism against the U.S. ―Drawing on a long tradition of 
extreme intolerance within one stream of Islam,‖ stated the Commission, a ―stream that is 
motivated by religion and does not distinguish politics from religion‖ provides for a distorted 
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view of the world where the United States is seen as the font of all evil.
200
 ―It is not a position 
with which Americans can bargain or negotiate. With it there is no common ground—not even 
respect for life—on which to begin a dialogue. It can only be destroyed or utterly isolated.‖201 In 
these passages the Commission provided the audience with a motive, a reason to take heed of its 
advice. We are in an all-out apocalyptic battle and failure means our own destruction. In essence, 
the Commission was fomenting the same kind of apocalyptic fear that conspiracists use in the 
narratives of their texts, but it only did so in its chapter of recommendations. Other fears, fears 
that the government is incapable of protecting its people, that the government is lying to its 
people, were never addressed. 
In essence, the Commission‘s desire to not engage conspiracy theories by adopting a 
hyper-objective stance provided conspiracy theories with proof that the Commission was 
engaging in a cover-up, and when it did engage conspiracy theories, the Commission‘s use of 
absence of evidence was, to conspiracy theorists, evidence of a cover-up. All told, the 
remarkable flexibility of conspiracy theories, and their power within indeterminate climates, 
speaks to the remarkable power of conspiracy theories, in our current times, to influence the 
form and substance of official discourse. Official discourse, in other words, is put into an 
untenable position, one where it cannot hope to prevail over the more closed, fixed, and 
ultimately satisfying narrative that conspiracy theories offer because government agents can 
never completely satisfy the argumentative burdens that conspiracy theories demand.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
SUBSTANCE AND FORM:  
CONSPIRATORIAL MANIFESTATIONS IN OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
 
The world has become one big grassy knoll, 
crawling with lone gunmen  
who think they’re the Warren Commission. 
—Ken MacLeod 
 
Conspiracy theories are becoming an increasingly significant mode of interpretation for 
understanding the causes behind historical events. Scholars have pointed to the eruption of 
conspiracy beliefs that continue to grow and expand in our contemporary world as proof that the 
U.S. is becoming more paranoid and more besieged by conspiracy beliefs.
1
 The expansion of 
conspiracy beliefs among the American people is a result, posit scholars, of the loss of central 
authority and the rise of the indeterminacy of information.
2
 In the wake of revelations of actual 
conspiracies enacted by the government against its people, in the wake of revelations of 
government and corporate malfeasance, belief in conspiracy is no longer a purely paranoid 
assumption. Labeling a belief as a conspiracy theory serves as a dismissal of its premises. But the 
persistence and prominence of conspiracy theories is indicative that conspiracy theories are not 
so easily marginalized and dispelled by simply dismissing their messages and their appeal. 
At the heart of this study is the determination of how conspiracy theories shape and 
influence official discourse. It has been widely acknowledged that conspiracy theories enter into 
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a dialogue with official discourse; what has not been examined is the degree to which conspiracy 
theories influence the substance of official discourse. Conspiracy theories come into being 
almost immediately after a significant historical event occurs. From Sarah Palin‘s 
pronouncement that President Obama wanted to impose ―death panels‖ as part of the health care 
bill, to the leaking of thousands of classified military documents on the War in Afghanistan 
which indicate that ―the Taliban are stronger than at any time since 2001,‖ to beliefs that 
President Obama is a closet Muslim and that he, along with his administration, is attempting to 
impose Sharia law in the United States, conspiracy theories are the wellspring of doubt, 
uncertainty, and anxiety within the American public.
3
 When conspiracy claims become strong 
enough, when they elicit enough doubt to effectively prohibit the government from enacting 
legislation, diminish public support of overseas war efforts, or even provoke people to violently 
target places of worship because of their fears that an alien religion is trying to usurp the 
American way of life, it becomes incumbent upon officials to address the issues.
4
 The ways in 
which officials respond to fears, to anxieties, to claims of conspiracy within the public sphere are 
instrumental in perfecting the maturity of conspiracy theories.  
The examination of two blue ribbon commissions and their reports from two deeply 
moments in our contemporary era has uncovered a wealth of information about the power of 
conspiracy theories in our time. The Warren Commission Report and the 9/11 Commission 
Report, though released to the public roughly forty years apart from one another, show 
remarkable differences and remarkable similarities. 
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The Cultural Force and Power of Conspiracy Theories 
The cultural force and power of conspiracy theories lies, in a large degree, with the loss of 
central authority and the indeterminacy of information.
5
 Since 1960, and even before, a litany of 
scandals and abuses of power have discredited the normally presumptive position authority 
holds. Peter Knight observed that in the face of revealed scandals and conspiracies committed by 
the government against its own people, conspiracy theories implicating the government of 
wrongdoing are now a default assumption on the part of large contingents of the American 
public.
6
 That loss of central authority thus gives rise to the indeterminacy of information. In our 
time, when a globally significant historical event occurs, a deluge of information is immediately 
available within the public through the media, especially through the Internet. 
  Competing sources, ones vying for the authority to narrate the happenings of such events, 
quickly forward their own interpretations of what happened, who did it, and why it occurred. 
While the more fantastic, the more conspiratorial beliefs may not be immediately creditable to 
segments of the public, as more information is released, and as more conflicting evidence and 
testimony is uncovered, the public has to make a series of choices as to whom or what to believe, 
a task that, at least since the early 1960s, has been made more and more untenable.
7
 As Knight 
indicates: 
Whether we like it or not, all of us now live in a world in which there is a vast amount of 
information but none of it is ever complete: there is always one more theory to consider, 
one more expert opinion to consult, not helped by the possibility that the ultimate 
consequences of any event threaten to mushroom outwards into a chain reaction of cause 
and effect. And with so many different, and often incommensurable, sources of 
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information, there seems to be no higher authority to which we can appeal in order to get 
to the ultimate truth.
8
 
The inability to appeal to a higher authority, the inability to find a higher truth, makes any 
information that is provided suspect. Instead, the public has to sift through all of the competing 
sources in order to determine its own truth. But the continual revelation of information never 
provides the public with a stable meaning. Instead, information is constantly being changed, 
challenged, and compounded. It is not possible to have anything but indeterminacy with such 
unstable meaning, and it is almost certain that conspiracy theories will continue to grow, and to 
be believed. The continued growth of conspiracy theories, and their ability to force officials to 
attack their premises, is revelatory of the power conspiracy theories have over the form of 
official discourse. 
 
The Hierarchical Function of Official Discourse in the Conspiracy Genre 
Official discourse plays an integral role in the development of the conspiracy argument. The 
battle lines are drawn between the conspiratorial and the official as soon as conspiracy claims 
gain enough cultural force within the public sphere to prompt a response. In confronting 
conspiracy claims, official discourse takes on a double burden of proof- providing the American 
public with an argument about what happened, who did it, and why, while simultaneously having 
to argue that the government was not involved in a conspiracy plot. It is during its attempt to 
―prove‖ that there was no conspiracy that official discourse takes on some of the substantive and 
stylistic characteristics of conspiracy theories because it is in those areas of conflict that exist 
between the conspiratorial and the authoritative arguments where officials have to strive to make 
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their cases. Official discourse, in confronting claims of conspiracy, provides a necessary step in 
the conspiracy genre.  
The Warren Commission, overtly concerned with the problems that popular conspiracy 
theories could impose on the social and political stability in the country, attempted to root out 
conspiracy theories by directly confronting them. Conspiracists on the political left, prior to the 
release of the Commission‘s report, raised a series of questions they believed the Commission 
should answer to dispel the uncertainty surrounding the assassination President Kennedy, 
especially concerns about ―establishment‖ connections to Oswald. Conspiracists on the political 
right, however, believed that the assassination of President Kennedy was a result of a vast 
Communist conspiracy that had been in the works for years. What is shared by the conspiracy 
theories on both the left and right is the belief that the government was being usurped by dark 
and powerful forces, forces that would keep the Warren Commission from being able to tell the 
truth of the assassination.
9
 In confronting claims of conspiracy, the Warren Commission 
mirrored some of the substantive and stylistic hallmarks of conspiracy arguments, namely the 
strategies of argument from absence, the paradox of substance, overwhelming the audience with 
massive evidence, and internal consistency.  
Like the Warren Commission, the 9/11 Commission, too, was concerned with the cultural 
force and power conspiracy theories wielded within the public realm. Within days of the Sept. 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, conspiracists on the right argued that a vast Jewish conspiracy was the 
cause behind 9/11. It took a bit longer for the political left‘s conspiracy theories to flourish, but, 
when they did, such theories posed that the terrorist attacks were, at the very least, allowed to 
happen in order to provide an excuse to invade the Middle East and gain control over the oil-rich 
region. Unlike the Warren Commission, the 9/11 Commission largely attacked conspiracy claims 
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indirectly by adopting a hyper-objective stance that disallowed anything but unanimity in its 
conclusions. Furthermore, the Commission used massively documented technical information 
that prohibited the audience from fully engaging in the information. When the Commission did 
directly confront conspiracy theories, it used argument from absence in order to contradict 
conspiracy claims. Finally, however, the 9/11 Commission, instead of addressing the American 
public‘s fears, cast blame onto a supremely powerful foreign enemy imbued with evil. In 
essence, the 9/11 Commission was using a conspiracy argument to combat conspiracy claims. 
If we look at the salient characteristics used by both commissions in their attempts to 
combat the conspiracy tide, we see a remarkable consistency with the forms they used. Both 
asserted they were addressing the evidence from a materialist standpoint; they were simply 
laying bare the facts of the assassination and the terrorist attacks. Both resorted to the use of 
technical information that was left largely up to the audience to decipher meaning from its dense 
prose. Both forwarded massively documented arguments to the American public. And both used 
argument from absence in an attempt to disprove conspiracy claims. When compared to the 
substantive, stylistic, and situational characteristics of conspiracy arguments, there is a 
remarkable consonance between conspiracy arguments and the two commission reports. 
However, just because official discourse and conspiracy arguments have similar forms does not 
mean that both commissions participated within the conspiracy genre. Even though there is ―a 
constellation of forms,‖ to borrow from Campbell and Jamieson, what is missing from official 
discourse that exists in that of official discourse is the signature element of the conspiracy 
argument; its ―self-sealing‖ nature.   
Conspiracy theories become self-sealing because of their interaction with official 
discourse. Initial conspiracy theories, such as those from Bertrand Russell and David Ray 
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Griffin, propose a series of questions, of queries, of concerns that they feel must be answered by 
official discourse. Yet, when confronting the evidence put forth in the commissions‘ reports, 
conspiracists are able to look to the ―authoritative texts,‖ the government‘s ―truth‖ about the 
event, and are then able to interrogate the evidence for its contradictions. Any questions that go 
unanswered, any perceived distortions of the evidence, any bit of information that does not ―ring 
true‖ with conspiracists‘ understanding of an event becomes further proof that there was a 
conspiracy. In essence, official discourse provides the hierarchical function necessary for 
conspiracy theories to gain their signature self-sealing nature. Official discourse confronts the 
conspiratorial and then the conspiratorial confronts the official. In this way, both official and 
conspiratorial are reactionary modes of discourse; both are attempting to uncover the ―truth,‖ but 
the conspiratorial is dependent upon the official to arrive at its next level of meaning.  
 Official discourse plays into the hands of the conspiratorial. Any time a conspiracy theory 
is confronted by officials, conspiracists can take the result of the clash of ideas and use it as 
evidence that a conspiracy exists. Conspiracy theories, unlike their official counterparts, are not 
constrained by the conventions of their offices, the rules of evidence, and the restrictions 
imposed on them by the powers that be in telling their stories. Furthermore, because of their 
mutability, conspiracy theories are able to easily adapt to the emotional needs of their audiences. 
Official discourse does not have the luxury of mutability; it is supposed to serve as the definitive 
and final narrative of an event. Once it is completed, it is forever consigned to the annals of 
history unless a new investigation is opened. Even still, conspiracy theories are able to 
continually renew their claims because new information inevitably comes to light. As more 
documents become declassified, as more information about the secret dealings of the government 
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comes to light, conspiracy theories have the opportunity to continually assert or reassert their 
arguments while official discourse remains largely fixed and stagnant.  
Conspiracy theories‘ cultural force now allows for conspiratorial understandings of 
significant historical events to gain presumptive power in the face of tragedy. Authority is no 
longer able to set the permissive terms of argument, choosing what to argue and how to argue it. 
Instead, authority finds itself vying for authority over other modes of discourse, including the 
conspiratorial. The burden of proof falls onto the shoulders of authority to not only make its case, 
but to simultaneously prove that there was no conspiracy on the part of the government.
10
 In 
essence, authority has to come out of its fortified position and attempt to make an argument 
against conspiracy claims, what Whately said can be viewed as a feeble attack. In confronting 
conspiracy beliefs, the official discourse becomes integral in the development of the 
conspiratorial and functions within the genre of the conspiracy argument, and, in this sense, is 
doomed to fail in containing conspiracy claims. If official discourse participates within the 
conspiratorial genre, and if official discourse is incapable of prevailing over conspiracy theories 
as a result, then it is revelatory of significant implications within political life.  
 
Harnessing and Combating the Power of Conspiracy 
With more people believing in conspiracy, and being seduced by conspiracy arguments, the 
ability to have reasonable public debate is seriously diminished. Instead of entering a 
marketplace of ideas where thoughts can be reasonably argued, the public is entering a growing 
era of suspiciousness, unreasonableness, and disparity. With so many disparate voices 
resounding within the public sphere, and with conspiracy beliefs becoming more prominent, the 
ability of conspiracy beliefs to infect public and political life is at an all-time high. Everything 
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done in the name of governing, in the name of the public good, is now suspect. While labeling 
something done for the good of the public has always been suspect in the minds of some, such as 
the fluoridation of water, the regularity of the belief that works being done in the name of the 
public good is a part of a greater conspiracy to dupe the masses is now at a critical force. If 
conspiracy theories are so easily believed, and if politicians, eager to maintain, and gain, power 
in their respective parties continually attempt to harness the power of conspiracy beliefs in order 
to mobilize support, then the public may fall victim to an endless, cyclical battle where the fury 
of the fringe in political life is able to dictate the agenda of government. 
Governance, instead of being about the greatest good for the greatest number of people, 
may be doomed to the endless array of conspiracy beliefs fueled by special interests, what Jürgen 
Habermas termed ―opinion management.‖11 Habermas argues that ―systematically creating news 
events or exploiting events that attract attention‖ by focusing on ―human interest topics,‖ and by 
then dramatically presenting ―facts and calculated stereotypes,‖ allows for ―a ‗reorientation‘ of 
public opinion by the formation of new authorities or symbols which will have acceptance.‖12 
Politicians as well as others who actively promote conspiratorial understandings of the current 
social, economic, and political situations, are able to tap into the very real fears of many 
Americans in these troubled times. By grabbing onto some of the most outrageous fears, such as 
U.S. Representative Michele Bachmann‘s beliefs that we are moving to a single world currency 
where China would be able to exert significant influence, or that expanding Americorps 
programs is an attempt by the government to brainwash the nation‘s youths, conspiracy 
advocates are able to exploit the very real fears that the government is going bankrupt and will 
become subject to the wishes and whims of China, or that the government is increasingly trying 
to control the lives of the American people.
13
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Take the conspiracy theory that President Obama is not a U.S. citizen. The Obama 
campaign provided a digital copy of his birth certificate in June 2008 to quell fears about his 
authenticity as a naturally born U.S. citizen. Conspiracists were then able to respond to the 
digital copy as a fake, offering that the failure to release the original document was evidence that 
candidate Obama was not a citizen.
14
 In essence, the fears prompted a response, the response 
fueled further fears and provided conspiracists the ability to make their theories self-sealing, and 
attacks against such claims has prompted beliefs about the foreign birth of the president to rise to 
an alarming 18 percent in public opinion polling.
15
 Part of the reason for the rise in conspiracy 
beliefs about the president‘s birth certificate stemmed, at least in part, from the actions of 
politicians in their attempts to cull support for their candidacies in the 2010 midterm elections by 
tapping into the fears of the electorate. Instead of attacking vitriolic conspiracy beliefs about 
President Obama, some Republican candidates fueled further beliefs because they never 
expressly asserted their denial. Instead, candidates according to Jonathan Alter, provided ―coded 
message[s]‖ that gave people ―permission to consider‖ conspiratorial understandings about the 
president.
16
 In essence, Republican candidates tapped into the fears of those with marginal 
beliefs in order to garner support for their candidacies. 
Members of the media, politicians, and others who came out and attacked the conspiracy 
claims frequently did so in a counterproductive way. In countering conspiracists‘ charges, it is 
not enough for officials to simply provide the audience with ―facts and figures‖ and hope that 
they ―will inevitably lead … to the right conclusions.‖17 Officials, in responding to conspiracies, 
frequently relay the facts and denigrate what is being said and who is saying it. In doing so, 
however, officials are not only failing to respond to the emotional fears of the people, fears that 
are not completely unfounded, but they are also engaging in the ad hominem fallacy and thus 
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appear  condescending, arrogant, and out of touch with the people.
18
 Such responses put 
conspiracists in a defensive mode. In attacking the fears and beliefs of conspiracists, officials are 
actually adding to the prominence of conspiracy theories, largely because they are failing to 
connect on an emotional level with the audience. Forwarding an argument requires all three of 
Aristotle‘s artistic proofs: ethos, pathos, and logos. Far too frequently, officials have relied 
entirely too much on their credibility and their reasoning to set forth their positions; however, 
credibility and reasoning are no longer enough to ensure a docile public because of the loss of 
central authority.  
Capitalizing on conspiracy fears in order to promote an agenda makes contemporary 
political life fraught with problems. Every belief, every fear, every conspiracy, every mistruth 
becomes fair game if it resonates with a public and can be exploited to forward an interest. Using 
conspiracy beliefs to garner support a frightening trend. In a society where a battle is being 
fought between the conspiratorial and the official, particularly in a society where the official is 
steadily losing ground to alternative explanations for events and occurrences, what gets 
determined as true and what gets labeled as conspiratorial may largely be determined by who is 
able to mobilize the most support for their version of reality. This polyphony of authority is 
dangerous because, as Hannah Arendt argued, ―The rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it 
may indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most 
tyrannical versions.‖19 When officials use conspiracy beliefs to promote their own agendas, their 
opponents are then put into the unenviable position of having to defend themselves against such 
attacks, a quest that becomes almost impossible. Instead, the current political climate threatens to 
become one where the side who can mobilize the support of those with the most conspiratorial 
understanding of what is occurring in the political, social, and economic realms will gain power, 
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thus begetting a continuous back-and-forth struggle among segments of the disenfranchised 
looking for a way to have some modicum of control over their lives. 
 
Taking Back the Political from the Conspiratorial 
Scholars have posited that the only way to stem the belief in conspiracy is by enforcing greater 
transparency of government.
20
 While greater transparency would certainly help, it is far more 
complicated than simply laying bare the vaults of government information. The government 
would also have to abstain from conspiring against its people. The manufactured evidence to 
promote the War in Iraq; the disclosures on Wikileaks that not all is going as well as thought in 
Afghanistan and the conviction of politicians such as Representative Charlie Rangel for ethics 
abuses and former House Majority Leader Tom Delay for conspiracy to commit fraud, provide 
the public with ample reason to believe that what is transpiring within the country is a series of 
conspiracies against the people. Numerous reasons exist as to why conspiracy theories flourish, 
and not least of which are the actual conspiracies that have been enacted. The umbrella of 
secrecy under which several government agents and agencies operate only provides further fuel 
for the problem, but the root of the problem stems from the loss of central authority precipitated 
by the scandals and abuses of the government. 
Parrying the influence of conspiracy theories also requires that officials, whether 
political, academic, or other, tap into the emotions that underlie conspiracy beliefs. It is all too 
common for politicians, for academics, and for that the median to diagnose the problems of 
conspiracy thinking; yet, in doing so, these same officials hold themselves above the fray. That 
attitude perpetuates beliefs that officials are elitist, and out of touch with the real fears of 
Americans. Conspiracy theories typically start with factual information and marshal evidence 
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forward to an inevitable conclusion. All too frequently, officials miss the very real fears—the 
pathos—of the situation. Officials have to be able to connect in a more emotional way. Even 
though conspiracy fears may not be rational, they remain deeply real to the people who are 
experiencing them, and officials need to be able to understand the fears and rebut them in a way 
that resonates with the people. Leaders have to be able to rebut conspiracy claims with a 
combination of solid argumentation based on logic and reasoning, along with patience, kindness, 
and compassion. In essence, we need to be able to find common ground between the official and 
the conspiratorial. 
Unless we can find common ground, unless we are willing to unveil the secrecy of the 
government, and unless we can restore public trust, we are doomed, at least as it stands now, to 
engage in a cyclical battle of wills between the disenfranchised and the establishment, a battle in 
which members of the establishment knowingly participate.  
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